Columns

Michigan law mandates ever-increasing use of solar photovoltaic cells to replace reliable, affordable, coal, natural gas and nuclear power. Consider that after decades of mandates, tax breaks, and subsidies that add to your taxes and electricity bills, solar is only generating a bit over 2% of Michigan’s electric demand.

Requiring more solar is the wrong plan for so many reasons:

• The threat of blackouts is highest in the winter, when the sun is not up and nights and early mornings are cold.

• A state agency estimates Michigan’s solar mandate will require 209,000 acres of farmland.

• Large solar projects often run into justified local opposition to permitting decisions (state law allows a state agency to override local decisions).

• Having a northern climate and surrounded by water, Michigan is a relatively cloudy state with poor solar resources.

• Solar project costs are rising dramatically from inflation, supply chain problems and lost federal subsidies.

• Solar panels last only one-third to one-half as long as other generating sources, presenting reconstruction and massive waste-disposal issues.

• The state’s 2030 emission goals can be met without solar.

Read on for the details.

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation says Michigan’s regional grid has a high risk of power shortages, starting in 2028. Reliable coal power plants are being closed prematurely and replaced too slowly by weather-dependent wind and solar.

Solar projects often face resistance from local governments. The Michigan Farm Bureau also objects, as the Department of Natural Resources estimates that meeting solar and wind goals will require 209,000 acres of land. Recognizing local opposition, the Legislature gave the Michigan Public Service Commission authority to override local permit bans. Opponents to this law are attempting to repeal it through a ballot initiative.

Michigan has lower solar resource potential than more southerly located states, as shown below. Michigan is about 10% less productive at generating electricity through solar than North Carolina and 21% less efficient than Arizona. This translates to Michigan having 28% higher costs to generate solar electricity than Arizona. In 2024, Michigan’s solar projects generated 71% less electricity in December than in June (62 megawatt-hours/ megawatt vs. 212).

Construction costs are increasing. Solar panel prices rose about 9% in the first quarter of 2025, mainly because of higher tariffs. Another factor is that projects placed in service after 2027 will not receive 30% investment tax credits under federal law. Also, wind and solar projects are often placed far from existing transmission lines, requiring expensive infrastructure upgrades. Because of these factors, the price of solar projects could rise 40% or more, with those extra costs passed on to ratepayers in their electricity bills.

Michigan’s electric demand was 98.8 million megawatt-hours in 2024. Solar generation only totaled 2.3 million, or about 2% of that. The state’s goal of generating 52% of demand, or 52 million megawatt-hours, from zero-emission sources by 2030 could be achieved by adding a new small modular reactor at the Palisades nuclear plant and restarting the main plant.

The future of electric generation is clearly nuclear, not solar, and state legislation needs to change in recognition of this reality.

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Dave Stevenson has spent the last 14 years as the director of the Center for Energy & Environment for the Caesar Rodney Institute. He served on President Trump’s Environmental Protection Agency Transition Team and has become a resource for national energy and environmental issues. He is a veteran executive of the Dupont Company.

A familiar slogan has echoed through the streets of variousIranian cities in recent days: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran.”

(THE CONVERSATION) — A familiar slogan has echoed through the streets of variousIranian cities in recent days: “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran.”

That phrase has been chanted at protests that have sprung up around Iran since Dec. 28, 2025. The spark of the uprising and bazaar strikes has been economic hardship and government mismanagement.

But as an expert of Iranian history and culture, I believe the slogan’s presence signals that protests go deeper than economic frustration alone. When people in Iran chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon,” they are, I believe, rejecting the theocratic system in Iran entirely. In other words, the current crisis isn’t just about bread and jobs, it’s about who decides what Iran stands for.

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The origins of the slogan

The phrase “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” first gained prominence during the 2009 Green Movement, when hundreds of thousands of people protested a disputed presidential election in Iran.

It has since appeared in successive major demonstrations, from the 2017-18 economic protests to the 2019 fuel price uprising. It was also prominent during the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” movement, sparked by the death of an Iranian-Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini, following her detention by Iran’s morality police for not wearing a “proper” hijab.

The phrase ties together two key aspects of successive Iranian protest movements: domestic economic, political or social grievances and an explicit rejection of the government’s justification for that hardship – namely, that sacrifice at home is necessary to fulfill ideological goals of “resistance” abroad.

In particular, the slogan targets the Islamic Republic’s decades-long support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

Estimates suggest that the regime has channeled between US$700 million and $1 billion annually to regional allies since the 1980s – funds that many Iranians argue should instead address domestic infrastructure, health care and education.

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From alliance to resentment

Understanding the full meaning of the slogan requires historical context. Under the U.S.-aligned Pahlavi monarchy, which ruled from 1925 to 1979, Iran maintained diplomatic and economic ties with Israel while pursuing modernization.

The Shah’s opponents, particularly leftist groups, exploited these connections, using slogans like “Iran’s become Palestine, why sit still, O people?” to mobilize against the monarchy.

Indeed, many of the Islamic revolutionary leaders that ousted the Shah in 1979 had ties with Palestinian groups.

After the revolution, the Islamic Republic inverted both its ties to the U.S. and Iran’s relationship with Israel, making anti-Israel rhetoric and support for Palestinian causes central to its identity.

Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution, declared solidarity with oppressed Muslims worldwide, positioning Iran as the vanguard of resistance against what he called “Western imperialism and Zionism.”

But this ideological commitment came with substantial costs for Iranians.

Iran’s support for Hezbollah during Lebanon’s civil war, its backing of Hamas in the Palestinian group’s fight against Israel, and its involvement in Syrian and Iraqi conflicts have contributed to international sanctions, diplomatic isolation and economic pressure on Iran. And these burdens have fallen disproportionately on ordinary citizens rather than the ruling elite.

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Economic crisis and political defiance

“Down with the Islamic Republic” is also chanted alongside “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon” in the current uprising – the most serious that the Iranian government has faced in years.

But neither lethal force – at least 1,203 arrests and more than two dozen deaths thus far – nor supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s Jan. 3 order for a harsher crackdown has quelled the unrest.

Instead, protests have expanded to 110 cities and villages.

The demonstrations illustrate how economic and political grievances intersect in Iran. When demonstrators chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon” while protesting bread prices and unemployment, they are not compartmentalizing issues – they are drawing a direct line between foreign policy choices and domestic suffering.

The slogan makes three simultaneous arguments.

First, it rejects imposed solidarity. Many Iranians, including those sympathetic to Palestinian rights, resent being conscripted into conflicts that are not their own. And the government’s insistence that Iranians must make sacrifices for distant causes breeds resentment rather than unity. Take the government’s effort to portray the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 as a moment of national resistance. Rather, many Iranians instead blamed the leadership for either provoking the conflict or failing to meaningfully defend the country from Israeli – or American – bombs.

The slogan also demands accountability for resource allocation. When state media broadcasts funerals for fighters killed in Syria or Yemen while Iran’s hospitals lack basic supplies, the disconnect between rhetoric and reality becomes glaring.
And finally, the protest message reclaims political belonging rooted in Iranian national history – and not just the ideological concerns of the Islamic Republic. By invoking Iran specifically, “I sacrifice my life for Iran,” protesters assert that their primary allegiance is to their own country, not to transnational ideological movements, regional proxies or the ruling government’s ideology.

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The limits of solidarity

For all its longevity, however, the slogan has proven divisive. While some see it as a necessary assertion of self-determination after decades of enforced sacrifice, others – including some Iranian leftist intellectuals and activists – view it as abandoning solidarity with oppressed peoples.

But it doesn’t need to be an either/or. Many protesters risking bullets to demand “Iran first” are not expressing indifference to the suffering of Palestinians. Rather, they are insisting that effective solidarity requires a functioning state capable of supporting its own citizens, and that genuine liberation begins at home.

Regardless, the Islamic Republic’s response has been to frame criticism as betrayal, suggesting that those who question support for Gaza or Lebanon are complicit with imperialism – a narrative enforced through a mix of rhetoric and coercion.

But this framing increasingly fails to persuade a population that has watched living standards decline while billions of dollars flow to foreign conflicts. The effects of sanctions and shrinking foreign-currency revenues have pushed the Iranian state to raise taxes on households while shielding military and ideological spending. Meanwhile, the dollar’s daily surge and the rial’s rapid collapse have accelerated inflation and eroded purchasing power.

Authoring one’s own story

Undoubtedly, economic grievances underpin the current protests in Iran. However, the slogans used in Iranian protests – be they over election disputes, economic crises or women’s rights – indicate a broader critique of the Islamic Republic’s governing philosophy.

In the current wave of protests, demonstrators articulate through slogans both what they reject – “Down with the Islamic Republic” – and what many now seek to happen: “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return,” a reference to the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.

The “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon” chant asks: What does it mean for a government to prioritize foreign conflicts over domestic welfare? How long can imposed solidarity substitute for actual prosperity? And who has the right to determine which causes are worth sacrifice?

Such questions extend beyond Iran. They challenge assumptions about how governments invoke international causes to justify domestic policies and when citizens have the right to say, “Our story comes first.”

As such, the chant “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” is, I believe, both protest and reclamation. It rejects the Iranian state’s narrative of mandatory sacrifice while asserting the right of people to author a national story focused on Iran’s own needs, challenges and aspirations.

With Congress back in session, legislators will take up a set of issues they haven’t comprehensively addressed since 2018 – the year the last farm bill passed.

(THE CONVERSATION) — With Congress back in session, legislators will take up a set of issues they haven’t comprehensively addressed since 2018 – the year the last farm bill passed.

Farm bills are massive pieces of legislation that address a diverse constellation of topics, including agricultural commodities, conservation, trade, nutrition, rural development, energy, forestry and more. Because of their complexity, farm bills are difficult to negotiate in any political environment. And as the topics have expanded since the first iteration in 1933, Congress has generally agreed to take the whole thing up once every five years or so.

However, the most recent farm bill’s provisions expired in 2023. They have been renewed one year at a time ever since, but without the comprehensive overhaul that used to accompany farm bills.

As former federal employees handling agriculture policy who now study that topic, it’s unclear to us whether a comprehensive, five-year farm bill can be passed in 2026, or ever again.

The July 2025 enactment of the so-called “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” the Trump administration’s budget priorities in the tax and spending bill, revised funding levels for many programs that were historically handled in the farm bill. For instance, that law included a 20% cut in funding to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, known as SNAP, which helps low-income families buy food. And it doubled support for the largest farm subsidy programs.

Those changes and current divisions in Congress mean the nation’s food and agriculture policy may remain stuck in limbo for yet another year.

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Cuts to SNAP used for farm subsidies

For decades, political conventional wisdom has held that sweeping federal farm bills are able to pass only because farmers seeking subsidies and anti-hunger advocates wanting increased SNAP dollars recognize the mutual advantage in working together. That’s how to build a broad, bipartisan consensus strong enough to garner the 60 votes in the U.S. Senate to avoid a filibuster and actually pass a bill.

But the One Big Beautiful Bill Act tax and spending law did not create a compromise between those competing interests. It slashed SNAP spending by US$186 billion over the next decade. At the same time, it boosted price support for farmers who grow key crops like corn, soybeans and wheat by $60 billion, in addition to a $10 billion economic relief package passed at the end of 2024 to address high costs of seeds, fertilizer and other farming supplies.

Supporters of anti-hunger programs are furious that these funds for farmers are being paid for by cutting SNAP benefits to families.

In addition, about one-third of the SNAP cuts came by shifting the program’s cost to state budgets. States have always carried some of the costs to administer SNAP, but they have never before been required to fund billions of dollars in benefits. 
Many states will be unable to cover these increased costs and will be forced to either reduce benefits or opt out of SNAP altogether, dramatically cutting the help available to hungry Americans.

Groups that support SNAP are unlikely to help pass any bill relating to food or farm policy that does not substantially reverse the cuts to SNAP.

And farmers who receive money under the two largest farm subsidy programs are not even required to grow the specific crops those programs are meant to support. Rather, they must simply own farmland that was designated in 1996 as having grown that crop in the early 1980s.

Farmers have repeatedly said they would prefer federal farm policies that support markets and create conditions for stable, fair commodity prices. And evidence shows that spending more money on farm subsidies does little to actually improve underlying economic conditions affecting the costs of farming or the prices of what is grown.

And yet, in early December 2025, the Department of Agriculture released an additional $12 billion to help offset losses farmers experienced when Trump’s tariffs reduced agricultural exports. In mid-December, the National Farmers Union said that money still wasn’t enough to cover losses from consistently low commodity prices and high seed and fertilizer costs.

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A regular five-year farm bill may be out of reach

The success of any bill depends on political will in Congress and outside pressure coming together to deliver the required number of votes.

Some leaders in Congress remain optimistic about the prospects of a farm bill passing in 2026, but major legislation is rare with midterm elections looming, so meaningful progress appears unlikely. It seems to us more likely that the ongoing stalemate will continue indefinitely.

In September 2025, Politico reported that instead of a complete five-year farm bill, the House and Senate committees on agriculture might take up a series of smaller bills to extend existing programs whose authorizations are expiring. Doing so would be an effective declaration that a permanent five-year farm bill is on indefinite hold.

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Prospects for sustainable farm policy

By using financial incentives cleverly, Congress has shifted farming practices over time in ways that lawmakers determined were in the public’s interest.

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, for instance, allocated $20 billion over four years to encourage farmers to reduce or offset carbon emissions, which the Agriculture Department calls “climate-smart agriculture.” Those funds, along with a separate Department of Agriculture initiative with similar aims, were well received by American farmers. Farmers applied for far more money than was actually available.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act tax and spending law cut those funds and repurposed them for traditional Agriculture Department programs for farmers who want to implement conservation practices on their land.

But unexpectedly, the Trump administration’s “Make America Healthy Again,” or MAHA, agenda contains some ideas that climate-smart advocates have previously advanced. These include scathing indictments of the effects of conventional agriculture on Americans’ health, including concerns over pesticide use and the so-far-undefined category of “ultra-processed foods.”

The MAHA agenda could be an opportunity for organic farmers to secure a boost in federal funding. In December, the Agriculture Department committed $700 million toward “regenerative” practices, but that’s a trifling amount compared with the billions commodity farmers received in 2025.

And the administration’s allies who support conventional agriculture have already expressed concerns that MAHA efforts might reduce the nation’s agricultural productivity. The administration may end up caught between the MAHA movement and Big Ag.

Overall, in this new political environment, we believe advocates for changes in agriculture and food aid will likely need to rethink how to advance their agendas without the promise of a farm bill coming anytime soon.

Since the end of December, 2025, X’s artificial intelligence chatbot, Grok, has responded to many users’ requests to undress real people by turning photos of the people into sexually explicit material. After people began using the feature, the social platform company faced global scrutiny for enabling users to generate nonconsensual sexually explicit depictions of real people.

By Wayne Unger
Quinnipiac University

(THE CONVERSATION) — Since the end of December, 2025, X’s artificial intelligence chatbot, Grok, has responded to many users’ requests to undress real people by turning photos of the people into sexually explicit material. After people began using the feature, the social platform company faced global scrutiny for enabling users to generate nonconsensual sexually explicit depictions of real people.

The Grok account has posted thousands of “nudified” and sexually suggestive images per hour. Even more disturbing, Grok has generated sexualized images and sexually explicit material of minors.

X’s response: Blame the platform’s users, not us. The company issued a statement on Jan. 3, 2026, saying that “Anyone using or prompting Grok to make illegal content will suffer the same consequences as if they upload illegal content.” It’s not clear what action, if any, X has taken against any users.

As a legal scholar who studies the intersection of law and emerging technologies, I see this flurry of nonconsensual imagery as a predictable outcome of the combination of X’s lax content moderation policies and the accessibility of powerful generative AI tools.

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Targeting users

The rapid rise in generative AI has led to countless websites, apps and chatbots that allow users to produce sexually explicit material, including “nudification” of real children’s images. But these apps and websites are not as widely known or used as any of the major social media platforms, like X.

State legislatures and Congress were somewhat quick to respond. In May 2025, Congress enacted the Take It Down Act, which makes it a criminal offense to publish nonconsensual sexually explicit material of real people. The Take It Down Act criminalizes both the nonconsensual publication of “intimate visual depictions” of identifiable people and AI- or otherwise computer-generated depictions of identifiable people.

Those criminal provisions apply only to any individuals who post the sexually explicit content, not to the platforms that distribute the content, such as social media websites.

Other provisions of the Take It Down Act, however, require platforms to establish a process for the people depicted to request the removal of the imagery. Once a “Take It Down Request” is submitted, a platform must remove the sexually explicit depiction within 48 hours. But these requirements do not take effect until May 19, 2026.

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Problems with platforms

Meanwhile, user requests to take down the sexually explicit imagery produced by Grok have apparently gone unanswered. Even the mother of one of Elon Musk’s children, Ashley St. Clair, has not been able to get X to remove the fake sexualized images of her that Musk’s fans produced using Grok. The Guardian reports that St. Clair said her “complaints to X staff went nowhere.”

This does not surprise me because Musk gutted then-Twitter’s Trust and Safety advisory group shortly after he acquired the platform and fired 80% of the company’s engineers dedicated to trust and safety. Trust and safety teams are typically responsible for content moderation and initiatives to prevent abuse at tech companies.

Publicly, it appears that Musk has dismissed the seriousness of the situation. Musk has reportedly posted laugh-cry emojis in response to some of the images, and X responded to a Reuters reporter’s inquiry with the auto-reply “Legacy Media Lies.”

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Limits of lawsuits

Civil lawsuits like the one filed by the parents of Adam Raine, a teenager who committed suicide in April 2025 after interacting with OpenAI’s ChatGPT, are one way to hold platforms accountable. But lawsuits face an uphill battle in the United States given Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which generally immunizes social media platforms from legal liability for the content that users post on their platforms.

Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas and many legal scholars, however, have argued that Section 230 has been applied too broadly by courts. I generally agree that Section 230 immunity needs to be narrowed because immunizing tech companies and their platforms for their deliberate design choices – how their software is built, how the software operates and what the software produces – falls outside the scope of Section 230’s protections.

In this case, X has either knowingly or negligently failed to deploy safeguards and controls in Grok to prevent users from generating sexually explicit imagery of identifiable people. Even if Musk and X believe that users should have the ability to generate sexually explicit images of adults using Grok, I believe that in no world should X escape accountability for building a product that generates sexually explicit material of real-life children.

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Regulatory guardrails

If people cannot hold platforms like X accountable via civil lawsuits, then it falls to the federal government to investigate and regulate them. The Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice or Congress, for example, could investigate X for Grok’s generation of nonconsensual sexually explicit material. But with Musk’s renewed political ties to President Donald Trump, I do not expect any serious investigations and accountability anytime soon.

For now, international regulators have launched investigations against X and Grok. French authorities have commenced investigations into “the proliferation of sexually explicit deepfakes” from Grok, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and Digital Rights Ireland have strongly urged Ireland’s national police to investigate the “mass undressing spree.” The U.K. regulatory agency Office of Communications said it is investigating the matter, and regulators in the European Commission, India and Malaysia are reportedly investigating X as well.

In the United States, perhaps the best course of action until the Take It Down Act goes into effect in May is for people to demand action from elected officials.

Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal President Nicolás Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

(THE CONVERSATION) — Perhaps no one outside of Venezuela or Cuba should care more about the U.S. capture of nominal President Nicolás Maduro than the Islamic Republic of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Khamenei and his regime are in trouble, and it’s not clear how they would survive should the Trump administration decide to support the millions who want a new government system without Khamenei and his ilk.

Iran has no state allies that would be willing to intervene militarily on its behalf. Further, its once-powerful network of partner and proxy militias – Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and other members of the Axis of Resistance – has been rendered incapable or reluctant to get involved. And Iran’s economy is in shambles in the midst of an ongoing water crisis with no relief in sight.

Further, the Iranian people have again taken to the streets to air their grievances against harsh economic conditions as well as government corruption, mismanagement and hypocrisy, echoing similar conditions to Venezuela in recent years.

Lastly, President Donald Trump has returned his attention to Iran. On Jan. 2, Trump warned Khamenei that if his forces violently suppress protesters, Iran would be “hit very hard” by the U.S.

Trump’s warning and show of solidarity will likely embolden protesters, which will almost certainly cause Iran’s internal security to crack down harder, as has happened in the past. Such U.S. intervention could lead to the overthrowing of the ayatollah, intended or not. Furthermore, Maduro’s fate demonstrates that the Trump administration is willing to use military force for that purpose if deemed necessary.

As an analyst of Middle East affairs focusing on Iran, I believe that these conditions place Khamenei’s regime under greater threat today than perhaps any other time in its 46-year history.

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Growing threats, internal and external

If Khamenei hopes to survive politically or mortally, I believe he has three options.

First, he could capitulate to U.S. demands to halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, Iran could sprint toward a nuclear bomb. Lastly, he could flee.

In hopes of restoring deterrence, Khamenei could also continue rebuilding his country’s military capabilities, which were significantly degraded during the June 2025 12-day war in which Israel and the U.S. aimed to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability.

Israel is eager to stifle Iran’s reconstitution plans, protests are spreading and growing more intense, and Trump – through hostile rhetoric and offensive military action – has put Khamenei on notice.

Khamenei’s problems aren’t his alone. The revolutionary theocratic system of government that he leads is in danger of falling. And his military and internal security apparatus may not have the time or ability to address its growing and interrelated internal and external threats simultaneously.

There are two fundamental factors analysts like me consider when assessing enemy threats: offensive capability to inflict damage and hostile intentions to use these capabilities to harm enemies.

Determining offensive capability involves evaluating the quality of a country or organization’s complete arsenal – air, ground, maritime, cyber and space capabilities – and how trained, disciplined, integrated and lethal their forces might be. Determining intentions involves evaluating if, when and under what conditions offensive capabilities will be used to achieve their goals.

If states hope to survive when they come under such pressure, their defense strategy should account for differences between their own military capability and the enemy’s, especially if enemies intend to attack. Or states need to convince enemies to be less hostile, if possible.

Maduro’s mistake was his inability to defend against a far superior U.S. military capability while believing that U.S. leaders would not remove him from office. Maduro gambled and lost.

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Bad choices

Iran’s supreme leader faces a similar conundrum: First, there is no foreseeable path that allows Tehran to produce or acquire the military capabilities necessary to deter Israel or defeat the United States, unless Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

And decades of mutual hostility, the memory of Iran’s once-clandestine nuclear weaponization program and recent Iranian lawmaker calls to develop nuclear bombs minimizes the prospect that U.S. leaders view Khamenei’s intentions as anything but hostile.

But as the clear weaker party, it is in Tehran’s interest to change Trump’s mind about Tehran’s hostile intent. The way to do that would be by abandoning nuclear enrichment.

In terms of threat analysis, the regime’s oft-repeated chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” perhaps have sent an easily misinterpreted message: that Iran’s hostile leaders intend to destroy the U.S. and Israel. But they simply lack the capability, for now.

President Theodore Roosevelt famously said “speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” Today, he might say that Khamenei is unwise for speaking with such vitriol considering the size of Iran’s stick. The United States and Israel possess military capabilities far superior to Iran’s – as demonstrated by the 12-day war – but they did not then share the same intent. Though both Israel and the U.S. operations shared the objective of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capability, Israel’s objectives were more broad and included targeting senior Iranian leaders and destabilizing the regime.

To Khamenei’s momentary personal and institutional fortune, Trump immediately called for a ceasefire following U.S. B-2 strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, delineating the United States’ narrower objectives that at the time did not include regime change in Iran.

But that was before U.S. forces removed Maduro from Caracas and before the outbreak of protests in Iran, both of which coincide with Israel’s signaling preparations for Round 2 against Iran.

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Iran without Khamenei?

During Trump’s Dec. 29 press conference at Mar-a-Lago with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he warned that the U.S. could “knock the hell” out of Iran if the country reconstitutes its nuclear facilities.

This is separate from the ominous warning that the U.S. could intervene on behalf of Iranian protesters; it would almost certainly differ in scale.

Nevertheless, a potential U.S. intervention could embolden protesters and further undermine and destabilize the Islamic Republic regime. Khamenei has predictably scoffed at and dismissed Trump’s warning.

I believe this is a serious mistake.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on Jan. 3, 2025, that Khamenei should not “play games” as Maduro did. Khamenei, Rubio said, should take Trump’s warnings seriously. I agree.

If Iran refrains from violent crackdowns on protesters, there is a chance that anti-government protestors overthrow the government. But the supreme leader’s chances of surviving a popular uprising are probably greater than surviving an unbridled U.S. or Israeli military intent on ushering in a new – post-Islamic Republic – Iran.

Otherwise, Khamenei has to address superior U.S. and Israeli military capability, quickly. But Iran is broke, and even if sanctions were not continuously strangling Iran economically, the country could probably never purchase its way to military parity with the U.S. or Israel.

Alternatively, Iran could determine that it must move quickly to develop a nuclear weapon to mitigate U.S. and Israeli military capabilities and deter future aggression. However, it is extremely unlikely Iran could do this without U.S. and Israeli intelligence discovering the project, which would immediately trigger an overwhelming military campaign that would likely expedite regime change in Iran.

And like Maduro, the supreme leader is utterly alone. None of Maduro’s closest partners – China, Russia, Cuba and even Iran – were willing to fight in his defense, despite weeks of forewarning and U.S. military buildup near Venezuela.

Under these circumstances, it may be impossible for Khamenei to address overwhelming U.S. and Israeli military capabilities. He could, however, reduce the threat by doing what is necessary to ensure the United States’ objectives for Iran remain narrow and focused on the nuclear program, which may also keep Israel at bay.

However, Khamenei would have to demonstrate unprecedented restraint from cracking down violently on protesters and a willingness to give up nuclear enrichment. Due to historical animosity and distrust toward the U.S., both are unlikely, increasing, I believe, the probability of a forthcoming Iran without Khamenei.

The U.S. military operation in Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, topped off months of military buildup and targeted strikes in the Caribbean Sea. It fulfills President Donald Trump’s claim to assert authoritative control over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

By Shelley Inglis
Rutgers University

(THE CONVERSATION) — The U.S. military operation in Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3, 2026, topped off months of military buildup and targeted strikes in the Caribbean Sea. It fulfills President Donald Trump’s claim to assert authoritative control over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in his administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy.

Some national security experts say U.S. military action in Venezuela – taken without U.S. congressional approval or U.N. Security Council authorization – is unlawful. It may violate domestic and international law.

The Venezuela attack represents the clearest example during Trump’s second presidency of the shift from traditional American values of democratic freedom and the rules-based international order to an America exerting unilateral power based purely on perceived economic interests and military might. Autocratic leaders are unconstrained by law and balance of power, using force to impose their will on others.

So, what does this transition from a liberal America in the world to an autocratic U.S. look like? After decades of working internationally on democracy and peace-building, I see three interrelated areas of long-standing U.S. foreign policy engagement being unraveled.

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1. Peace and conflict prevention

The Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela reflect its “peace through strength” approach to international relations, which emphasizes military power. The actions also follow the emphasis the administration places on economic pressure and wins as a deterrent to war and a cudgel for peace.

This approach contrasts with decades of diplomatic efforts to build peace processes that last.

Foreign policy experts point out that the Trump administration’s emphasis on business deal-making in its conduct of foreign relations, focused on bargaining between positions, misses the point of peacemaking, which is to address underlying interests shared by parties and build the trust required to tackle the drivers of conflict.

Trump’s focus on deal-making also counters the world’s traditional reliance on the U.S. as an honest broker and a reliable economic partner that supports free trade. Trump made it clear that U.S. interest in oil is a key rationale for the Venezuela attack.

Before Venezuela, the limits of the Trump administration’s approach were already showing in the global conflicts Trump claims to have halted. That’s evident in ongoing violence between Thailand and Cambodia and in ceasefire violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Moreover, U.S. expertise and resources for sustainable peacemaking and preventing conflict are gone.

The entire Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations in the U.S. Department of State was dismantled in May 2025, while funding for conflict prevention and key peace programs like Women, Peace and Security was cut.

Trump’s unilateral military action against Venezuela belie an authentic commitment to sustainable peace.

While it’s too soon to predict Venezuela’s future under U.S. control, the Trump administration’s approach is likely to drive more global conflict and violence in 2026, as major powers begin to understand the different rules and learn to play the new game.

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2. Democracy and human rights

Since the 1980s, U.S. national security strategies have incorporated aspects of democracy promotion and human rights as U.S. values.

Trump has not highlighted human rights and democracy as rationales for capturing Maduro. And, so far, the administration has rejected claims to the Venezuelan leadership by opposition leader María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, widely considered the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election.

Much of the U.S. foreign policy to build democracy globally and promote human rights was delivered through foreign assistance, worth over US$3 billion in 2024. The Trump administration cut that by nearly 75% in 2025.

These funds sought to promote fair elections, supporting civil societies and free media globally. They were also meant to help enable independent and corruption-free judiciaries in many countries, including Venezuela.

Since 1998, for example, the U.S. has funded 85% of the annual $10 million budget of the U.N Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. The fund, now imperiled, helps survivors recover from torture in the U.S. and around the world.

The congressionally mandated annual Human Rights Report issued by the State Department in August signaled the Trump administration’s intent to undermine key human rights obligations of foreign governments.

However, the White House has used tariffs, sanctions and military strikes to punish countries on purported human rights-related grounds, such as in Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa. Equally concerning to democracy defenders is its rhetoric chastising European democracies and apparent willingness to elevate political parties in Europe that reject human rights.

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3. International cooperation

A major aim of U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been to counter threats to America’s security that require cooperation with other governments.

But the Trump administration is ignoring or denying many transnational threats. They include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, new technologies and climate change.

Moreover, the tools that America helped build to tackle shared global threats, like international law and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, have been disparaged and undermined.

Even before the U.S. attack on Venezuela, scholars were warning of the collapse of the international norm, embedded in the U.N. Charter, that prohibits the use of force by one sovereign country against another, except in specific cases of self-defense.

Early in 2025, Trump signaled an end to much of U.S. multilateral engagement, pulling the country out of many international bodies, agendas and treaties.

The administration proposed eliminating its contributions to U.N. agencies like the fund for children. It is also allocating only $300 million this year to the U.N., which is about one-fifth of the membership dues it owes the organization by law. A looming budgetary crisis has now consumed this sole worldwide deliberation body.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration says migration and drug trafficking, including from Venezuela, pose the greatest security threats. Its solutions – continuing U.S. economic and military might in the Americas – ignore shared challenges like corruption and human trafficking that drive these threats and also undermine U.S. economic security.

There is also evidence that the Trump administration is not only disregarding international law and retreating from America’s long-standing respect for international cooperation, but it’s also seeking to reshape policy in its own image and punish those it disagrees with.

For example, its call to reframe global refugee protections – to undermine the principle that prohibits a return of people to a country where they could be persecuted – would alter decades-old international and U.S. domestic law. 
The Trump administration has already dismantled much of the U.S. refugee program, lowering the cap for 2025 to historic levels.

Even for those who work in international institutions, there could also be a price to pay for an illiberal America. For instance, the Trump administration has economically sanctioned many judges and prosecutors of the International Criminal Court for their work.

And the administration has threatened more sanctions unless the court promises not to prosecute Trump – a more salient challenge now with the apparent U.S. aggression against Venezuela, which is a party to the International Criminal Court.

Some democracy experts worry that the U.S. military action in Venezuela not only undermines international law, but it may also serve to reinforce Trump’s project to undo the rule of law and democracy at home.