The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in four cases on Wednesday, May 8, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa in Lansing. This will be the final case call of the 2023-2024 court session. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, May 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
164869-77
PINEBROOK WARREN, LLC, et al., (attorney Alan Greene)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Marlinga, C.)
CITY OF WARREN, et at., (attorney Andrea Pike)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
LIVWELL MICHIGAN, LLC, et al., (attorney Robert Davis)
Intervening Defendants-Appellees.
The plaintiffs applied for but were not granted licenses for medical marijuana dispensaries in the City of Warren. They sued the City, its Medical Marihuana Review Committee, and the members of the committee, alleging due process violations and violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq. Entities that received licenses intervened. The issue with respect to the OMA was whether the Review Committee was subject to the OMA as a “public body” as defined in MCL 15.262(a). The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary disposition and denied the City’s cross-motion for summary disposition, holding that the Review Committee was a public body and violated the OMA. The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, held that the trial court erred by holding that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to the plaintiffs, vacated the trial court’s opinion and order, reversed the trial court’s decision on the motions for reconsideration, and vacated the court’s invalidation of the City Council’s initial licensing decisions. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the City of Warren’s Medical Marihuana Review Committee was a “public body” as defined by MCL 15.262(a), subject to the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq.
—————
165815
In re BATES, Minors
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Grd Traverse CC, Family Div - Whitten, J.)
Attorney for respondent-appellant, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Jennifer Rosen
Guardian Ad Litem for minor children, Laura Garneau
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition to remove the espondent-mother’s two children from her care and to terminate her parental rights due to her substance abuse and mental health issues and her inability to care for her children’s health care needs. The children are in the custody of their father, who is divorced from the respondent and is not a party to these legal proceedings. One of the children has been diagnosed with type 1 diabetes and had to be hospitalized while in the respondent’s care. The respondent pled guilty to third-degree child abuse and served time in jail due to her failure to provide the child with proper medical assistance. Following a termination hearing, the trial court found that there were statutory grounds to terminate the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3) (c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). Although the children were placed with their father, the trial court concluded that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the respondent challenged whether there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, challenging the trial court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. The respondent filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether, when a child is in the care of a relative, the trial court is required to consider and eliminate available alternative remedies short of termination as a matter of: (1) constitutional due process, see generally Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 (1997) (The government may not infringe on fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); or (2) statute, see MCL 712A.19b(5); and (3) whether the trial court erred in this case. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of the Court to schedule this case for argument at the May 2024 session, to be argued the same day as In re D N Dailey, Minor (Docket No. 165889).
—————
165889
In re D.N. DAILEY, Minor
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC, Family Div - Szymanski, F.)
Attorney for respondent-appellant, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Jennifer Rosen
Guardian Ad Litem for minor child, Joseph Stewart
In April 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over the respondents’ minor child. The child was placed in the care of his maternal grandmother, where he has remained throughout the case. The respondents entered pleas of admission in which they admitted that the child was born with drugs in his system, that they continued to abuse heroin, and that their continued drug use impaired their ability to care for the child. The trial court accepted the pleas and found statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction over the child. During a subsequent dispositional hearing, the respondents were ordered to comply with a treatment plan designed to address their substance abuse issues and improve their parenting skills. In November 2019, the permanency plan was changed from reunification to adoption. In January 2020, DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of the respondents’ parental rights. Both respondents entered pleas of admission and stipulated that statutory grounds existed to support termination of their parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The trial court accepted the pleas and found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the respondents’ parental rights. Following a best-interests hearing in March and July 2022, the trial court found that termination of the respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The respondent-father (but not the respondent-mother) filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by upholding termination as in the child’s best interests despite his close bond with the child and the child’s placement with a relative. According to the respondent-father, the trial court should have at least ordered a guardianship and erred by failing to determine whether termination of his parental rights was the best available option. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether, when a child is in the care of a relative, the trial court is required to consider and eliminate available alternative remedies short of termination as a matter of: (1) constitutional due process, see generally Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 (1997) (The government may not infringe on fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); or (2) statute, see MCL 712A.19b(5); and (3) whether the trial court erred in this case. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of the Court to schedule this case for argument at the May 2024 session, to be argued the same day as In re Bates, Minors (Docket No. 165815).
—————
165577
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Jeffrey Gerish)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tuscola CC - Gierhart, A.)
JOHN MICHAEL PENA and KRYSTLE SEWELL, (attorney Stanley Feldman)
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BRITTNEY GIDDINGS,
Defendant.
On August 5, 2020, Brittney Giddings rear-ended another vehicle, propelling it into oncoming traffic, where it collided with a motorcycle operated by John Michael Pena and occupied by Krystle Sewell. Pena and Sewell sought personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act from Progressive Marathon Insurance Company, which insured Giddings’ vehicle pursuant to a six-month insurance policy that became effective on March 11, 2020, and expired on September 11, 2020. In addition to providing for unlimited PIP benefits, the policy provided bodily injury liability coverage limited to $20,000 for any one person and $40,000 for any one accident. Pena and Sewell filed a negligence action against Giddings, seeking damages for bodily injury. Progressive filed a separate lawsuit against Pena, Sewell, and Giddings, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to provide liability coverage for any amount above the $20,000/$40,000 bodily injury limits stated in the insurance policy. Pena and Sewell argued that the bodily injury liability limits were $250,000/$500,000 pursuant to the amendment of MCL 500.3009, which raised the minimum bodily injury liability limits in automobile policies, effective after July 1, 2020. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Pena and Sewell, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, holding that the legislative reforms regarding tort liability under the no-fault act impact only policies issued or renewed after July 1, 2020. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether automobile policies delivered or issued for delivery prior to July 2, 2020, that insure against loss “resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,” are subject to heightened liability coverage limits effective after July 1, 2020. See MCL 500.3009(1)(a), (b).
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, May 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
164869-77
PINEBROOK WARREN, LLC, et al., (attorney Alan Greene)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Marlinga, C.)
CITY OF WARREN, et at., (attorney Andrea Pike)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
LIVWELL MICHIGAN, LLC, et al., (attorney Robert Davis)
Intervening Defendants-Appellees.
The plaintiffs applied for but were not granted licenses for medical marijuana dispensaries in the City of Warren. They sued the City, its Medical Marihuana Review Committee, and the members of the committee, alleging due process violations and violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq. Entities that received licenses intervened. The issue with respect to the OMA was whether the Review Committee was subject to the OMA as a “public body” as defined in MCL 15.262(a). The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary disposition and denied the City’s cross-motion for summary disposition, holding that the Review Committee was a public body and violated the OMA. The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, held that the trial court erred by holding that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to the plaintiffs, vacated the trial court’s opinion and order, reversed the trial court’s decision on the motions for reconsideration, and vacated the court’s invalidation of the City Council’s initial licensing decisions. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the City of Warren’s Medical Marihuana Review Committee was a “public body” as defined by MCL 15.262(a), subject to the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq.
—————
165815
In re BATES, Minors
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Grd Traverse CC, Family Div - Whitten, J.)
Attorney for respondent-appellant, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Jennifer Rosen
Guardian Ad Litem for minor children, Laura Garneau
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition to remove the espondent-mother’s two children from her care and to terminate her parental rights due to her substance abuse and mental health issues and her inability to care for her children’s health care needs. The children are in the custody of their father, who is divorced from the respondent and is not a party to these legal proceedings. One of the children has been diagnosed with type 1 diabetes and had to be hospitalized while in the respondent’s care. The respondent pled guilty to third-degree child abuse and served time in jail due to her failure to provide the child with proper medical assistance. Following a termination hearing, the trial court found that there were statutory grounds to terminate the respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3) (c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). Although the children were placed with their father, the trial court concluded that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the respondent challenged whether there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, challenging the trial court’s determination that termination was in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. The respondent filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether, when a child is in the care of a relative, the trial court is required to consider and eliminate available alternative remedies short of termination as a matter of: (1) constitutional due process, see generally Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 (1997) (The government may not infringe on fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); or (2) statute, see MCL 712A.19b(5); and (3) whether the trial court erred in this case. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of the Court to schedule this case for argument at the May 2024 session, to be argued the same day as In re D N Dailey, Minor (Docket No. 165889).
—————
165889
In re D.N. DAILEY, Minor
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC, Family Div - Szymanski, F.)
Attorney for respondent-appellant, Vivek Sankaran
Attorney for petitioner-appellee, Jennifer Rosen
Guardian Ad Litem for minor child, Joseph Stewart
In April 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition requesting that the trial court assume jurisdiction over the respondents’ minor child. The child was placed in the care of his maternal grandmother, where he has remained throughout the case. The respondents entered pleas of admission in which they admitted that the child was born with drugs in his system, that they continued to abuse heroin, and that their continued drug use impaired their ability to care for the child. The trial court accepted the pleas and found statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction over the child. During a subsequent dispositional hearing, the respondents were ordered to comply with a treatment plan designed to address their substance abuse issues and improve their parenting skills. In November 2019, the permanency plan was changed from reunification to adoption. In January 2020, DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of the respondents’ parental rights. Both respondents entered pleas of admission and stipulated that statutory grounds existed to support termination of their parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The trial court accepted the pleas and found clear and convincing evidence to terminate the respondents’ parental rights. Following a best-interests hearing in March and July 2022, the trial court found that termination of the respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The respondent-father (but not the respondent-mother) filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred by upholding termination as in the child’s best interests despite his close bond with the child and the child’s placement with a relative. According to the respondent-father, the trial court should have at least ordered a guardianship and erred by failing to determine whether termination of his parental rights was the best available option. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether, when a child is in the care of a relative, the trial court is required to consider and eliminate available alternative remedies short of termination as a matter of: (1) constitutional due process, see generally Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 721 (1997) (The government may not infringe on fundamental liberty interests “unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); or (2) statute, see MCL 712A.19b(5); and (3) whether the trial court erred in this case. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of the Court to schedule this case for argument at the May 2024 session, to be argued the same day as In re Bates, Minors (Docket No. 165815).
—————
165577
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Jeffrey Gerish)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tuscola CC - Gierhart, A.)
JOHN MICHAEL PENA and KRYSTLE SEWELL, (attorney Stanley Feldman)
Defendants-Appellants,
and
BRITTNEY GIDDINGS,
Defendant.
On August 5, 2020, Brittney Giddings rear-ended another vehicle, propelling it into oncoming traffic, where it collided with a motorcycle operated by John Michael Pena and occupied by Krystle Sewell. Pena and Sewell sought personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act from Progressive Marathon Insurance Company, which insured Giddings’ vehicle pursuant to a six-month insurance policy that became effective on March 11, 2020, and expired on September 11, 2020. In addition to providing for unlimited PIP benefits, the policy provided bodily injury liability coverage limited to $20,000 for any one person and $40,000 for any one accident. Pena and Sewell filed a negligence action against Giddings, seeking damages for bodily injury. Progressive filed a separate lawsuit against Pena, Sewell, and Giddings, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to provide liability coverage for any amount above the $20,000/$40,000 bodily injury limits stated in the insurance policy. Pena and Sewell argued that the bodily injury liability limits were $250,000/$500,000 pursuant to the amendment of MCL 500.3009, which raised the minimum bodily injury liability limits in automobile policies, effective after July 1, 2020. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of Pena and Sewell, but the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion, holding that the legislative reforms regarding tort liability under the no-fault act impact only policies issued or renewed after July 1, 2020. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether automobile policies delivered or issued for delivery prior to July 2, 2020, that insure against loss “resulting from liability imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,” are subject to heightened liability coverage limits effective after July 1, 2020. See MCL 500.3009(1)(a), (b).
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