MSC: Can cars be seized in drug busts? Only if they transport the wares

By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service

The Wayne County Sheriff’s Office unlawfully confiscated a defendant’s Saturn Ion – which prosecutors said was involved in a drug transaction – through civil forfeiture because it was not used to transport the drugs in question, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Monday.

In a 6-1 decision with an opinion written by Justice Richard Bernstein, the majority In re Forfeiture Of 2006 Saturn Ion (MSC Docket No. 164360) held that forfeiture of the vehicle was outside the scope Michigan’s Controlled Substances Act. The holding reversed the opinion of a split Court of Appeals panel and reinstated the Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition to the owner of the vehicle.

Bernstein was joined by Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, Justice Brian Zahra, Justice Megan Cavanagh, Justice Elizabeth Welch and Justice Kyra Harris Bolden.

Justice David Viviano wrote a dissenting opinion and would have held that the vehicle was subject to forfeiture.

The case dealt with a defendant pulled over after a police officer saw her purchase drugs at a house being surveilled in Detroit. Her vehicle was seized in the state-initiated forfeiture proceedings.

The trial court granted summary disposition for the defendant and denied the state’s motion for reconsideration, a stay and ex parte relief from judgment. It also ordered the release of her vehicle.

A Court of Appeals panel reversed the trial court in a 2-1 decision. The high court was asked to determine whether there was an issue of material fact regarding the state’s claim that the vehicle was used to transport controlled substances.

Bernstein wrote that the provision cited by law enforcement to seize the Saturn Ion required it to have been used or intended to be used for the transportation of the drugs in question, and for the purposes of their sale and receipt. The facts of the case showed that the vehicle was not used to do so and fell outside the statute’s scope.

Viviano’s dissent said that he questioned whether the majority’s narrow interpretation of the word “receipt” in the act was correct.

“Although it is not a model of clarity, I believe that Subsection (1)(d) can reasonably be interpreted more broadly as subjecting the plaintiff’s vehicle to forfeiture under the facts of this case,” Viviano wrote. “I would not resolve the difficult interpretive issues presented under Subsection (1)(d), however, because claim­ant’s vehicle was clearly subject to forfeiture under MCL 333.7521(1)(f). As a result, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on other grounds.”


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