The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in 12 cases on Wednesday, December 6, and Thursday, December 7, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa in Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, December 6, 2023
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
164360
In re FORFEITURE OF 2006 SATURN ION.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Joseph Shopp)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Allen, D)
2006 SATURN ION,
Defendant,
and
STEPHANIE WILSON, (attorney Kirby West)
Claimant-Appellant.
According to Sergeant Chivas Rivers of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, he pulled the claimant over after he saw her passenger purchase drugs at a house that he was surveilling in Detroit. The claimant’s 2006 Saturn Ion was seized and the plaintiff initiated forfeiture proceedings. The trial court granted the claimant’s motion for summary disposition. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, motion to stay, and ex parte motion for relief from judgment, and it directed the plaintiff to release the claimant’s vehicle immediately. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the claimant’s 2006 Saturn Ion was, on June 24, 2019, “used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of [a controlled substance].” MCL 333.7521(1)(d) (emphasis added).
164598
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Michael Rola)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Otsego CC - Hunter, C.)
STEPHEN MATTHEW BUTKA, (attorney Alona Sharon)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2006, the defendant pled no contest to third-degree child abuse involving his stepdaughters and was sentenced to nine months in jail and two years of probation. After successfully completing probation, the defendant sought to set aside his conviction, but the trial court denied his applications in 2013 and 2019. The defendant filed another application to set aside his conviction in 2021 and the victims opposed the application. MCL 780.621d gives trial courts the discretion to grant an application to set aside a conviction if warranted by “the circumstances and behavior of an applicant” and if it is “consistent with the public welfare.” The trial court denied the defendant’s application in 2021, explaining that it would not be consistent with the public welfare to set aside the defendant’s conviction based on the victims’ statements in opposition to the expungement. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly defined “public welfare” under former MCL 780.621(14), 2016 PA 336; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that it was not “consistent with the public welfare” to set aside the defendant’s conviction based solely on victim statements in opposition to the expungement.
164652
In re Guardianship of ANNA-MARIE
MARGARET BAZAKIS.
CHRISTY BOMBA, Coguardian of ANNA-MARIE MARGARET BAZAKIS, a legally protected person, (attorney Curtis Warner)
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Saginaw PC - McGraw, P.)
ANDREW BAZAKIS, Coguardian of ANNA-MARIE MARGARET BAZAKIS, and ANNA-MARIE MARGARET BAZAKIS, (attorney Phoebe Moore)
Appellees.
Christy Bomba and Andrew Bazakis are the divorced parents and coguardians of their developmentally disabled adult daughter, AM. After Bomba successfully applied for Social Security Disability benefits for AM, and was made AM’s representative payee, Bazakis petitioned the probate court to obtain information from Bomba about AM’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. The probate court entered an order requiring that the Social Security Administration be informed of the parties’ coguardianship status and that AM’s SSI benefits be split equally between Bomba and Bazakis. Bazakis subsequently filed a motion to compel Bomba’s compliance with the order. The probate court ordered Bomba to create a new bank account for AM and provide Bazakis with access, and to make all of AM’s bank accounts joint with both Bomba and Bazakis. The court also ordered Bomba to provide Bazakis with 50% of AM’s monthly SSI benefits. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the probate court regarding the allocation of AM’s SSI benefits. The court held that the Social Security Act preempts the probate court’s jurisdiction to require Bomba to pay half of AM’s monthly SSI benefits to Bazakis. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the probate court’s order requires Bomba to place AM’s social security benefits into a joint account held by both Bomba and Bazakis; and (2) if so, whether such order is prohibited by principles of federal preemption. See Foster v Foster, 505 Mich 151 (2020).
165146
JOHN STUTH, (attorney Steven Hicks)
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Washtenaw CC - Connors, T.)
HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Daniel Saylor)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
Appellee.
The plaintiff motorcyclist was injured when he veered off the road. He claims he took evasive action to avoid a van that had crossed the first yellow line of a double yellow line. He sought personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from his no-fault insurer, Home-Owners Insurance Company, on the basis that his injuries arose out of the operation of a motor vehicle (i.e., the van). Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits because the van caused his injuries. The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court, concluding that there was not a sufficient causal connection between the van’s actions and the plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle under MCL 500.3105(1), including whether there was a sufficient causal connection between the van that the plaintiff encountered and his injuries to entitle him to personal protection insurance benefits.
Wednesday, December 6, 2023
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
164195 & 164227
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Brent Morton)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tuscola CC - Borchard, F.)
ANTHONY RAY HULL, (attorney Alona Sharon)
Defendant-Appellant.
—————
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Brent Morton)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tuscola CC - Borchard, F.)
BRANDI MARIE HULL, (attorney Michael Waldo)
Defendant-Appellant.
A police officer went to the home of Brandi and Anthony Hull (defendants) with the understanding that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Ms. Hull. The officer incorrectly thought the warrant was for loud exhaust and told that to Ms. Hull. The defendants questioned the validity of the warrant because they knew Ms. Hull had not been ticketed for loud exhaust. The defendants went inside their home, shutting the door on the officer. From inside the home, Mr. Hull called 911 and asked for more police to come to the home. The police officer went to the police car and separately asked for backup. More police arrived on scene and the defendants came outside of their home. The police explained that the warrant was actually for Ms. Hull’s failure to appear for a hearing for driving with a suspended license. The defendants and the police argued further about the warrant. Following a jury trial, the defendants were each convicted of resisting and obstructing a police officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether a person has a right to resist arrest where an arresting officer’s actions cause the person to reasonably believe the arrest is unlawful, Drennan v People, 10 Mich 169, 177 (1862); and (2) whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the defendants resisted, obstructed, or opposed a police officer, People v Vasquez, 465 Mich 83 (2001). In addition, the parties in Mr. Hull’s case shall address whether a person may aid another in resisting an unlawful arrest, and the parties in Ms. Hull’s case shall address whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed that a person has a right to resist arrest where an arresting officer’s actions cause the person to reasonably believe the arrest is unlawful.
164608-9
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Daniel Hebel)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Cox, K.)
JESSICA LYNN HURLEY, (attorney Michael Maddaloni)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was convicted following a jury trial of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, one count of third-degree criminal conduct, and other offenses. On Appeal, she asked for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to allow the defendant to move for a new trial and to conduct an evidentiary hearing to address allegations that the jury was exposed to extraneous information. Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court vacated the defendant’s convictions and sentences and granted her motion for a new trial, finding that the jury had been exposed to an extraneous influence as a result of comments made by one of the jurors. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial and reinstated her convictions and sentences. The Court of Appeals held that the juror’s comments did not expose the jury to the type of extraneous influence that would warrant a new trial. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether a verdict may be impeached based on juror misconduct if the misconduct occurred prior to the jury’s deliberative process, see People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77 (1997); and (2) whether there may be cases of “juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged,” see Warger v Shauers, 574 US 40 (2014), and if so, whether that exception applies to the facts of this case.
164261
PEGASUS WIND, LLC, (attorney Ashley Chrysler)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Tuscola CC - Gierhart, A.)
TUSCOLA COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
TUSCOLA AREA AIRPORT ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, (attorney Michael Homier)
Intervenor-Appellant.
The plaintiff is constructing a commercial wind energy system in Tuscola County. Some of the planned wind turbines are within the Tuscola Area Airport zoning area. The Tuscola Area Airport Zoning Board of Appeals (AZBA) is responsible for deciding whether to grant variances from airport zoning regulations. This case involves the plaintiff’s variance applications for the construction of eight wind turbines that allegedly would violate the height limitations and the minimum descent requirements set forth in the Tuscola Area Airport Zoning Ordinance. The AZBA denied the plaintiff’s request for the eight variances and the Tuscola Circuit Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: (1) the requirement of showing unique circumstances inherent in the property is only an element of unnecessary hardship, and not an element of practical difficulty; (2) the self-created hardship rule only applies when the applicant has partitioned, subdivided, or physically altered the property; and (3) the AZBA’s decision was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.
Thursday, December 7, 2023
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
165325
MOTHERING JUSTICE, MICHIGAN ONE FAIR WAGE, MICHIGAN TIME TO CARE, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF MICHIGAN, JAMES HAWK, and TIA MARIE SANDERS, (attorney Mark Brewer)
Plaintiffs-Appellants/
Cross-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Shapiro, D.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL, (attorney Ann Sherman)
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
and
STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Eric Restuccia)
Defendant-Appellee.
In 2018, two ballot initiative committees submitted statutory initiatives to the Secretary of State that would, among other things, increase the State of Michigan’s minimum hourly wage and allow employees to earn paid sick leave from their employers. Within the 40-session-day window provided in Const 1963, art 2, § 9, the Legislature passed both initiatives as 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338. But in the same legislative session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369, which amended both proposals by delaying the minimum wage increase, restricting eligibility to paid sick time, and cutting the amount of paid sick time that could be earned. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the Legislature violated art 2, § 9 when it enacted 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 but then amended them in the same legislative session by enacting 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369. After the Attorney General indicated her agreement with the plaintiffs’ position, the plaintiffs added the State of Michigan as a defendant. The Court of Claims granted the plaintiffs’ and the Attorney General’s motions for summary disposition, while denying the State of Michigan’s motion. The Court of Claims therefore voided 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369 and held that 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 remained in effect, but it stayed its ruling until February 19, 2023. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion dated January 26, 2023, reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for entry of summary disposition in favor of the State of Michigan. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the Legislature violated art 2, § 9 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 when it enacted 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 into law and then amended those laws in the same legislative session by enacting 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369; and (2) if so, whether 2018 PA 337 and 2018 PA 338 remain in effect.
165018, 165020
In re Guardianship of MARY ANN MALLOY.
DARREN FINDLING, Coguardian of MARY ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and
DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, (attorney Jordan Ahlers)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
PATRICK MALLOY, Coguardian of MARY ANN MALLOY, a legally protected person, and KATHREN MALLOY,
Plaintiffs,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland PC - O’Brien D.)
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Erin Rodenhouse)
Defendant-Appellant.
—————
In re Guardianship of DANA JENKINS.
DARREN FINDLING, Guardian of DANA JENKINS, a legally protected person, and DARREN FINDLING LAW FIRM, PLC, (attorney Jordan Ahlers)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland PC - O’Brien D.)
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Erin Rodenhouse)
Defendant-Appellant.
Darren Findling is the court-appointed guardian of the wards in these cases, each of whom was injured in an automobile accident and receives benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., from Auto-Owners Insurance Company.
Findling charged Auto-Owners for a variety of services performed by himself and employees of his law firm on behalf of each ward. Auto-Owners refused to pay for services that were not personally performed by Findling in the absence of proof of compliance with MCL 700.5103(1), which sets forth the requirements for delegating a guardian’s powers. The parties filed competing motions for partial summary disposition, and the probate court issued a decision that favored Findling. The Court of Appeals denied Auto-Owners’ interlocutory application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals properly construed and applied the relevant provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL 700.1101 et seq., in determining that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the guardianship services provided by Findling and his law firm were “lawfully rendered” so as to be payable under MCL 500.3107 of the no fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.
164243
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Audra Blodgett)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kent CC - Sullivan, P.)
STEVEN LEE MONTEZ, (attorney Maya Menlo)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count, but acquitted of the other count. The presentence investigation report (PSIR) contained references to the count of which he was acquitted. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 15 to 50 years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to references in the PSIR to the acquitted conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s sentence in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether references to acquitted conduct in the defendant’s PSIR violated his right not to be sentenced on the basis of conduct of which he was acquitted, as articulated in People v Beck, 504 Mich 605 (2019); and (2) whether the defendant’s trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the references to acquitted conduct in the PSIR.
164763
MAMIE GRAZIANO, GEORGE LOUIS CORSETTI, JIM WEST, and STEVE BABSON, (attorney Matthew Erard)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Murray, C.)
JONATHAN BRATER, in his official capacity as Director of Elections and Secretary of the Board of State Canvassers, (attorney Erik Grill)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiffs are registered electors who signed an initiative petition promulgated by the Committee to Ban Fracking in Michigan (CBFM) more than 180 days before it was filed. The CBFM began circulating its petition and collecting signatures in 2015. The CBFM filed its petition on November 5, 2018, seeking to place its proposal on the 2020 ballot. The board of state canvassers determined that the CBFM’s petition was insufficient because approximately 89% of the signatures were collected more than 180 days before the petition was submitted and thus could not be counted pursuant to MCL 168.472a. The CBFM filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court, asking it to declare the 180-day rule in MCL 168.472a unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the requested mandamus relief. Comm to Ban Fracking in Mich v Bd of State Canvassers, 505 Mich 1137 (2020). In 2021, the plaintiffs filed this action in the Court of Claims, alleging various violations of the Michigan constitution. The Court of Claims granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ challenge to the Board’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a petition. The Court of Claims concluded that, pursuant to MCL 168.479, the plaintiffs’ claim should have been filed in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court of Claims further held that MCL 168.479 did not violate separation-of-powers principles, did not deprive plaintiffs of notice and an opportunity to be heard, and was not otherwise constitutionally deficient. It did not address the constitutionality of MCL 168.472a (the 180-day rule). The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, concluding that the Court of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the lower courts correctly interpreted MCL 168.479 as divesting the Court of Claims of subject matter jurisdiction over a challenge to a “determination made by the board of state canvassers regarding the sufficiency or insufficiency of an initiative petition”; (2) whether the Court of Claims erred by reframing Count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint as a challenge that is subject to MCL 168.479(2); (3) if MCL 168.479 does divest the Court of Claims of subject matter jurisdiction over Count I of the plaintiffs’ complaint, whether the Court of Appeals erred by declining to review the Court of Claims’ determination that it retained jurisdiction over Count II of the complaint and its resolution of the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the application of MCL 168.479; and (4) if MCL 168.479 does divest the Court of Claims of subject matter jurisdiction, whether the statute contravenes the separation of powers under Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the exclusive powers of this Court under Const 1963, art 6, §§ 4-5, or the due process protections afforded by Const 1963, art 1, § 17 and art 6, § 28.
164694
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Amy Sheppard)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kalamazoo CC - Lightvoet, P.)
ROOSEVELT JOHNSON, (attorney John Zelvaking)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with his 13-year-old daughter in 2013. Within a day or two of that incident, the victim was evaluated by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) with respect to a separate incident not involving the defendant. As a result of the second incident, the victim was given emergency contraceptive medication and prophylactic medications to protect against sexually transmitted disease. Also, forensic specimens were gathered through an evidence specimen collection kit. In 2016, the kit was processed as part of a statewide effort to reduce the number of untested sexual assault evidence kits. Testing of that evidence in 2016 revealed the defendant’s DNA, resulting in his arrest and prosecution. The defendant pled no contest to first-degree criminal sexual conduct and the trial court sentenced him to 22 to 35 years in prison. The trial court assigned 10 points to Offense Variable 3 (OV 3) on the basis that the victim sustained “[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment.” MCL 777.33(1)(d). The defendant challenged the scoring of OV 3 on the basis that the SANE evaluation in 2013 revealed no evidence of physical injury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the scoring of OV 3 in a published opinion, concluding that the administration of prophylactic medication to prevent pregnancy or disease following a sexual assault supports the assignment of 10 points to OV 3. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the assignment of 10 points to OV 3, MCL 777.33, for prophylactic treatment following a sexual assault, and in particular whether the holding in People v Barnes, 332 Mich App 494, 500 (2020), lv den 507 Mich 893 (2021), conflicts with the holding in People v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, lv den 502 Mich 904 (2018).
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