By Lee Dryden
BridgeTower Media Newswires
DETROIT — Gun restrictions in schools and the definition of a “willfully absent” spouse are among the cases that will be heard by the Michigan Supreme Court during April oral arguments.
The high court will convene to hear the cases on the sixth floor of the Hall of Justice, 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing. Arguments will begin at 9:30 a.m. April 11-12. An afternoon session will begin at about 1 p.m. April 11.
Oral arguments are broadcast live online.
The order of cases is as follows:
April 11 morning session: People v. Washington; People v. Bentz; People v. Sharpe; People v. Johnson and Scott.
April 11 afternoon session: Michigan Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Public Schools; Michigan Open Carry, Inc. v. Clio Area School District.
April 12 morning session: In re Estate of Erwin; North American Brokers v. Howell Public Schools; McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co.; Johnson v. VanderKooi.
More information about select cases is below based on case summaries provided in a Michigan Courts news release.
April 11 afternoon session
Michigan Gun Owners, Inc. v. Ann Arbor Public Schools; Michigan Open Carry, Inc. v. Clio Area School District
The Ann Arbor Public Schools and the Clio Area School District enacted policies to restrict weapons on school grounds. Plaintiffs are gun advocacy organizations and individuals licensed to carry concealed firearms who filed separate lawsuits against the defendant school districts, arguing that the state has preempted the field of firearm regulation and that the school districts cannot adopt their own stricter policies.
The school districts respond that there is no preemption because no state statute conflicts with their authority to enact regulations for the safety of their students. They acknowledge that MCL 123.1102 preempts local units of government from adopting firearm ordinances or regulations, but they argue that the statute does not apply to school districts. They also argue that the factors set forth in People v. Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314 (1977) do not support a finding of field preemption.
Plaintiffs rely on the Court of Appeals opinion in Capital Area Dist Library v. Michigan Open Carry, Inc, 298 Mich App 220 (2012) (CADL) (holding that the district library could not enact a firearms ban). They argue that state law preempts local units of government — including school districts — from regulating firearms, and that the Llewellyn factors favor a finding of field preemption.
In the Ann Arbor case, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the school district, ruling that there was no express preemption under MCL 123.1102, no legislative history supporting preemption, no single body of law or cohesive scheme regulating guns such that preemption could be implied, and that the nature of firearms regulation did not demand exclusive state regulation.
In the Clio case, the trial court denied the school district’s motion for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to plaintiffs, ruling that CADL was controlling, and that the Legislature completely occupied the field of firearms regulation.
Both cases were appealed. In separate published opinions released on the same day, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school districts. The Supreme Court has ordered separate oral arguments to be heard at the same session on plaintiffs’ applications for leave to appeal to address: (1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to address the Llewellyn factors in order to determine whether the school districts’ policies are preempted; and (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Llewellyn factors did not favor preemption.
April 12 morning session
In re Estate of Erwin
In 2012, James Erwin, Sr., died intestate, survived by his spouse, Maggie Erwin, six children from his first marriage, and four children from his marriage to Maggie. A dispute arose among potential beneficiaries of the estate whether, pursuant to the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), 700.1101 et seq., Maggie is entitled to a share of the decedent’s intestate estate as a “surviving spouse” because she had not physically lived with James for many years before his death.
According to MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i), a surviving spouse does not include an individual who was “willfully absent from the decedent spouse” for “1 year or more before the death of the deceased person.” James and Maggie were married in 1968, purchased a house as tenants by the entireties in 1973, and separated in 1976. James and Maggie did not live together again after 1976. But they did maintain a relationship as evidenced by Maggie’s petition for support for herself and their four children, James’ lawsuit in 2010 against his employer to keep Maggie covered by his health insurance plan, and James’ decision to name Maggie as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy.
The probate court held that, because James and Maggie had ongoing contact and maintained a relationship through the years, Maggie had not willfully abandoned James. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on In re Harris Estate, 151 Mich App 780 (1986), which held that MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) requires proof of an intent to abandon one’s marital rights before a widow or widower is disqualified from being a “surviving spouse.” But a subsequent panel of the Court of Appeals, In re Peterson Estate, 315 Mich App 423 (2016), disagreed with the holding in Harris.
The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the “willfully absent” provision in MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) is defined exclusively by physical separation, or whether it includes consideration of the emotional bonds and connections between spouses; and (2) whether MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) requires proof that a spouse intends to abandon his or her marital rights.
North American Brokers v. Howell Public Schools
Plaintiffs, a real estate agent and real estate broker, filed suit against defendant Howell Public Schools, alleging that they had engaged a buyer to purchase property owned by the school district but received no broker commission for the sale. The school district moved for summary disposition, arguing that the statute of frauds barred plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs responded by relying on the promise conveyed by the “broker protected” sign on the property and oral communications with defendants.
The trial court granted summary disposition to the school district on grounds that the statute of frauds barred plaintiffs’ claims. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that promissory estoppel remains an exception to the statute of frauds and remanding for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals explained that it was compelled to reach this result by binding precedent, opined that it was the wrong result, and urged the Supreme Court to grant leave to appeal to address the issue. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the school district’s application for leave to appeal to address whether promissory estoppel is an exception to the statute of frauds. MCL 566.132.
McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co.
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant Perfect Fence Company, was injured while installing a fence when he was struck in the head by a Bobcat that was being used to drive a fence post into the ground. The operator of the Bobcat was plaintiff’s nominal supervisor, who had allegedly, just a day or two earlier, been instructed by defendant’s owner not to employ the Bobcat in that manner because it was too dangerous.
After plaintiff brought this negligence suit, defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff was an employee receiving worker’s compensation benefits, and that the exclusive remedy provision of the worker’s compensation act barred the suit. The trial court agreed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that he could maintain his suit pursuant to MCL 418.171(4), which provides that statutory employers who try to circumvent the insurance requirements of the act may be held liable in tort.
The trial court also refused to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to add an intentional tort claim, because there was no evidence of any intent to injure, or to add a breach of contract claim, because the amount involved was jurisdictionally inadequate. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that plaintiff had done enough to maintain or further develop his claims under MCL 418.171(4) and the intentional tort exception to the worker’s compensation exclusive remedy.
The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the defendant’s application for leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the statutory employer provision of MCL 418.171(4) is applicable to plaintiff’s claims; and (2) if so, whether plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary disposition; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s order denying, on the basis of futility, plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add an intentional tort claim.
Johnson v. VanderKooi
Law enforcement officers in Grand Rapids, with the knowledge and approval of the city, occasionally photograph and fingerprint individuals who are questioned in public and are without identification. This practice, called “P&P,” occurs even when the individuals photographed and fingerprinted are not arrested and no evidence of criminal activity is found. The photograph/fingerprint cards are collected and maintained by the city.
Plaintiffs are two teenaged individuals who were subject to the P&P procedure, and, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, filed suit against the city and the officers who conducted the P&P. The ACLU challenged the practice on various constitutional and statutory bases.
The trial court granted summary disposition to defendants, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the city was entitled to dismissal for lack of a showing of an official municipal policy or custom violating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, issuing two separate opinions, one published. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal to address whether the police department’s actions were a policy or custom.
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