Does a “family joyriding” doctrine require auto insurers to pay medical expenses for two drivers who drove family members’ cars — despite knowing that the owners had forbidden them to do so?
That’s a question the Michigan Supreme Court will consider when it hears oral arguments this week.
In Spectrum Health Hospitals v Farm Bureau, a car owner allowed his son’s girlfriend to use his car, but had forbidden his son to drive the car and had also warned the girlfriend not to let the son drive it.
But the son, who lacked a valid driver’s license, borrowed the car with his girlfriend’s permission and got into an accident while legally drunk, court documents show.
In Progressive Marathon Insurance v DeYoung, a man with four drunk driving convictions was specifically excluded from his wife’s auto insurance policy, and she had also forbidden him to drive her car.
Despite knowing this, according to court records, the man took his wife’s car without permission and crashed it while driving drunk.
The insurance companies in both cases argued that the injured drivers had “taken unlawfully” in violation of Michigan’s No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3113(a), which provides that “A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident ... [t]he person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully ....”
But in both cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the “taken unlawfully” provision does not apply to “family joyriding,” where a family member borrows a car without permission but without meaning to steal it.
The appeals court judges in Progressive Marathon said they were “acutely aware” that the no-fault act does not provide a family joyriding exception, but said they were constrained by prior appellate decisions that recognized the doctrine.
The Supreme Court will also hear People v Cole, in which the defendant seeks to withdraw or amend his no-contest plea to sexually abusing his five-year-old stepdaughter.
The state’s criminal code requires lifetime electronic monitoring upon release from prison for anyone over age 17 who is convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct against a victim under 13.
While the sentencing judge told the defendant about the length of his prison term, the judge did not inform him of the mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring.
The defendant argues that lifetime monitoring is a sentencing term and that he could not make a knowing and voluntary plea without that information.
In a split decision, an appeals court panel ruled in the defendant’s favor, with the majority finding that electronic monitoring is a “sentence” that the sentencing judge was required to disclose.
The dissenting judge observed that, while it would be “better practice” for a sentencing judge to inform a defendant of every action the state is required to take, “the law plainly does not require such disclosure.”
The remaining 11 cases the high court will hear include constitutional, criminal, insurance, medical malpractice, legal procedure, property taxes and tort law issues.
The court will hear oral arguments in its courtroom in Lansing today through Thursday starting at 9:30 a.m. each day.
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