By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service
In a case dealing with whether a defendant poses a danger to society, a trial court’s decision to set aside a conviction based on public welfare cannot be determined solely by looking at the impact setting aside the conviction might have on individuals or a limited group of people, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The high court split 5-2 in People v. Butka (MSC Docket No. 164598), with an opinion written by Justice Richard Bernstein. The court found that there was no true statutory definition of “public welfare,” but that it amounted to society at large and not just the impact a set aside might have on two minor stepdaughters who were sexually abused by their stepfather, the defendant. The Court of Appeals therefore erred and the decision to not grant a conviction set aside was reversed, the justice wrote.
Bernstein’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, Justice Megan Cavanagh, Justice Elizabeth Welch and Justice Kyra Harris Bolden.
The majority also held that the Otsego Circuit Court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s application to set aside the remaining of three criminal sexual conduct related convictions because no record evidence supported a finding that either the circumstances and behavior of the defendant, or the public welfare, weighed in favor of denying his request.
The case was remanded to the trial court with an order to set aside the conviction.
Justice Brian Zahra wrote a separate opinion in which he agreed with the majority on the trial court’s abuse of discretion, but he disagreed with the majority’s understanding of the term “public welfare” under the Michigan Penal Code’s section dealing with child abuse.
Justice David Viviano dissented, saying he disagreed with the sum of the majority’s holding because it improperly discouraged trial judges from considering the feelings and views of those who might be most affected by CSC crimes.
The defendant in Butka pleaded no contest to third-degree child abuse involving his stepdaughters. He was sentenced to nine months in jail and two years of probation, which he successfully completed. He sought to have his conviction set aside, which the trial court denied twice.
The victims opposed a third attempt, and the trial court denied it because it was not in the public welfare to do so. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded and ordered the ruling to be reconsidered. The appellate panel affirmed the trial court. The defendant then asked the high court to determine whether that ruling was in error and if the trial court abused its discretion.
Bernstein wrote that public welfare was a legal term of art initially added to the statute in a 1982 amendment. The Court of Appeals erred when it interpreted the term to include every member of the public, but not just as a whole, but also potentially just a few individuals who make up that greater whole.
The majority found that the interpretation disregarded term of art logic, which expressly excludes an interpretation of that public welfare may be determined by a limited class of people. The trial court did not err by hearing statements of the victims, Bernstein wrote, but they were not representative of all the individuals who should be considered when determining a ruling based on public welfare.
The record evidence bore no straight conclusion that the defendant might reoffend, and that should have weighed in favor of granted his request to set aside the third conviction.
Zahra wrote that the question before the court was whether the substance of his stepdaughters’ statements formed a sufficient basis to conclude that expungement was warranted or inconsistent with the public welfare. He added that victim statements might reveal that a defendant’s conduct could have supported ineligibility for a set aside, but the trial court in this case only considered those statements.
In that context, Zahra wrote, the statements were not necessarily relevant to whether expungement was consistent with the term of art definition of public welfare.
Aside from his stance that the court may have created disincentives for trial courts from considering the views of victims, Viviano noted that judges have broad discretion under statute, and that even if a defendant satisfies the legal hurdles for expungement, grating it is not always mandatory.
Gongwer News Service
In a case dealing with whether a defendant poses a danger to society, a trial court’s decision to set aside a conviction based on public welfare cannot be determined solely by looking at the impact setting aside the conviction might have on individuals or a limited group of people, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled Monday.
The high court split 5-2 in People v. Butka (MSC Docket No. 164598), with an opinion written by Justice Richard Bernstein. The court found that there was no true statutory definition of “public welfare,” but that it amounted to society at large and not just the impact a set aside might have on two minor stepdaughters who were sexually abused by their stepfather, the defendant. The Court of Appeals therefore erred and the decision to not grant a conviction set aside was reversed, the justice wrote.
Bernstein’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, Justice Megan Cavanagh, Justice Elizabeth Welch and Justice Kyra Harris Bolden.
The majority also held that the Otsego Circuit Court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant’s application to set aside the remaining of three criminal sexual conduct related convictions because no record evidence supported a finding that either the circumstances and behavior of the defendant, or the public welfare, weighed in favor of denying his request.
The case was remanded to the trial court with an order to set aside the conviction.
Justice Brian Zahra wrote a separate opinion in which he agreed with the majority on the trial court’s abuse of discretion, but he disagreed with the majority’s understanding of the term “public welfare” under the Michigan Penal Code’s section dealing with child abuse.
Justice David Viviano dissented, saying he disagreed with the sum of the majority’s holding because it improperly discouraged trial judges from considering the feelings and views of those who might be most affected by CSC crimes.
The defendant in Butka pleaded no contest to third-degree child abuse involving his stepdaughters. He was sentenced to nine months in jail and two years of probation, which he successfully completed. He sought to have his conviction set aside, which the trial court denied twice.
The victims opposed a third attempt, and the trial court denied it because it was not in the public welfare to do so. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded and ordered the ruling to be reconsidered. The appellate panel affirmed the trial court. The defendant then asked the high court to determine whether that ruling was in error and if the trial court abused its discretion.
Bernstein wrote that public welfare was a legal term of art initially added to the statute in a 1982 amendment. The Court of Appeals erred when it interpreted the term to include every member of the public, but not just as a whole, but also potentially just a few individuals who make up that greater whole.
The majority found that the interpretation disregarded term of art logic, which expressly excludes an interpretation of that public welfare may be determined by a limited class of people. The trial court did not err by hearing statements of the victims, Bernstein wrote, but they were not representative of all the individuals who should be considered when determining a ruling based on public welfare.
The record evidence bore no straight conclusion that the defendant might reoffend, and that should have weighed in favor of granted his request to set aside the third conviction.
Zahra wrote that the question before the court was whether the substance of his stepdaughters’ statements formed a sufficient basis to conclude that expungement was warranted or inconsistent with the public welfare. He added that victim statements might reveal that a defendant’s conduct could have supported ineligibility for a set aside, but the trial court in this case only considered those statements.
In that context, Zahra wrote, the statements were not necessarily relevant to whether expungement was consistent with the term of art definition of public welfare.
Aside from his stance that the court may have created disincentives for trial courts from considering the views of victims, Viviano noted that judges have broad discretion under statute, and that even if a defendant satisfies the legal hurdles for expungement, grating it is not always mandatory.
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