By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service
A law passed in the wake of the Larry Nassar scandal extending the statute of limitations for child victims of sexual abuse to sue for damages is not retroactive and addressed only future claims, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Wednesday.
In an opinion written by Justice Megan Cavanagh, the high court’s majority in McLain v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing (MSC Docket No. 165741) upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse a trial court order regarding PA 182 of 2018 and PA 183 of 2018. The per curiam ruling declared the Legislature “plainly” did not intend for the law to apply retroactively to claims that were already time-barred before the statute was enacted in 2018.
Cavanagh, joined by Justice Richard Bernstein, Justice Elizabeth Welch and Justice Kyra Harris Bolden, wrote that the high court majority affirmed the Court of Appeals.
“This case concerns the effect of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) on the accrual date for civil claims based on allegations of criminal sexual conduct against minors. MCL 600.5851b was enacted in 2018, in the wake of the Larry Nassar criminal sexual conduct convictions, to specifically address the circumstances under which individuals who are or were victims of criminal sexual conduct may sue for damages,” Cavanagh wrote. “While Subsection (1)(b) creates a discovery rule for tolling the accrual date of future claims, we hold that it does not apply retroactively to resuscitate lapsed claims premised on past acts of criminal sexual conduct. Because plaintiff’s complaint alleges damages caused by sexual abuse that occurred nearly 30 years ago, it is untimely.”
That said, the court’s majority disagreed with the appellate panel’s holding on how, or if, the law affected the accrual date of child sex abuse claims.
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, Justice David Viviano and Justice Brian Zahra concurred with the majority in its holding that the law does not apply retroactively to resuscitate lapsed claims and that the plaintiffs claim was untimely but dissented on the accrual portion.
The plaintiff in the case, while a minor in 1999, was sexually abused by defendant Richard Lobert, a priest for the Diocese of Lansing and the Archdiocese of Baltimore.
The plaintiff filed the complaint in 2021, alleging claims of negligence against all three defendants based on sexual abuse. In 2018, before the plaintiff filed his complaint, the Legislature enacted MCL 600.5851b. A section of the new law extended the statute of limitations for individuals who, while a minor, were “the victim of criminal sexual conduct” to “three years after the date the individual discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the individual’s injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the criminal sexual conduct.” The plaintiff suffered from mental health issues and didn’t make the connection between the health problems and the abuse until 2020.
The plaintiff argued retroactivity was not an issue because the acts changed the accrual date for actions based on criminal sexual conduct that occurred while the plaintiff was a minor from the date on which the criminal sexual conduct occurred to the date on which the plaintiff discovered the causal relationship between the criminal sexual conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and denied the defendant’s motions for summary disposition.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s actions.
As the Legislature debated these acts in 2018, in response to the Larry Nassar scandal at Michigan State University, early versions of the bills did apply those sections retroactively. The version of the bills that passed the Senate had support of survivors but were changed in the House.
At one point, the legislation would have provided a yearlong window for anyone sexually abused as a minor after 1997 to bring forward a civil suit. The House version – the final version signed into law – kept the same date but limited the window to 90 days to file suit and included restrictions so narrow it likely only applied to those abused by Nassar.
In its decision affirming that the Legislature did not mean for the bills to be retroactive, the Court of Appeals noted the early versions of the legislation that were later changed.
Cavanagh and the high court’s majority agreed with the retroactivity piece, but said it disagreed on accrual bit.
“Whether MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) is characterized as a tolling of the general accrual rule or an extension of or exception to the statute of limitations is largely a matter of semantics,” she wrote. “A statute that states that a particular cause of action can be brought within a certain amount of time (i.e., three years) following the discovery of a particular condition (i.e., the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and criminal sexual conduct) has the practical effect of extending the statute of limitations because it changes or tolls the starting point from which the statute of limitations is calculated – i.e., the accrual date.”
Cavanagh added that the Nassar law was a hybrid. Subsection (1)(a) was “a straightforward extension of the statute of limitations because it extends the time for a minor to file an action from until at least age 19 (i.e., one year after the disability of minority is removed, MCL 600.5851) to age 28,” but Subsection (1)(b) was “an unmistakable statutory codification of a discovery rule.”
“It does not simply extend the statute of limitations an additional three years. Rather, it changes the date from which the three-year period begins to run. In other words, it tolls the accrual date,” Cavanagh wrote. “Under a discovery-based analysis, a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff knows, or objectively should know, that they have a cause of action and can allege it in a proper complaint. That is exactly what Subsection (1)(b) does: it provides that the claim accrues when the plaintiff ‘discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,’ both the individual’s injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the criminal sexual conduct. The date of the offense does not control when the claim accrues.”
That said, because the plaintiff’s initial negligence claim would require retroactive application and is barred by the statute of limitations, the court ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary disposition for the Diocese.
Zahra, in a dissent joined by Clement and Viviano, wrote that he disagreed with the opinion’s characterization of the law as creating a discovery rule for measuring the accrual date of the limitations period for claims of criminal sexual conduct.
“The plain language of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) makes clear that it merely creates an extended statute of limitations for those who were sexually abused as minors,” he wrote. “MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) does not affect the date on which a claim accrues. Instead, it provides an extended statute of limitations for civil claims by victims who suffered criminal sexual abuse as minors. The extended statute of limitations would apply here if the plaintiff’s claim accrued after MCL 600.5851b(1) came into effect. But the plaintiff’s claim arose and then expired many years before the passage of MCL 600.5851b(1).”
On the majority’s characterization that the accrual rule was a matter of semantics, Zahra wrote that the court needed to analyze the plain language to understand how that provision functions. For those reasons, Zahra argued that the majority opinion fails to support its holding on the accrual date and was contrary to the plain language of the law.
“Accrual rules and exceptions to the statute of limitations are distinct legal concepts that should not be conflated in our jurisprudence,” Zahra wrote. “And the majority opinion does not point to language in MCL 600.5851b(1) that would alter the MCL 600.5827 general rule of accrual. Nor does the majority opinion identify any language in the statute that creates a new cause of action.”
Gongwer News Service
A law passed in the wake of the Larry Nassar scandal extending the statute of limitations for child victims of sexual abuse to sue for damages is not retroactive and addressed only future claims, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Wednesday.
In an opinion written by Justice Megan Cavanagh, the high court’s majority in McLain v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing (MSC Docket No. 165741) upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision to reverse a trial court order regarding PA 182 of 2018 and PA 183 of 2018. The per curiam ruling declared the Legislature “plainly” did not intend for the law to apply retroactively to claims that were already time-barred before the statute was enacted in 2018.
Cavanagh, joined by Justice Richard Bernstein, Justice Elizabeth Welch and Justice Kyra Harris Bolden, wrote that the high court majority affirmed the Court of Appeals.
“This case concerns the effect of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) on the accrual date for civil claims based on allegations of criminal sexual conduct against minors. MCL 600.5851b was enacted in 2018, in the wake of the Larry Nassar criminal sexual conduct convictions, to specifically address the circumstances under which individuals who are or were victims of criminal sexual conduct may sue for damages,” Cavanagh wrote. “While Subsection (1)(b) creates a discovery rule for tolling the accrual date of future claims, we hold that it does not apply retroactively to resuscitate lapsed claims premised on past acts of criminal sexual conduct. Because plaintiff’s complaint alleges damages caused by sexual abuse that occurred nearly 30 years ago, it is untimely.”
That said, the court’s majority disagreed with the appellate panel’s holding on how, or if, the law affected the accrual date of child sex abuse claims.
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, Justice David Viviano and Justice Brian Zahra concurred with the majority in its holding that the law does not apply retroactively to resuscitate lapsed claims and that the plaintiffs claim was untimely but dissented on the accrual portion.
The plaintiff in the case, while a minor in 1999, was sexually abused by defendant Richard Lobert, a priest for the Diocese of Lansing and the Archdiocese of Baltimore.
The plaintiff filed the complaint in 2021, alleging claims of negligence against all three defendants based on sexual abuse. In 2018, before the plaintiff filed his complaint, the Legislature enacted MCL 600.5851b. A section of the new law extended the statute of limitations for individuals who, while a minor, were “the victim of criminal sexual conduct” to “three years after the date the individual discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, both the individual’s injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the criminal sexual conduct.” The plaintiff suffered from mental health issues and didn’t make the connection between the health problems and the abuse until 2020.
The plaintiff argued retroactivity was not an issue because the acts changed the accrual date for actions based on criminal sexual conduct that occurred while the plaintiff was a minor from the date on which the criminal sexual conduct occurred to the date on which the plaintiff discovered the causal relationship between the criminal sexual conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and denied the defendant’s motions for summary disposition.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s actions.
As the Legislature debated these acts in 2018, in response to the Larry Nassar scandal at Michigan State University, early versions of the bills did apply those sections retroactively. The version of the bills that passed the Senate had support of survivors but were changed in the House.
At one point, the legislation would have provided a yearlong window for anyone sexually abused as a minor after 1997 to bring forward a civil suit. The House version – the final version signed into law – kept the same date but limited the window to 90 days to file suit and included restrictions so narrow it likely only applied to those abused by Nassar.
In its decision affirming that the Legislature did not mean for the bills to be retroactive, the Court of Appeals noted the early versions of the legislation that were later changed.
Cavanagh and the high court’s majority agreed with the retroactivity piece, but said it disagreed on accrual bit.
“Whether MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) is characterized as a tolling of the general accrual rule or an extension of or exception to the statute of limitations is largely a matter of semantics,” she wrote. “A statute that states that a particular cause of action can be brought within a certain amount of time (i.e., three years) following the discovery of a particular condition (i.e., the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and criminal sexual conduct) has the practical effect of extending the statute of limitations because it changes or tolls the starting point from which the statute of limitations is calculated – i.e., the accrual date.”
Cavanagh added that the Nassar law was a hybrid. Subsection (1)(a) was “a straightforward extension of the statute of limitations because it extends the time for a minor to file an action from until at least age 19 (i.e., one year after the disability of minority is removed, MCL 600.5851) to age 28,” but Subsection (1)(b) was “an unmistakable statutory codification of a discovery rule.”
“It does not simply extend the statute of limitations an additional three years. Rather, it changes the date from which the three-year period begins to run. In other words, it tolls the accrual date,” Cavanagh wrote. “Under a discovery-based analysis, a claim does not accrue until a plaintiff knows, or objectively should know, that they have a cause of action and can allege it in a proper complaint. That is exactly what Subsection (1)(b) does: it provides that the claim accrues when the plaintiff ‘discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,’ both the individual’s injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the criminal sexual conduct. The date of the offense does not control when the claim accrues.”
That said, because the plaintiff’s initial negligence claim would require retroactive application and is barred by the statute of limitations, the court ultimately affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary disposition for the Diocese.
Zahra, in a dissent joined by Clement and Viviano, wrote that he disagreed with the opinion’s characterization of the law as creating a discovery rule for measuring the accrual date of the limitations period for claims of criminal sexual conduct.
“The plain language of MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) makes clear that it merely creates an extended statute of limitations for those who were sexually abused as minors,” he wrote. “MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) does not affect the date on which a claim accrues. Instead, it provides an extended statute of limitations for civil claims by victims who suffered criminal sexual abuse as minors. The extended statute of limitations would apply here if the plaintiff’s claim accrued after MCL 600.5851b(1) came into effect. But the plaintiff’s claim arose and then expired many years before the passage of MCL 600.5851b(1).”
On the majority’s characterization that the accrual rule was a matter of semantics, Zahra wrote that the court needed to analyze the plain language to understand how that provision functions. For those reasons, Zahra argued that the majority opinion fails to support its holding on the accrual date and was contrary to the plain language of the law.
“Accrual rules and exceptions to the statute of limitations are distinct legal concepts that should not be conflated in our jurisprudence,” Zahra wrote. “And the majority opinion does not point to language in MCL 600.5851b(1) that would alter the MCL 600.5827 general rule of accrual. Nor does the majority opinion identify any language in the statute that creates a new cause of action.”
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