Oct. 14, 2025—Lansing, MI—On October 14, the Michigan Court of Appeals heard arguments by the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) concerning whether seven chimpanzees confined in the DeYoung Family Zoo are entitled to the right to liberty and a habeas corpus hearing on the lawfulness of their imprisonment.
Six world-renowned experts in chimpanzee cognition and behavior, including the late Jane Goodall, submitted expert declarations in support of the NhRP’s case, which is the first of its kind in Michigan. The Animal Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, Michigan State University School of Law Professors David Favre and Angie Vega, and the Michigan group Attorneys for Animals submitted a “friends of the court” brief in support.
The expert declarations demonstrate that chimpanzees are autonomous beings who suffer physically and psychologically in an environment like the DeYoung Family Zoo, where they appear to be confined largely indoors in cages closed off from public view.
“We appreciate the Court’s serious and rigorous engagement with our arguments today,” said Christopher Berry, Executive Director of the NhRP. “The core question now before the Court is whether the protection of autonomy will remain a supreme judicial value in Michigan or whether the protection of the autonomy of the chimpanzees confined in the DeYoung Family Zoo doesn’t matter simply because they’re chimpanzees.”
The NhRP filed a 127-page habeas corpus complaint on the chimpanzees’ behalf in 2023. Five days after the case was filed, a trial court judge issued a one-sentence order denying the complaint based solely on the fact that the NhRP’s clients aren’t human. The NhRP appealed and is now asking the Michigan Court of Appeals to direct the trial court to issue an “order to show cause” (a habeas corpus order that requires someone’s captor to come to court to justify their imprisonment) so that a hearing can be held on the merits of the chimpanzees’ case.
NhRP Senior Staff Attorney Jake Davis, who argued the appeal, began his arguments with the story of Tommy, the NhRP’s first client, a chimpanzee who died alone in a building in the DeYoung Family Zoo after he was transferred there from New York. “His life can be characterized as little more than restrictive confinement informed by devastating traumas,” Davis said. As Davis referenced, Tommy’s case resulted in a historic opinion by New York Court of Appeals Judge Eugene Fahey urging his fellow judges to reconsider the legal status of chimpanzees as rightless “things.”
Calling the NhRP’s oral arguments “very well presented,” Judge Brock Swartzle presided over the 25-minute hearing, which was nearly double the NhRP’s originally allotted time. Judge Swartzle’s questions centered on where to draw the line regarding other species, whether chimpanzees needed to be considered part of the social contract to receive the protections of habeas corpus, and whether the NhRP’s requested relief–releasing the chimpanzees to an accredited chimpanzee sanctuary–made sense given that a chimpanzee sanctuary is still a form of confinement.
“If we were to agree with you, where’s the stopping point?” Judge Swartzle said. “Where would you draw the line? Would the trial court have to issue the order to show cause for any being–for a chimp, for a dog, what have you?”
Davis explained that the Court should evaluate these questions on a case-by-case basis and follow a two-step process: assess the intrinsic nature of the species based on the scientific evidence before the Court, as urged by Judge Fahey in New York, and then apply the common law principles and values accordingly. He also urged the Court not to replicate the error of the New York appellate court that denied Tommy the right to liberty because he supposedly can’t bear duties under a social contract; many humans can’t bear duties, yet unquestionably have the right to liberty. Moreover, Jane Goodall’s expert declaration, among several others, makes clear that chimpanzees can indeed bear duties, both among themselves and in relationship with humans.
Regarding the NhRP’s requested relief, Davis explained that, while a chimpanzee sanctuary is still a form of confinement, the DeYoung chimpanzees “will be able to exercise their autonomy” to the greatest extent possible in such an environment–in a way they can’t at the DeYoung Family Zoo.
A poll recently commissioned by the NhRP and conducted by RABA research suggests that 90% of Michiganders would support the release of animals from a roadside zoo like the DeYoung Family Zoo to a sanctuary if the animals were found to be suffering. The poll also suggests that 61% of Michiganders would support recognizing chimpanzees as legal persons (a legal person is an entity with at least one legal right) given that corporations are legal persons.
Regarding when a court should issue an order to show cause on behalf of a nonhuman animal, Davis responded that it should do so when a prima facie case of unlawful confinement has been made–in other words, when a party has presented enough evidence to support its claim, as the NhRP has done in this case.
Toward the end of the proceeding, Judge Christopher Trebilcock said he was “curious about the broader issue” of why laws prohibiting animal cruelty are insufficient to protect the interests of the chimpanzees.
“If those laws were sufficient,” Davis said, “we would not be here today … Habeas corpus has a history of challenging confinements that violated no law, they violated no statutory right, but were otherwise unjust.”
Judge Swartzle concluded the hearing by expressing appreciation for the NhRP “coming and answering our questions. It’s a novel issue obviously. We’ve already given it some attention, and we’ll give it more attention.”
The NhRP remains hopeful the Michigan courts will ensure justice is done and grant the chimpanzees relief from their unlawful confinement.
“As Tommy’s story shows, what’s at stake here is not just judicial values like the protection of autonomy,” said Berry regarding this juncture in the case. “For the seven surviving chimpanzees at the DeYoung Family Zoo, it’s about whether their suffering will ever end.”
October 17 COA decision:
On the merits, we hold that chimpanzees are not “persons” eligible for habeas relief. The trial court also correctly declined plaintiff’s invitation to construe animals as “persons” in contravention of the common law; only our Supreme Court may revise that common law principle, and plaintiff’s argument for doing so is in any event substantively unpersuasive. Because defendants’ chimpanzees are not eligible for habeas relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s petition.
Statement from NhRP Executive Director Christopher Berry:
The Nonhuman Rights Project is deeply troubled that the Michigan Court of Appeals declined to protect autonomy—a supreme value under Michigan law—when the autonomous beings are chimpanzees. While the decision properly treated the issue of nonhuman eligibility for habeas corpus relief as one for judges to consider under the common law, the Court of Appeals held that it was bound by 19th-century Michigan Supreme Court precedent treating animals as mere property. The Nonhuman Rights Project will ask the Michigan Supreme Court to reject this outdated classification. The chimpanzees confined in the DeYoung Family Zoo deserve the law's protection because they are autonomous beings whose suffering matters.
For the chimpanzees’ stories, information about the DeYoung Family Zoo, and a complete court case timeline, visit https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client/the-deyoung-prisoners/.
For information on the Nonhuman Rights Project, Project visit https://www.nonhumanrights.org/
Six world-renowned experts in chimpanzee cognition and behavior, including the late Jane Goodall, submitted expert declarations in support of the NhRP’s case, which is the first of its kind in Michigan. The Animal Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, Michigan State University School of Law Professors David Favre and Angie Vega, and the Michigan group Attorneys for Animals submitted a “friends of the court” brief in support.
The expert declarations demonstrate that chimpanzees are autonomous beings who suffer physically and psychologically in an environment like the DeYoung Family Zoo, where they appear to be confined largely indoors in cages closed off from public view.
“We appreciate the Court’s serious and rigorous engagement with our arguments today,” said Christopher Berry, Executive Director of the NhRP. “The core question now before the Court is whether the protection of autonomy will remain a supreme judicial value in Michigan or whether the protection of the autonomy of the chimpanzees confined in the DeYoung Family Zoo doesn’t matter simply because they’re chimpanzees.”
The NhRP filed a 127-page habeas corpus complaint on the chimpanzees’ behalf in 2023. Five days after the case was filed, a trial court judge issued a one-sentence order denying the complaint based solely on the fact that the NhRP’s clients aren’t human. The NhRP appealed and is now asking the Michigan Court of Appeals to direct the trial court to issue an “order to show cause” (a habeas corpus order that requires someone’s captor to come to court to justify their imprisonment) so that a hearing can be held on the merits of the chimpanzees’ case.
NhRP Senior Staff Attorney Jake Davis, who argued the appeal, began his arguments with the story of Tommy, the NhRP’s first client, a chimpanzee who died alone in a building in the DeYoung Family Zoo after he was transferred there from New York. “His life can be characterized as little more than restrictive confinement informed by devastating traumas,” Davis said. As Davis referenced, Tommy’s case resulted in a historic opinion by New York Court of Appeals Judge Eugene Fahey urging his fellow judges to reconsider the legal status of chimpanzees as rightless “things.”
Calling the NhRP’s oral arguments “very well presented,” Judge Brock Swartzle presided over the 25-minute hearing, which was nearly double the NhRP’s originally allotted time. Judge Swartzle’s questions centered on where to draw the line regarding other species, whether chimpanzees needed to be considered part of the social contract to receive the protections of habeas corpus, and whether the NhRP’s requested relief–releasing the chimpanzees to an accredited chimpanzee sanctuary–made sense given that a chimpanzee sanctuary is still a form of confinement.
“If we were to agree with you, where’s the stopping point?” Judge Swartzle said. “Where would you draw the line? Would the trial court have to issue the order to show cause for any being–for a chimp, for a dog, what have you?”
Davis explained that the Court should evaluate these questions on a case-by-case basis and follow a two-step process: assess the intrinsic nature of the species based on the scientific evidence before the Court, as urged by Judge Fahey in New York, and then apply the common law principles and values accordingly. He also urged the Court not to replicate the error of the New York appellate court that denied Tommy the right to liberty because he supposedly can’t bear duties under a social contract; many humans can’t bear duties, yet unquestionably have the right to liberty. Moreover, Jane Goodall’s expert declaration, among several others, makes clear that chimpanzees can indeed bear duties, both among themselves and in relationship with humans.
Regarding the NhRP’s requested relief, Davis explained that, while a chimpanzee sanctuary is still a form of confinement, the DeYoung chimpanzees “will be able to exercise their autonomy” to the greatest extent possible in such an environment–in a way they can’t at the DeYoung Family Zoo.
A poll recently commissioned by the NhRP and conducted by RABA research suggests that 90% of Michiganders would support the release of animals from a roadside zoo like the DeYoung Family Zoo to a sanctuary if the animals were found to be suffering. The poll also suggests that 61% of Michiganders would support recognizing chimpanzees as legal persons (a legal person is an entity with at least one legal right) given that corporations are legal persons.
Regarding when a court should issue an order to show cause on behalf of a nonhuman animal, Davis responded that it should do so when a prima facie case of unlawful confinement has been made–in other words, when a party has presented enough evidence to support its claim, as the NhRP has done in this case.
Toward the end of the proceeding, Judge Christopher Trebilcock said he was “curious about the broader issue” of why laws prohibiting animal cruelty are insufficient to protect the interests of the chimpanzees.
“If those laws were sufficient,” Davis said, “we would not be here today … Habeas corpus has a history of challenging confinements that violated no law, they violated no statutory right, but were otherwise unjust.”
Judge Swartzle concluded the hearing by expressing appreciation for the NhRP “coming and answering our questions. It’s a novel issue obviously. We’ve already given it some attention, and we’ll give it more attention.”
The NhRP remains hopeful the Michigan courts will ensure justice is done and grant the chimpanzees relief from their unlawful confinement.
“As Tommy’s story shows, what’s at stake here is not just judicial values like the protection of autonomy,” said Berry regarding this juncture in the case. “For the seven surviving chimpanzees at the DeYoung Family Zoo, it’s about whether their suffering will ever end.”
October 17 COA decision:
On the merits, we hold that chimpanzees are not “persons” eligible for habeas relief. The trial court also correctly declined plaintiff’s invitation to construe animals as “persons” in contravention of the common law; only our Supreme Court may revise that common law principle, and plaintiff’s argument for doing so is in any event substantively unpersuasive. Because defendants’ chimpanzees are not eligible for habeas relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s petition.
Statement from NhRP Executive Director Christopher Berry:
The Nonhuman Rights Project is deeply troubled that the Michigan Court of Appeals declined to protect autonomy—a supreme value under Michigan law—when the autonomous beings are chimpanzees. While the decision properly treated the issue of nonhuman eligibility for habeas corpus relief as one for judges to consider under the common law, the Court of Appeals held that it was bound by 19th-century Michigan Supreme Court precedent treating animals as mere property. The Nonhuman Rights Project will ask the Michigan Supreme Court to reject this outdated classification. The chimpanzees confined in the DeYoung Family Zoo deserve the law's protection because they are autonomous beings whose suffering matters.
For the chimpanzees’ stories, information about the DeYoung Family Zoo, and a complete court case timeline, visit https://www.nonhumanrights.org/client/the-deyoung-prisoners/.
For information on the Nonhuman Rights Project, Project visit https://www.nonhumanrights.org/
