MSC: OSHA, MiOSHA do not preempt public policy in discharge lawsuits

By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service

State and federal occupational safety statutes inadequately create exclusive remedies in preemptive lawsuits where a person alleged termination in violation of public policy because they fail to provide employees with sufficient redress, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Monday.

In a 4-3 decision with an opinion written by Justice Kyra Harris Bolden, the court’s majority in Stegall v. Resource Technology Corporation (MSC Docket No. 165450) that both the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act were inadequate to address the relief requested, and because those statutes had a cumulative effect, the plaintiff’s public policy claim was not preempted.

The Court of Appeals judgment in Stegall was reversed, and the case was remanded to the Oakland Circuit Court to consider whether there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the plaintiff’s claim that was discharged in violation of public policy.

Bolden was joined by her liberal majority counterparts Justice Richard Bernstein, Justice Megan Cavanagh and Justice Elizabeth Welch.

Justice Brian Zahra wrote a dissenting opinion, saying he would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. Zahra was joined by Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement and Justice David Viviano.

The case involved a whistleblower’s complaint over asbestos when the plaintiff was working for FCA US, a subsidiary of Stellantis, through a temp agency. The plaintiff alleged retaliatory termination under the Whistleblower’s Protection Act.

Stegall has been kicked back and forth between the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court several times.

The high court had, in the most recent round, been asked to determine whether a public policy claim for retaliation based upon a statute that had an antiretaliation provision still existed under case law given the effects of a related high-court decision; and whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the plaintiff’s public policy claim was preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act; or whether the claim was not preempted because the remedy provided by the statutes is inadequate.

Bolden wrote that, generally, a cause of action based on a discharge in violation of public policy is “predicated on a failure or refusal to violate a law or on the exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.”

“Such a claim may be asserted despite the applicability of a statute that has an antiretaliation provision only where the remedies in the subject statute are cumulative and not exclusive,” Bolden wrote. “Here, the remedies provided under OSHA and MiOSHA are inadequate to constitute exclusive remedies that preempt public policy claims because they fail to provide employees with sufficient redress. Given that the remedies under OSHA and MiOSHA are therefore cumulative, the plaintiff’s public-policy cause of action is not preempted.”

Bolden wrote that the high court would leave it to the trial court in the first instance to issue a ruling on the fact issue regarding his termination and if it violated public policy.

Zahra’s dissent said the majority erred on two fronts: by holding that the antiretaliation provisions of OSHA and MiOSHA fail to preempt the plaintiff’s claims, and because it held the plaintiff was not an at-will employee who could be fired for any reason not prohibited by law.

“In Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc, this court clearly held that a public-policy claim is sustainable ‘only where there also is not an applicable statutory prohibition against discharge in retaliation for the conduct at issue,”’ Zahra wrote to the first point. “Because both OSHA and MiOSHA contain statutory prohibitions against discharging an employee in retaliation for the employee alerting the state or federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration of a potentially hazardous worksite, the plaintiff’s public-policy claim is plainly preempted.”

To the second point, Zahra wrote that Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. established a general rule that employees working under an at-will employment contract may be fired for any reason, with three limited and narrow exceptions.

“The plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether he falls under any of the three exceptions,” Zahra wrote. “Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff’s public-policy claim even if that claim is not preempted by state and federal law.”


––––––––––––––––––––
Subscribe to the Legal News!
http://legalnews.com/Home/Subscription
Full access to public notices, articles, columns, archives, statistics, calendar and more
Day Pass Only $4.95!
One-County $80/year
Three-County & Full Pass also available