By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service
The bounds of recently decided precedent from the Michigan Supreme Court dealing with juvenile life sentences without parole were before the bench in three separate cases on Wednesday for oral arguments.
The cases included People v. Poole (MSC Docket No. 166813), People v. Taylor (MSC Docket No. 166428) and People v. Czarnecki (MSC Docket No. 166654). Each case asked the court if it should overturn the decades-old People v. Hall to allow People v. Parks – decided in 2022 – to be expanded.
Parks found that automatic life without parole sentences cannot be imposed without a sentencing judge first taking into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, or more specifically, the development of the late-adolescent brain.
The ruling was controversial as it extended the age at which a defendant could be considered fully aware of the consequences of their actions, moving it to 18 years old. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Miller held that automatic life in prison without possibility of parole sentences for those 17 and older was unconstitutional.
More specifically, Parks found that defendants who were 18 at the time of a heinous crime like murder can still be sentenced to life sentences without parole but are now entitled to the full protections that exist within individualized sentencing procedures prior to that determination. Life without parole cannot be automatic.
John Poole was convicted of first-degree murder for a crime he committed when he was 18 years old. Montario Taylor was 20 years old at the time of his offense, and Andrew Czarnecki was 19 years old.
Czarnecki asked the court to determine if Parks should be extended to 19-year-old defendants. Taylor asks the same of the court regarding 20-year-olds. Poole asks the court to determine if the Court of Appeals was correct when it ruled Parks applies retroactively to cases that have become final after the expiration for periods of review.
Each case also asks if the court should overrule Hall to allow the evolution of Parks, but several of the attorneys for the defendants said overruling Hall wasn't necessary to extend Parks.
Maya Menlo, attorney for Czarnecki, said the court should extend the line to 19-year-olds because they, like 18-year-olds, have youth as a mitigating factor.
"The very science this court relied on in Parks establishes that 19-year-old brains are equivalent to 18-year-old brains for the purposes of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation," Menlo said. "Nineteen-year-olds have the same attributes of youth that mitigate their culpability, and that makes them more amenable to rehabilitation. The science and the law this court relied on applies squarely to 19-year-olds."
Tina Olson, attorney for Taylor, said the same of 20-year-olds, citing what she called a powerful body of neuroscience that the court already recognized in Parks, with an emphasis on the ability to be rehabilitated due to the plasticity of youth.
"All of those articles were well researched, well peer-reviewed, empirically based, evidence-based articles. And indeed, even the dissent in the Parks case did not contradict that," Olson said. "That was the established neuroscience for these late adolescents. And indeed, the court referenced the cutoff of 25 years."
Olson added that the prosecution in her case stated that they needed to have individual knowledge of a person's brain in order to make these types of determinations, and because they don't, saying that youth as a mitigating factor was impossible.
But Olson said that is not how laws are made, and that the great deal of brain imaging studies that made up the basis of Parks show that a large class of 20- to 21-year-olds have brains that behave more similarly to 13- or 17-year-old brains than 22- to 25-year-old brains.
Menlo also represented Poole. Menlo said that Parks' main effect was it announced a substantive new court rule, and therefore, that rule should apply retroactively to all people who are serving mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for offenses they committed with they were 18 years old.
"Just like the rule in Miller v. Alabama, the Parks rule is substantive," Menlo said. "A certain category of people may no longer be sentenced to mandatory life without parole because of their status as late adolescents. Parks is a ban on mandatory LWOP for a group of people, just like Miller was substantive. Rules apply retroactively, and no other analysis is needed from this court."
Menlo added that if the court did need to engage in its precedential test to determine if rules established by caselaw applied retroactively, it could do so, and that test's first prong would favor retroactive application.
"The purpose of Parks was to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment on late adolescents. And given that Parks was a constitutional rule and that the punishment here is death in prison, pre-sentencing is required for Mr. Poole and others like him," Menlo said. "This court should take the opportunity to hold that where a new rule declares a punishment cruel or unusual, that new rule applies to all people serving that unconstitutional punishment."
Jon Wojtala, representing the state in Czarnecki, said that the Legislature has made the line of juveniles and non-juveniles the age of 18 years old. Once the court decided to cross that river in Parks, it accepted a different line based on science.
Wojtala said he can't dispute that science, but his goal was to indicate that in the years since Miller was decided, the state of juvenile life sentencing has "fallen into disarray."
"My request for this court is you need to either set a bright line right now and set the line," Wojtala said. "And if you're going to set it, since we've already gone past 18 years old, 21 years old is probably the next line, and it should not go above that."
Katie Jory, representing the state in Taylor, said there was a lot of discussion before the court about brain development and how a mandatory life sentence violates constitutional rights, but she wanted to focus on the constitutional rights of victims and their families.
"Mandatory lifetime imprisonment for first-degree murder is commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Michigan imposes the same punishment for other non-homicide offenses. Michigan is not an outlier in this, and the sentence furthers valid penological goals of retribution and incapacitation," Jory said. "The science regarding exactly at what age and what it means for her brain to be fully developed is still evolving and rapidly evolving, and at over 20 years old, defendant's brain was sufficiently developed to understand that a premeditated and deliberate murder was wrong.
Jory added that the Legislature has decided that the proper punishment is mandatory lifetime imprisonment, and that should be respected. Not respecting that line and extending it to 20-year-olds, Jory said, could mean some 600 defendants needing to be resentenced, and that equated to 600 victims' families who could suffer as a consequence.
"That's thousands of people across the state of Michigan who would be forced to reopen these old wounds, stop where they are in their grieving process, go in front of a court again and bear publicly their soul regarding the hurt that they have experienced based on the murder of their loved one," Jory said.
Tim Baughman, representing the people in Poole, asked the court to not take up the test for retroactivity mentioned by Menlo but to instead use another that would clarify whether retroactivity was available in Parks. By that measure, Baughman said the court should decline to do so.
In all, justices fielded questions about the science behind that decision, whether they would be encroaching on the Legislature's inherent power and duty to extend the Parks rule and if they would be going too far in their own jurisprudence if it did decide to move the goalpost again.
Justice Richard Bernstein asked Menlo about how the court should legally draw the distinction between juveniles if the science keeps changing.
Menlo said the task before the bench was admittedly difficult.
"Any line that this court draws should be guided by the relevant science, and the court did reference a number of scientific studies and articles in the Parks opinion," she said. "All of those support our position here today that 19-year-olds are included in the definition of a late adolescent."
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement doubled down on that question and expanded it to the 25 years old reference in the scientific studies that forged Parks. She asked Menlo how they should reconcile that given 25 years old is well into adulthood.
As Menlo reiterated her previous response, Clement asked pointedly why this shouldn't just be left up to the Legislature.
"The court has already said, here's the science. They've extended this to 18-year-olds. Why are you relying on the court to draw that line and say the science supports up until 25, but we're only going to extend it to under 21?" Clement asked. "Why aren't we leaving that to the Legislature to make that policy decision?"
The answer, Menlo said, was that the court was duty-bound to interpret and apply the law and the Constitution, and that's what it did in Parks. Doing so in Czarnecki and Taylor would be no different.
"The Legislature can make any law it chooses, but ultimately this court is the backstop as far as constitutionality," Menlo said. "And so, because the science applies equally here, everything that the court said in Parks when it interpreted the Michigan Constitution applies."
Clement said the struggle she was having and that the court might have is it may decide that 21 is that line but no further. Menlo said, with all due respect, that appellants may very well be back in court later to argue that 22 or 23 was the appropriate line if the court decides that Parks only applies to 19- and 20-year-olds.
Gongwer News Service
The bounds of recently decided precedent from the Michigan Supreme Court dealing with juvenile life sentences without parole were before the bench in three separate cases on Wednesday for oral arguments.
The cases included People v. Poole (MSC Docket No. 166813), People v. Taylor (MSC Docket No. 166428) and People v. Czarnecki (MSC Docket No. 166654). Each case asked the court if it should overturn the decades-old People v. Hall to allow People v. Parks – decided in 2022 – to be expanded.
Parks found that automatic life without parole sentences cannot be imposed without a sentencing judge first taking into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, or more specifically, the development of the late-adolescent brain.
The ruling was controversial as it extended the age at which a defendant could be considered fully aware of the consequences of their actions, moving it to 18 years old. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Miller held that automatic life in prison without possibility of parole sentences for those 17 and older was unconstitutional.
More specifically, Parks found that defendants who were 18 at the time of a heinous crime like murder can still be sentenced to life sentences without parole but are now entitled to the full protections that exist within individualized sentencing procedures prior to that determination. Life without parole cannot be automatic.
John Poole was convicted of first-degree murder for a crime he committed when he was 18 years old. Montario Taylor was 20 years old at the time of his offense, and Andrew Czarnecki was 19 years old.
Czarnecki asked the court to determine if Parks should be extended to 19-year-old defendants. Taylor asks the same of the court regarding 20-year-olds. Poole asks the court to determine if the Court of Appeals was correct when it ruled Parks applies retroactively to cases that have become final after the expiration for periods of review.
Each case also asks if the court should overrule Hall to allow the evolution of Parks, but several of the attorneys for the defendants said overruling Hall wasn't necessary to extend Parks.
Maya Menlo, attorney for Czarnecki, said the court should extend the line to 19-year-olds because they, like 18-year-olds, have youth as a mitigating factor.
"The very science this court relied on in Parks establishes that 19-year-old brains are equivalent to 18-year-old brains for the purposes of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation," Menlo said. "Nineteen-year-olds have the same attributes of youth that mitigate their culpability, and that makes them more amenable to rehabilitation. The science and the law this court relied on applies squarely to 19-year-olds."
Tina Olson, attorney for Taylor, said the same of 20-year-olds, citing what she called a powerful body of neuroscience that the court already recognized in Parks, with an emphasis on the ability to be rehabilitated due to the plasticity of youth.
"All of those articles were well researched, well peer-reviewed, empirically based, evidence-based articles. And indeed, even the dissent in the Parks case did not contradict that," Olson said. "That was the established neuroscience for these late adolescents. And indeed, the court referenced the cutoff of 25 years."
Olson added that the prosecution in her case stated that they needed to have individual knowledge of a person's brain in order to make these types of determinations, and because they don't, saying that youth as a mitigating factor was impossible.
But Olson said that is not how laws are made, and that the great deal of brain imaging studies that made up the basis of Parks show that a large class of 20- to 21-year-olds have brains that behave more similarly to 13- or 17-year-old brains than 22- to 25-year-old brains.
Menlo also represented Poole. Menlo said that Parks' main effect was it announced a substantive new court rule, and therefore, that rule should apply retroactively to all people who are serving mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for offenses they committed with they were 18 years old.
"Just like the rule in Miller v. Alabama, the Parks rule is substantive," Menlo said. "A certain category of people may no longer be sentenced to mandatory life without parole because of their status as late adolescents. Parks is a ban on mandatory LWOP for a group of people, just like Miller was substantive. Rules apply retroactively, and no other analysis is needed from this court."
Menlo added that if the court did need to engage in its precedential test to determine if rules established by caselaw applied retroactively, it could do so, and that test's first prong would favor retroactive application.
"The purpose of Parks was to avoid imposing an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment on late adolescents. And given that Parks was a constitutional rule and that the punishment here is death in prison, pre-sentencing is required for Mr. Poole and others like him," Menlo said. "This court should take the opportunity to hold that where a new rule declares a punishment cruel or unusual, that new rule applies to all people serving that unconstitutional punishment."
Jon Wojtala, representing the state in Czarnecki, said that the Legislature has made the line of juveniles and non-juveniles the age of 18 years old. Once the court decided to cross that river in Parks, it accepted a different line based on science.
Wojtala said he can't dispute that science, but his goal was to indicate that in the years since Miller was decided, the state of juvenile life sentencing has "fallen into disarray."
"My request for this court is you need to either set a bright line right now and set the line," Wojtala said. "And if you're going to set it, since we've already gone past 18 years old, 21 years old is probably the next line, and it should not go above that."
Katie Jory, representing the state in Taylor, said there was a lot of discussion before the court about brain development and how a mandatory life sentence violates constitutional rights, but she wanted to focus on the constitutional rights of victims and their families.
"Mandatory lifetime imprisonment for first-degree murder is commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Michigan imposes the same punishment for other non-homicide offenses. Michigan is not an outlier in this, and the sentence furthers valid penological goals of retribution and incapacitation," Jory said. "The science regarding exactly at what age and what it means for her brain to be fully developed is still evolving and rapidly evolving, and at over 20 years old, defendant's brain was sufficiently developed to understand that a premeditated and deliberate murder was wrong.
Jory added that the Legislature has decided that the proper punishment is mandatory lifetime imprisonment, and that should be respected. Not respecting that line and extending it to 20-year-olds, Jory said, could mean some 600 defendants needing to be resentenced, and that equated to 600 victims' families who could suffer as a consequence.
"That's thousands of people across the state of Michigan who would be forced to reopen these old wounds, stop where they are in their grieving process, go in front of a court again and bear publicly their soul regarding the hurt that they have experienced based on the murder of their loved one," Jory said.
Tim Baughman, representing the people in Poole, asked the court to not take up the test for retroactivity mentioned by Menlo but to instead use another that would clarify whether retroactivity was available in Parks. By that measure, Baughman said the court should decline to do so.
In all, justices fielded questions about the science behind that decision, whether they would be encroaching on the Legislature's inherent power and duty to extend the Parks rule and if they would be going too far in their own jurisprudence if it did decide to move the goalpost again.
Justice Richard Bernstein asked Menlo about how the court should legally draw the distinction between juveniles if the science keeps changing.
Menlo said the task before the bench was admittedly difficult.
"Any line that this court draws should be guided by the relevant science, and the court did reference a number of scientific studies and articles in the Parks opinion," she said. "All of those support our position here today that 19-year-olds are included in the definition of a late adolescent."
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement doubled down on that question and expanded it to the 25 years old reference in the scientific studies that forged Parks. She asked Menlo how they should reconcile that given 25 years old is well into adulthood.
As Menlo reiterated her previous response, Clement asked pointedly why this shouldn't just be left up to the Legislature.
"The court has already said, here's the science. They've extended this to 18-year-olds. Why are you relying on the court to draw that line and say the science supports up until 25, but we're only going to extend it to under 21?" Clement asked. "Why aren't we leaving that to the Legislature to make that policy decision?"
The answer, Menlo said, was that the court was duty-bound to interpret and apply the law and the Constitution, and that's what it did in Parks. Doing so in Czarnecki and Taylor would be no different.
"The Legislature can make any law it chooses, but ultimately this court is the backstop as far as constitutionality," Menlo said. "And so, because the science applies equally here, everything that the court said in Parks when it interpreted the Michigan Constitution applies."
Clement said the struggle she was having and that the court might have is it may decide that 21 is that line but no further. Menlo said, with all due respect, that appellants may very well be back in court later to argue that 22 or 23 was the appropriate line if the court decides that Parks only applies to 19- and 20-year-olds.
––––––––––––––––––––
Subscribe to the Legal News!
http://legalnews.com/Home/Subscription
Full access to public notices, articles, columns, archives, statistics, calendar and more
Day Pass Only $4.95!
One-County $80/year
Three-County & Full Pass also available
