The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in six cases on Wednesday, November 13, beginning at 9:30 a.m. in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa, Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, November 13
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166189
3M COMPANY, (attorney Nessa Horewitch Coppinger)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Swartzle, B.)
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ENERGY, (attorney Richard Kuhl)
Defendant-Appellant.
The Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) promulgated a new set of rules changing the permissible levels of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act, MCL 325.1001 et seq. The plaintiff filed suit against EGLE, raising numerous challenges to the new drinking-water rules. Among those challenges was whether EGLE met the requirement in the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.245(3)(n), that agencies must prepare a regulatory impact statement (RIS) that includes an estimate of how much compliance with the proposed rules will cost “businesses and other groups,” specifically whether EGLE was required to include in the RIS the costs of the change in groundwater-cleanup standards, which are tied to the drinking-water rules pursuant to MCL 324.20120a(5). The Court of Claims granted the plaintiff summary disposition in part, holding that the new drinking-water rules were invalid because the RIS was deficient because it lacked an estimate for groundwater-cleanup costs. The Court of Claims found that the plaintiff’s other challenges lacked merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that EGLE violated Section 45 of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, MCL 24.201 et seq., by issuing new rules changing the permissible levels of PFAS in drinking water without preparing a regulatory impact statement that included a sufficient “estimate of the actual statewide compliance costs of the proposed rule on businesses and other groups,” MCL 24.245(3)(n).
165537-8
C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS, PLLC, (attorney Matthew Payne)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Faunce, J.)
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Kaitlyn Cramer)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2018, Jose Cruz-Muniz and Sandra Cruz were injured in a motor vehicle accident. They received medical services from plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC. Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, the no-fault insurer responsible for paying no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits with respect to their care and treatment, refused to pay C-Spine. Cruz-Muniz and Cruz assigned to C-Spine their rights to seek PIP benefits from Progressive. C-Spine then assigned those rights to various third-party factoring companies, which purchased the outstanding invoices at a discounted rate. Thereafter, C-Spine brought first-party no-fault actions against Progressive, relying on the assignments provided by Cruz-Muniz and Cruz. After the lawsuits were filed, C-Spine and the factoring companies signed counter-assignments and purchase agreement amendments, assigning the rights to seek PIP benefits back to C-Spine. The trial court initially denied Progressive’s motion for summary disposition, relying on the counter-assignments. But a few months later, after it was discovered that all of the counter-assignments were signed after the lawsuits were filed, the trial court granted Progressive’s renewed motion for summary disposition, ruling that C-Spine lacked standing when the complaints were filed.
The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, reversed and remanded the cases to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the counter-assignments and purchase agreement amendments permit C-Spine to maintain its causes of action under MCL 500.3112. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether a plaintiff has standing and is a real party in interest if, before filing a cause of action, it had assigned its rights to that cause of action to third parties but, after filing the cause of action, the third parties assign those rights back to it. See MCR 2.201(B)(1); MCL 600.2041.
165964
PARIE WALLACE, (attorney Matthew Payne)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
AFFILIATED DIAGNOSTIC OF OAKLAND and ONE STEP REHAB, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiffs,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - McCarthy, K.)
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, a/k/a SMART, (attorney Jonathan Freshour)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JANET SZCZOTKA,
Defendant.
The plaintiff was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by the defendant when the bus was involved in an accident. The plaintiff received treatment for injuries sustained in the accident and incurred bills from various medical providers. The plaintiff assigned to the medical providers her rights to collect personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. She then filed a complaint seeking payment of PIP benefits from the defendant. The defendant moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim PIP benefits because she assigned her rights to the medical providers. During the first hearing on the defendant’s motion, the trial court adjourned the hearing to allow supplemental briefing and to permit the plaintiff to obtain rescissions of the assignments. Almost two years after the litigation started, the plaintiff obtained rescissions of the assignments.
The trial court then denied in part the defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition on the basis of the rescissions. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the rescissions of the assignments did not save the claims from application of the one-year-back rule of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(2). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether a plaintiff has standing and is a real party in interest if, before filing a cause of action, she had assigned her rights to that cause of action to her medical providers but, after filing the cause of action, the plaintiff and medical providers rescind the assignments, see MCR 2.201(B)(1); MCL 600.2041; Wilmore-Moody v Zakir, 511 Mich 76 (2023); and (2) the effect, if any, of the one-year-back rule of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(2), on the plaintiff’s standing and status as a real party in interest. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co (Docket Nos. 165537-8).
165768
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Joseph Shopp)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Evans, W.)
RONNIE LAMONT SPEARS, (attorney Ian Kierpaul)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2017, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and felony-firearm and was sentenced to 20 to 50 years for second-degree murder, plus a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s applications for leave to appeal. In 2019, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the trial court properly advised the defendant of his rights under MCR 6.302(B)(3), which, because the court used “a writing on a form approved by the State Court Administrative Office,” required the court to “address the defendant and obtain from the defendant orally on the record a statement that the rights were read and understood and a waiver of those rights[,]” MCR 6.302(B); (2) whether “without justification or excuse” is an element of second-degree murder that the trial court was required to address when eliciting the factual basis for the defendant’s guilty plea under MCR 6.302(D)(1); and (3) whether the defendant has demonstrated “good cause” and “actual prejudice” as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3).
Wednesday, November 13
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
165658
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, (attorney Joseph Santoro)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Draganchuk, J.)
METRO FIBERNET LLC, (attorney Michael Donnelly)
Defendant-Appellee.
This case involves the question whether defendant Metro Fibernet, LLC must obtain permission from plaintiff Norfolk Southern Railway Company to install fiber optic internet cables 15 feet underground, below railway crossings. Initially, the defendant gave the plaintiff notice under MCL 462.265, which applies when an entity wishes to “string any wire, electrical or other, over and across a railroad or street railway right-of-way.” The plaintiff contended that this statute did not apply to underground cables and that the defendant instead had to follow the plaintiff’s procedures and pay its fees. After an administrative law judge determined that the Michigan Department of Transportation did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, the plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court. The circuit court granted the defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), holding that MCL 462.265 did not apply but that the plaintiff had not identified another statute under which the defendant had to obtain its permission to install cables at crossings well below the railway roadbed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, holding that absent a statute giving railroads increased rights at intersections, it could not find that the plaintiff’s property rights were invaded. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant utility company must comply with the plaintiff railroad’s approval process before installing a utility line 15 feet under the railroad track at its intersection with a public roadway; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly considered evidence outside of the factual record in reaching its decision.
165726
MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY, and all others similarly situated, (attorney Gregory Hanley)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Ewell, R.)
CITY OF DETROIT, (attorney Sheri Whyte)
Defendant-Appellee.
Defendant City of Detroit imposes annual charges on owners of commercial real property and multiunit residential real property located in the city. The plaintiff is a property owner who paid these charges. The defendant says these charges are permit fees, but the plaintiff claims they are taxes imposed in violation of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 31, and MCL 141.91. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant alleging claims under the Headlee Amendment, MCL 141.91, assumpsit, unjust enrichment, the city ordinance, and equal protection theories. The trial court granted partial summary disposition to the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims under the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims following a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address
whether the challenged annual charges violate: (1) the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 31; and/or (2) the Prohibited Taxes by Cities and Villages Act, MCL 141.91.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, November 13
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166189
3M COMPANY, (attorney Nessa Horewitch Coppinger)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Swartzle, B.)
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT LAKES, AND ENERGY, (attorney Richard Kuhl)
Defendant-Appellant.
The Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) promulgated a new set of rules changing the permissible levels of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) in drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act, MCL 325.1001 et seq. The plaintiff filed suit against EGLE, raising numerous challenges to the new drinking-water rules. Among those challenges was whether EGLE met the requirement in the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.245(3)(n), that agencies must prepare a regulatory impact statement (RIS) that includes an estimate of how much compliance with the proposed rules will cost “businesses and other groups,” specifically whether EGLE was required to include in the RIS the costs of the change in groundwater-cleanup standards, which are tied to the drinking-water rules pursuant to MCL 324.20120a(5). The Court of Claims granted the plaintiff summary disposition in part, holding that the new drinking-water rules were invalid because the RIS was deficient because it lacked an estimate for groundwater-cleanup costs. The Court of Claims found that the plaintiff’s other challenges lacked merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims in a 2-1 published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that EGLE violated Section 45 of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, MCL 24.201 et seq., by issuing new rules changing the permissible levels of PFAS in drinking water without preparing a regulatory impact statement that included a sufficient “estimate of the actual statewide compliance costs of the proposed rule on businesses and other groups,” MCL 24.245(3)(n).
165537-8
C-SPINE ORTHOPEDICS, PLLC, (attorney Matthew Payne)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Faunce, J.)
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE COMPANY, (attorney Kaitlyn Cramer)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2018, Jose Cruz-Muniz and Sandra Cruz were injured in a motor vehicle accident. They received medical services from plaintiff C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC. Defendant Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, the no-fault insurer responsible for paying no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits with respect to their care and treatment, refused to pay C-Spine. Cruz-Muniz and Cruz assigned to C-Spine their rights to seek PIP benefits from Progressive. C-Spine then assigned those rights to various third-party factoring companies, which purchased the outstanding invoices at a discounted rate. Thereafter, C-Spine brought first-party no-fault actions against Progressive, relying on the assignments provided by Cruz-Muniz and Cruz. After the lawsuits were filed, C-Spine and the factoring companies signed counter-assignments and purchase agreement amendments, assigning the rights to seek PIP benefits back to C-Spine. The trial court initially denied Progressive’s motion for summary disposition, relying on the counter-assignments. But a few months later, after it was discovered that all of the counter-assignments were signed after the lawsuits were filed, the trial court granted Progressive’s renewed motion for summary disposition, ruling that C-Spine lacked standing when the complaints were filed.
The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 published opinion, reversed and remanded the cases to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the counter-assignments and purchase agreement amendments permit C-Spine to maintain its causes of action under MCL 500.3112. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether a plaintiff has standing and is a real party in interest if, before filing a cause of action, it had assigned its rights to that cause of action to third parties but, after filing the cause of action, the third parties assign those rights back to it. See MCR 2.201(B)(1); MCL 600.2041.
165964
PARIE WALLACE, (attorney Matthew Payne)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
AFFILIATED DIAGNOSTIC OF OAKLAND and ONE STEP REHAB, LLC,
Intervening Plaintiffs,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - McCarthy, K.)
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION, a/k/a SMART, (attorney Jonathan Freshour)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
JANET SZCZOTKA,
Defendant.
The plaintiff was a passenger on a bus owned and operated by the defendant when the bus was involved in an accident. The plaintiff received treatment for injuries sustained in the accident and incurred bills from various medical providers. The plaintiff assigned to the medical providers her rights to collect personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. She then filed a complaint seeking payment of PIP benefits from the defendant. The defendant moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim PIP benefits because she assigned her rights to the medical providers. During the first hearing on the defendant’s motion, the trial court adjourned the hearing to allow supplemental briefing and to permit the plaintiff to obtain rescissions of the assignments. Almost two years after the litigation started, the plaintiff obtained rescissions of the assignments.
The trial court then denied in part the defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition on the basis of the rescissions. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed in part and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the rescissions of the assignments did not save the claims from application of the one-year-back rule of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(2). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether a plaintiff has standing and is a real party in interest if, before filing a cause of action, she had assigned her rights to that cause of action to her medical providers but, after filing the cause of action, the plaintiff and medical providers rescind the assignments, see MCR 2.201(B)(1); MCL 600.2041; Wilmore-Moody v Zakir, 511 Mich 76 (2023); and (2) the effect, if any, of the one-year-back rule of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(2), on the plaintiff’s standing and status as a real party in interest. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co (Docket Nos. 165537-8).
165768
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Joseph Shopp)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Evans, W.)
RONNIE LAMONT SPEARS, (attorney Ian Kierpaul)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2017, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder and felony-firearm and was sentenced to 20 to 50 years for second-degree murder, plus a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court denied the defendant’s applications for leave to appeal. In 2019, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the trial court properly advised the defendant of his rights under MCR 6.302(B)(3), which, because the court used “a writing on a form approved by the State Court Administrative Office,” required the court to “address the defendant and obtain from the defendant orally on the record a statement that the rights were read and understood and a waiver of those rights[,]” MCR 6.302(B); (2) whether “without justification or excuse” is an element of second-degree murder that the trial court was required to address when eliciting the factual basis for the defendant’s guilty plea under MCR 6.302(D)(1); and (3) whether the defendant has demonstrated “good cause” and “actual prejudice” as required by MCR 6.508(D)(3).
Wednesday, November 13
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
165658
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, (attorney Joseph Santoro)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Draganchuk, J.)
METRO FIBERNET LLC, (attorney Michael Donnelly)
Defendant-Appellee.
This case involves the question whether defendant Metro Fibernet, LLC must obtain permission from plaintiff Norfolk Southern Railway Company to install fiber optic internet cables 15 feet underground, below railway crossings. Initially, the defendant gave the plaintiff notice under MCL 462.265, which applies when an entity wishes to “string any wire, electrical or other, over and across a railroad or street railway right-of-way.” The plaintiff contended that this statute did not apply to underground cables and that the defendant instead had to follow the plaintiff’s procedures and pay its fees. After an administrative law judge determined that the Michigan Department of Transportation did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, the plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court. The circuit court granted the defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), holding that MCL 462.265 did not apply but that the plaintiff had not identified another statute under which the defendant had to obtain its permission to install cables at crossings well below the railway roadbed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, holding that absent a statute giving railroads increased rights at intersections, it could not find that the plaintiff’s property rights were invaded. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the defendant utility company must comply with the plaintiff railroad’s approval process before installing a utility line 15 feet under the railroad track at its intersection with a public roadway; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals impermissibly considered evidence outside of the factual record in reaching its decision.
165726
MIDWEST VALVE & FITTING COMPANY, and all others similarly situated, (attorney Gregory Hanley)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Ewell, R.)
CITY OF DETROIT, (attorney Sheri Whyte)
Defendant-Appellee.
Defendant City of Detroit imposes annual charges on owners of commercial real property and multiunit residential real property located in the city. The plaintiff is a property owner who paid these charges. The defendant says these charges are permit fees, but the plaintiff claims they are taxes imposed in violation of § 31 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 31, and MCL 141.91. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant alleging claims under the Headlee Amendment, MCL 141.91, assumpsit, unjust enrichment, the city ordinance, and equal protection theories. The trial court granted partial summary disposition to the defendant on the plaintiff’s claims under the Headlee Amendment and MCL 141.91. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims following a bench trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address
whether the challenged annual charges violate: (1) the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, § 31; and/or (2) the Prohibited Taxes by Cities and Villages Act, MCL 141.91.
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