By Alan Polack
Does a person have to prove a biological relationship with a decedent to establish a parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession?
In published Opinion No. 311310, In re Estate of Richard James Daniels, the Court of Appeals addressed this issue.
Jamie Leonard filed a petition in the probate court alleging that he was the decedent’s son and requesting that he be appointed personal representative in place of decedent’s biological daughter.
The court had to determine whether Leonard was an heir within the meaning of section 2114 of the Estate and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.2114(1)(b)(iii).
The court held an evidentiary hearing and accepted the following facts:
1. Leonard was born when decedent and Leonard’s mother were cohabiting;
2. Leonard’s birth certificate did not indicate who his father was;
3. Leonard testified that decedent was his father and that he believed he was decedent’s biological child;
4. Decedent’s live-in girlfriend testified that decedent introduced Leonard as his son and that Leonard referred to decedent as “dad”;
5. The biological daughter and her mother both testified that decedent raised Leonard as his son and that Leonard called decedent “dad”;
6. The biological daughter also testified that decedent never referred to Leonard as his biological child and that this fact was supported by several family members;
7. The daughter’s mother testified that decedent had told her that Leonard was not his biological child.
The probate court did not find that Leonard was the decedent’s biological child but that the elements set forth in the statute had been satisfied in terms of determining that Leonard was the natural child of decedent because the witnesses “…confirmed, unequivocally, that decedent and Mr. Leonard had mutually acknowledged the relationship of parent and child that began, indeed, from the time that Mr. Leonard was a young child right through the death of decedent.
That fact is, and has not been refuted in any way, shape or form by any of the witnesses.”
The court removed the daughter as personal representative and appointed Leonard as successor.
The daughter argued that in order to establish a parent-child relationship pursuant to MCL 700.2114(1)(b)(iii) the court first had to find that the man and the child had a biological relationship.
The court then went into an extensive analysis of the statute, in particular (b)(iii) which provides that “if a child is born out of wedlock or if a child is born or conceived during a marriage but is not the issue of that marriage, a man is considered to be the child’s natural father for purposes of intestate succession if any of the following occur: (iii) the man and child have established a mutually acknowledged relationship of parent and child that begins before the child becomes age 18 and continues until terminated by the death of either.”
The court referred to the dictionary definition of the word “consider” as meaning “to regard as or deemed to be.”
Therefore, the court concluded that “… the plain language of the statute contemplates that, in some situations, a man may not be the child’s natural father, but he will nevertheless be considered to be the child’s natural father”.
The court went on to say that the daughter was essentially requesting the court to insert the word “biological” into the statute where it does not exist.
The court then examined the other five subsections of MCL 700.2114(1)(b) which defined additional ways in which a man can be considered a child’s natural father.
For example, MCL 700.2114(1)(b)(i) provides for establishment of a parent-child relationship by completing an acknowledgment of parentage pursuant to the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, 1996 PA 305, MCL 722.1001 to 722.1013.
The court could find nothing in that act which required anyone to establish that the man completing the acknowledgment form is actually the child’s biological father.
Moving on to section (1)(b)(ii), the court noted that a man can be considered the child’s natural father if he joins with the mother in a written request for correction of certificate of birth, thereby obtaining a substituted certificate recording the child’s birth.
That section does not require an underlying finding that decedent is the child’s biological father.
In the same vein, section (1)(b)(iv) describes the procedure for an order of filiation pursuant to the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711, et seq.
The Paternity Act allows a man who is not the biological father of a child to agree to an order of filiation entered against him that would declare him the child’s father.
Again, there is no requirement that decedent be the child’s biological father.
The court then examined sections (1)(b)(v) and (vi) and came to the same conclusion.
Without further belaboring the point, the court ruled that there is nothing in any part of the statute that requires a preliminary finding that a child is the biological child of decedent before he may be considered the decedent’s child and adding such a requirement would be inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the statute.
Although the court designates this case an “issue of first impression,” EPIC is crystal clear that no biological evidence is necessary for a man to inherit from his father once the statutory elements are satisfied. It’s interesting that this issue has not come up in the 13 years since EPIC was enacted.
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Alan F. Polack specializes in elder and probate law and practices out of Shelby Township. He is a former president of the Macomb County Probate Bar Association.
