Defendant can amend pleadings in dispute

By Kelly Caplan
BridgeTower Media Newswires
 
DETROIT, MI — The Township of Indianfields might not be large — it has a population just north of 2,600 — but it’s got plenty of room to live, work and play, according to its website.
Also featured on the website? A zoning map.

In Township of Indianfields v Carpenter, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties have a “longstanding dispute” over Ernest Carpenter’s use of his property.

Now, that dispute will last a little longer.

Appellate Judges Michael J. Riordan, Douglas B. Shapiro and Amy Ronayne Krause upheld an award of summary disposition for the Township. But Carpenter will get another day in court, because the panel also vacated a Tuscola County Circuit Court’s denial of Carpenter’s motion to amend his pleadings and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court “abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to amend his answer.”

In remanding the matter, the panel emphasized that Carpenter “must comply with all procedural and substantive requirements for making such a request, such as, but not necessarily limited to, the provision of a proposed amended answer that includes his proposed affirmative defenses. We only direct that the trial court shall entertain defendant’s motion and may not deny it solely because of defendant’s failure to raise any matter earlier. We impose no other conditions upon the trial court.”

The dispute between the parties extends back to at least 2004, perhaps longer.

The Township claims Carpenter is using his property as a junkyard and storage site for junk and waste.

But Carpenter said he’s operating a farm and keeps “valuable farm equipment” and “necessary spare parts” on his property.

Also present? Collectable vintage vehicles and “some temporary waste items he intends to dispose of.”

Most recently, the Township and Carpenter settled litigation that centered around the Township’s blight and zoning ordinances.

The final judgment, from 2013, required Carpenter to, among other things, “remove all items identified as blight by the Indianfields Blight Ordinance” in stages, and allow for property inspections.

In return, Carpenter was allowed to keep one semi-trailer for farm storage purposes and one for farm hauling purposes. Any others had to be stored in a building, and licensed, insured and MDOT-certified.

In 2014, the Township sought to enforce the final judgment.

The trial court amended the 2013 final judgment according to the stipulations made by the Township and Carpenter, including exempting Carpenter’s Dodge vehicles and all farm machinery.

But in 2018, the Township commenced the instant action, alleging that Carpenter hadn’t removed the “excess” equipment, that he was in violation of a recently enacted nuisance ordinance, and that he was using his property as a junkyard in violation of the property’s agricultural zoning.

Carpenter initially had difficulty finding counsel. Eventually, he filed an answer in propria persona. He did not assert any affirmative defenses.

The trial court quickly entered a scheduling order. But shortly before the deadline to respond, Carpenter found counsel. His response, the opinion notes, “was terse.”

In a bench ruling, the trial court granted the Township’s motion largely because no defense had been put forth by Carpenter.

Carpenter then filed what he captioned as a motion for reconsideration, providing a more expanded recitation of the facts, and sought leave to amend his pleadings. Here, he set forth an extensive discussion of assorted defenses he could raise.

The trial court denied the motion because those defenses “were never pled within the answer nor raised at the Motion for Summary Disposition.”

Carpenter appealed.

While the Court of Appeals panel agreed with the Township that Carpenter’s answer to the complaint was insufficient, it found some aspects of the trial court’s ruling troubling.

The trial court relied on Charbeneau v Wayne Co Gen Hosp, 158 Mich App  (1987), which correctly suggests that a motion for reconsideration is properly denied where that motion rests “on a legal theory and facts which could have been pled or argued prior to the trial court’s original order.”

However, the panel said that courts must consider the substance of a pleading or motion rather than the label given to it by a party.

The trial court here correctly recognized that in substance Carpenter sought leave to amend his pleadings, and it was error to treat that motion as being for reconsideration.

Finally, the trial court committed another clear error of law by ruling that Carpenter was not entitled to amend his pleadings simply because he could have made his arguments earlier.

Prior rulings by the Court of Appeals have “unambiguously held that ‘a party’s failure to set forth a valid statement of an affirmative defense in its first responsive pleading does not necessarily result in waiver of the defense,’ because the party may seek leave to amend the affirmative defenses at any time, and such leave should be granted so long as the plaintiff is not thereby prejudiced.”