Collateral estoppel: The cure for legal deja vu

Agenique Smiley
BridgeTower Media Newswires   

The Michigan Court of Appeals has found a cure for modern-day monotony — collateral estoppel. Generally, the purpose of collateral estoppel is to save time, money, effort and frustration for all parties involved by preventing the relitigation of issues that have been actually and necessarily determined in a prior proceeding involving the same parties.

Collateral estoppel has three elements that must be satisfied before it can be properly applied; however, if applicable, it has a preclusive effect on issues “actually litigated” in prior proceedings.

In Dinehart v. Great Lakes Property Group Trust, the Michigan Court of Appeals was called upon to make the determination whether the requirement that the issue in question be “actually litigated” was fulfilled as it pertained to plaintiff Kimberly Dinehart’s claim that her apartment was infested with hazardous mold.

The panel held that the “actually litigated element” had been satisfied and affirmed the Kalamazoo Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant Drakes Pond Apartments, a “dba” of Great Lakes Property Group Trust, finding that the trial court properly concluded that collateral estoppel — predicated on a previous district court ruling that no mold existed in Dinehart’s apartment — precluded Dinehart’s claim.

‘Dinehart v. Great Lakes Property Group Trust’

In October 2012, Dinehart, her children and her husband moved into “the Dillingham apartment” at Great Lakes. In December 2012, water leaked through the apartment ceiling during a rainstorm. Because of the leak, Dinehart asked and she and her family were allowed to move to a different apartment within the same complex, “the Hemmingway apartment.” During Dinehart and her family’s occupancy in the Hemmingway apartment, Great Lakes hired Camelot to clean the duct system.

District court proceedings

In April 2013, Great Lakes served Dinehart with a notice to quit for non-payment of rent, and later filed summary proceedings in the Kalamazoo District Court for possession and unpaid rent. A bench trial was held in district court, during which Dinehart claimed that she was lawfully entitled to withhold rent because Great Lakes was in breach of the Covenant of Habitability for failure to maintain her apartment in reasonable repair. She claimed that her unit was infested with mold which created “hazardous living conditions in the apartment.”

Dinehart personally testified that she and her children had been ill because of mold in both apartments. In contrast, three Great Lakes employees testified that there was no mold or moisture in the Hemmingway apartment and that plaintiff had never made such a claim until served with a notice to quit. Ultimately, the district court entered judgment in favor of Great Lakes, concluding that Great Lakes was entitled to past due rent.

The district court specifically considered, and rejected, plaintiff’s assertion that the Hemmingway apartment was uninhabitable due to mold. Plaintiff and her family vacated the apartment in June 2013. In October 2014, Dinehart filed the present suit against Great Lakes in circuit court, proceeding individually and as next friend for her children. She brought claims of negligence and premises liability, asserting that both apartments had mold and that she and her children suffered various mold-related ailments as a result of living in the Dillingham and Hemmingway apartments. The circuit court later granted Great Lakes’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), concluding that collateral estoppel precluded Dinehart’s claim.

Collateral estoppel

Collateral estoppel functions to prevent relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.

Its purpose is the prevention of and protection against litigious behavior amongst parties to a lawsuit that has already been fully adjudicated; promotion of judicial economy and the flow of cases through the court system; and promotion of the public’s confidence and trust in the judicial system through the system itself adhering to its bedrock principle — stare decisis.

Three elements must be satisfied to justify the court’s application of collateral estoppel. A question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; the same parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue on which the question of fact was based; and there must be mutuality of estoppel.

‘Actually litigated’

Dinehart’s circuit court case against Great Lakes sounded in negligence and premises liability, eventually resulting in the court granting summary disposition in Great Lakes’ favor based on the application of collateral estoppel. This decision would later be affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals found its justification to affirm the Kalamazoo Circuit’s holding not from that court’s proceedings, but from the eviction proceedings held in the Kalamazoo District Court. The panel reasoned, in addressing the first element of collateral estoppel, that the issue of mold was actually litigated in and determined by a valid and final judgment in the district court.

Great Lakes filed summary proceedings against Dinehart for non-payment of rent. As her defense, Dinehart asserted that, due to the alleged existence of mold in her unit, Great Lakes breached the Covenant of Habitability by failing to maintain her apartment in reasonable repair; thereby, entitling her to withhold rent.

After taking testimony from Dinehart and Great Lakes’ employees, the court “specifically considered and rejected” Dinehart’s defense. Finding rent properly owed, the district court entered a judgment of possession in favor of Great Lakes. Dinehart did not appeal the district court’s ruling, therefore, it became a final judgment of the court and a final disposition of the mold issue.


Simplistically, a plaintiff suing under a negligence theory of recovery has to prove four basic elements: duty, breach, causation and damages. Dinehart’s basic claim is that Great Lakes owed her and her family a duty to keep her apartment in reasonable repair; it breached that duty because of the existence of the mold; the mold caused her family to suffer illness; and damages claimed.

Dinehart’s circuit court negligence claim is the exact mirror image of her district court defense and, like her district court defense, it is wholly dependent on the court’s finding that mold created a hazardous living condition inside of her apartment. In both her district court defense and in her circuit court negligence claim, the existence of mold fulfills the critical “causation” requirement.

However, the existence of mold is a question already asked and answered. The district court, after weighing the evidence and considering the parties’ testimony, ruled that the alleged mold did not create a hazardous condition in Dinehart’s apartment and, in doing so, disposed of the central and most critical element of her negligence claim.

As the appellate panel pointed out, because the mold issue was “actually litigated” in the district court proceedings, the district court decision may have a preclusive effect in circuit court.

‘Full and fair opportunity to litigate’

Dinehart does not challenge that the action involves the same parties. She suggests that because she was without the benefit of counsel in the district court that she was not afforded a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the mold issue. Her claim is, because she did not have an attorney, the court excluded some of her evidence and disregarded some of her testimony.

However, as the panel points out, it was Dinehart’s choice to proceed without an attorney; therefore, that election does not give her a right to relitigate the mold issue.

Mutuality of estoppel

The Court of Appeals concluded that mutuality of estoppel exits between Dinehart and Great Lakes because each are equally bound by the district court’s decision and the district court action would have had a preclusive effect on Great Lakes’ ability to relitigate the mold question had the district court determined that there was mold in the Hemmingway apartment.


A graduate of Cooley Law School, Agenique Smiley  is a solo practitioner and her firm, Write to Win, PLLC, provides legal research and writing services to attorneys. She also is an adjunct professor at Henry Ford College, where she teaches Legal Research and Writing.