The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will hear oral arguments in 11 cases on Wednesday, April 9, and Thursday, April 10, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa, Lansing. Oral arguments will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, April 9, 2025
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166782
SARAH MARIE MARKIEWICZ, (attorney Nicholas Curcio)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Switalski, M.)
DAVID RANDAL MARKIEWICZ, (attorney Trish Oleska Haas)
Defendant-Appellee.
The parties were married in 2009 and had four children during their marriage. Their first child was conceived through an in vitro fertilization (IVF) process using the plaintiff’s sister’s egg and the defendant’s sperm. The second child was conceived naturally. And the third and fourth children (twins) were conceived through IVF, again using the plaintiff’s sister’s egg and the defendant’s sperm. During the IVF process with the twins, the parties had three embryos at their disposal. They chose to proceed with implanting two of them in the plaintiff and cryogenically preserving the last one. The parties divorced in 2020, resolving all issues except what to do with the frozen embryo. The plaintiff wanted the embryo to potentially use in the future and the defendant wanted the embryo because he did not want another child or another child to be born from his DNA. The trial court concluded that the embryo was marital property and that the equities favored granting the embryo to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether there is a valid agreement between the parties addressing the disposition of the embryo, and if not, to then balance the interests of the parties. On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, concluded that the terms of the parties’ contract prior to engaging in IVF did not resolve the dispute, weighed the equities, and awarded the embryo to the defendant. The plaintiff again appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the lower courts properly construed the parties’ agreement with the storage facility; (2) whether the lower courts properly balanced the equities in their application of the factors from Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 (1992), see Karungi v Ejalu, 501 Mich 1051 (2018) (McCormack, J., concurring); Jocelyn P v Joshua P, 250 A3d 373 (Md App, 2021); In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P3d 579 (Colo, 2018); (3) whether Const 1963, art 1, § 28 applies retroactively; and (4), if so, its effect on the instant case.
—————
163989
TIMIKA RAYFORD, (attorney Carla Aikens)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Servitto, M.)
AMERICAN HOUSE ROSEVILLE I, LLC, d/b/a AMERICAN HOUSE EAST I, d/b/a AMERICAN HOUSE, (attorney Daniel Waslawski)
Defendant-Appellee.
NOTE: The case was argued on the application at the November 2023 session of the Court. The application materials and supplemental briefs can be found at the Case Information page for the prior argument.
The plaintiff is a certified nursing assistant who was hired to work at a nursing care facility run by the defendant. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment, claiming that she made a false police report about her purse being stolen from the facility. The plaintiff claims that the alleged false police report was a pretext and that the defendant terminated her employment to retaliate against her for reporting to human resources and the state about inappropriate sexual behavior between the defendant’s upper management and other nursing assistants. Nearly three years after her termination, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging civil rights violations, wrongful discharge, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice, holding that all claims arising out of her employment were barred by a contractual six-month limitations period contained within an employee handbook acknowledgement that she signed early in her employment, and further holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for abuse of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the contractually shortened limitations period is invalid and that an employer should not be able to contractually limit an employee’s time to bring a civil rights claim. After holding the case in abeyance for McMillon v City of Kalamazoo (Docket No. 162680), the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application to address whether Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 244 Mich App 234 (2001), correctly held that contractual limitations clauses which restrict civil rights claims do not violate public policy. See, e.g., Rodriguez v Raymours Furniture Co, Inc, 225 NJ 343 (2016). After hearing oral argument on the application on November 18, 2023, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 268 Mich App 138 (2005), properly extended this Court’s holding in Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005), to employment contracts (see also Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 410 Mich 118 (1981), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich 457, and Herweyer v Clark Hwy Servs, Inc, 455 Mich 14 (1997), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich 457); and (2) if not, whether the contract at issue in this case is an unconscionable contract of adhesion.
The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, April 9, 2025
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
SARAH MARIE MARKIEWICZ, (attorney Nicholas Curcio)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Switalski, M.)
DAVID RANDAL MARKIEWICZ, (attorney Trish Oleska Haas)
Defendant-Appellee.
The parties were married in 2009 and had four children during their marriage. Their first child was conceived through an in vitro fertilization (IVF) process using the plaintiff’s sister’s egg and the defendant’s sperm. The second child was conceived naturally. And the third and fourth children (twins) were conceived through IVF, again using the plaintiff’s sister’s egg and the defendant’s sperm. During the IVF process with the twins, the parties had three embryos at their disposal. They chose to proceed with implanting two of them in the plaintiff and cryogenically preserving the last one. The parties divorced in 2020, resolving all issues except what to do with the frozen embryo. The plaintiff wanted the embryo to potentially use in the future and the defendant wanted the embryo because he did not want another child or another child to be born from his DNA. The trial court concluded that the embryo was marital property and that the equities favored granting the embryo to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether there is a valid agreement between the parties addressing the disposition of the embryo, and if not, to then balance the interests of the parties. On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, concluded that the terms of the parties’ contract prior to engaging in IVF did not resolve the dispute, weighed the equities, and awarded the embryo to the defendant. The plaintiff again appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the lower courts properly construed the parties’ agreement with the storage facility; (2) whether the lower courts properly balanced the equities in their application of the factors from Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141 (1992), see Karungi v Ejalu, 501 Mich 1051 (2018) (McCormack, J., concurring); Jocelyn P v Joshua P, 250 A3d 373 (Md App, 2021); In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P3d 579 (Colo, 2018); (3) whether Const 1963, art 1, § 28 applies retroactively; and (4), if so, its effect on the instant case.
—————
TIMIKA RAYFORD, (attorney Carla Aikens)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Servitto, M.)
AMERICAN HOUSE ROSEVILLE I, LLC, d/b/a AMERICAN HOUSE EAST I, d/b/a AMERICAN HOUSE, (attorney Daniel Waslawski)
Defendant-Appellee.
NOTE: The case was argued on the application at the November 2023 session of the Court. The application materials and supplemental briefs can be found at the Case Information page for the prior argument.
The plaintiff is a certified nursing assistant who was hired to work at a nursing care facility run by the defendant. The defendant terminated the plaintiff’s employment, claiming that she made a false police report about her purse being stolen from the facility. The plaintiff claims that the alleged false police report was a pretext and that the defendant terminated her employment to retaliate against her for reporting to human resources and the state about inappropriate sexual behavior between the defendant’s upper management and other nursing assistants. Nearly three years after her termination, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging civil rights violations, wrongful discharge, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice, holding that all claims arising out of her employment were barred by a contractual six-month limitations period contained within an employee handbook acknowledgement that she signed early in her employment, and further holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for abuse of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the contractually shortened limitations period is invalid and that an employer should not be able to contractually limit an employee’s time to bring a civil rights claim. After holding the case in abeyance for McMillon v City of Kalamazoo (Docket No. 162680), the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application to address whether Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 244 Mich App 234 (2001), correctly held that contractual limitations clauses which restrict civil rights claims do not violate public policy. See, e.g., Rodriguez v Raymours Furniture Co, Inc, 225 NJ 343 (2016). After hearing oral argument on the application on November 18, 2023, the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 268 Mich App 138 (2005), properly extended this Court’s holding in Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457 (2005), to employment contracts (see also Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 410 Mich 118 (1981), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich 457, and Herweyer v Clark Hwy Servs, Inc, 455 Mich 14 (1997), overruled by Rory, 473 Mich 457); and (2) if not, whether the contract at issue in this case is an unconscionable contract of adhesion.
—————
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorneys Jordan Miller, Keith Clark)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Manistee CC - Thompson, D.)
CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN TADGERSON, (attorney Michael Mittlestat)
Defendant-Appellant.
While the defendant was an inmate at a Michigan prison, a fellow inmate slipped a folded paper containing a controlled substance into a slot on the defendant’s cell door. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (PPCS), allowing him to argue that the crime of prisoner in possession of a controlled substance, MCL 800.281(4), requires the prosecutor to prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance. In People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386 (1998), the Court of Appeals held that PPCS is a strict liability offense, but the defendant argues that a knowing possession of contraband is required by MCL 8.9, which codified an intent element for certain crimes and allows strict liability only if the statute plainly imposes strict liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a published opinion, holding that MCL 800.281(4) imposes strict liability. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the offense of being a prisoner in possession of a controlled substance (“PPCS”), MCL 800.281(4), is a strict liability offense or should be construed as having a scienter (knowledge) requirement or mens rea element, see MCL 8.9; People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386 (1998); People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446 (2005); and People v Magnant, 508 Mich 151 (2021); and (2) if PPCS is not a strict liability offense, then what form of scienter requirement or mens rea element applies.
—————
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Jonathan Mycek)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Servitto, M.)
DEVANTE KYRAN JENNINGS, (attorney Jason Eggert)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant’s first jury trial on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) ended in a mistrial at his request after the prosecutor elicited testimony and presented argument concerning the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent. After declaring a mistrial, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that double jeopardy barred retrial, citing Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 675-676 (1982), for the proposition that jeopardy would only attach if the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into requesting a mistrial. Finding no evidence that the prosecutor had such an intent, the trial court allowed the case to be retried. On retrial, the second jury convicted the defendant of CCW and the trial court sentenced him to 1 to 5 years. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that the second trial violated double jeopardy protections. The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) what standard the Court should apply to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial under Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 676 (1982); Pool v Superior Court, 139 Ariz 98, 108-109 (1984); State v McClaugherty, 144 NM 483, 491 (2008); Commonwealth v Smith, 532 Pa 177, 186 (1992); People v Batts, 30 Cal 4th 660, 695-696 (Cal 2003); State v Rogan, 91 Hawaii 405, 423-424 (1999); and (2) whether retrial was impermissible in this case.
—————
Afternoon Session – 1:00 p.m.
166363
MARK A. HACKEL, (attorney David Porter)
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Maceroni, J.)
MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, (attorney Peter Webster)
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
Every fiscal year, plaintiff Macomb County Executive Mark Hackel is responsible for presenting a recommended balanced budget to defendant Macomb County Board of Commissioners. Beginning in 2017, the defendant adopted general appropriations ordinances that required the plaintiff to furnish its Director of Legislative Affairs with real-time, read-only access to the county’s integrated financial software program. The plaintiff refused to do so, which the defendant alleges interfered with its ability to adopt appropriation ordinances. In 2018, the plaintiff sued the defendant regarding a different dispute, and the defendant filed a countercomplaint seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus ordering the plaintiff to grant access to the software program to its Director of Legislative Affairs. The trial court granted partial summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff on the defendant’s countercomplaint, ruling that requiring the plaintiff to furnish access to the software would unlawfully infringe on his authority to “[s]upervise, coordinate, direct, and control” the County Finance Department under § 3.5(a) of the Macomb County Charter. The trial court later dismissed the remaining claims in the defendant’s countercomplaint by stipulation of the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether, pursuant to Macomb County Charter § 8.6.1 and/or the defendant’s annual appropriations ordinances (see, e.g., Ordinance 2017-04 § 10(H)), the plaintiff is required to provide the defendant or its agent with access to real-time, read-only access to financial software programs used by the county; and (2) whether the term “law” as used in Charter § 3.5(a) encompasses ordinances validly enacted by the Commission.
MACOMB COUNTY PROSECUTOR, (attorney John Perrin)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
MACOMB COUNTY EXECUTIVE and COUNTY OF MACOMB, (attorney David Porter)
Defendants-Appellants.
Note: This case is to be argued at the same session as MSC No. 166363, Hackel v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs.
In November 2023, the Macomb County Board of Commissioners (Commission) enacted its 2024 appropriations ordinance, which included a $42,500 line-item for contract services for plaintiff Macomb County Prosecutor to obtain prelitigation services. Macomb County Executive Mark Hackel vetoed that line-item, stating he could not enforce the appropriation because it was contrary to Macomb County Charter § 6.6.5 and Michigan law. The Commission overrode Hackel’s veto and adopted a resolution approving five contracts with various legal practitioners totaling $42,500, but Hackel again refused to disburse funds for the appropriation. The plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act, MCL 141.421 et seq., seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, rejected the defendants’ claim that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was untimely, granted the plaintiff mandamus relief, and ordered Hackel to disburse the $42,500 appropriation. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action under MCL 141.438; (2) whether the plaintiff timely filed his complaint in the Court of Appeals pursuant to MCL 141.438(7); and (3) whether the term “law” as used in Macomb County Charter § 6.6.5 encompasses ordinances validly enacted by the Macomb County Board of Commissioners. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Hackel v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs (Docket No. 166363).
—————
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
166320
LOUIS JACKSON, MICHAEL C. BIRAC, LEE CRAFT, GAYLYNN CRAFT, RONALD HAYES, SMFJ, LLC, EVERTT HODGE, DONALD SWINNEY, STEFANIE BOYD, LISA SMITH, and KIRK BOYD, (attorney Scott Smith)
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Sosnick, E.)
SOUTHFIELD NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION INITIATIVE, FRED ZORN, CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, KEN SIVER, and SOUTHFIELD NON-PROFIT HOUSING CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
OAKLAND COUNTY, (attorneyWilliam Horton)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ETOILE LIBBETT, MICHAEL A. MANDELBAUM, SUSAN WARD WITKOWSKI, also known as SUSAN WARD and also known as SUSAN WITKOWSKI, and GERALD WITKOWSKI,
Defendants.
NOTE: This case is to be argued at the same session as MSC No. 166791, Yono v Ingham County.
The plaintiffs owned real property in Southfield. When they became delinquent on their property tax payments, defendant Oakland County foreclosed on the properties pursuant to the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., which at that time required the county to take title to real property to cover the cost of the unpaid tax debt and associated fees without compensating the owners for their equity. The plaintiffs entered into payment plans, but failed to make the required payments and did not appeal the judgments of foreclosure. Defendant City of Southfield exercised its right of first refusal under then-MCL 211.78m(1), and purchased the properties for the minimum bid with funds from defendant Southfield Non-Profit Housing Corporation, and conveyed the properties to defendant Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection. They also alleged violations of the Takings Clauses of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, and violation of the GPTA. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, but the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court for reconsideration in light of Rafaeli v Oakland Co, 505 Mich 429 (2020), in which the Supreme Court held that when real property is taken to satisfy an unpaid tax debt, the government’s retention of surplus proceeds of the tax-foreclosure sale is a taking under Const 1963, art 10, § 2, entitling the former property owner to just compensation. On remand, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, holding that Rafaeli did not apply retroactively and, regardless, the plaintiffs did not have a protected property interest pursuant to Rafaeli. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, holding among other things that: (1) Rafaeli applies retroactively; (2) the trial court erred by holding that the federal Takings Clause did not recognize a protected property interest in the plaintiffs’ equity in their homes; (3) the trial court erred by concluding that this Court’s decision in Rafaeli did not permit the plaintiffs’ takings claims against the county; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to give retroactive application to the amended language in MCL 211.78m and 78t. The Supreme Court held this case in abeyance pending the decision in Schafer v Kent Co (Docket No. 164975). The Supreme Court subsequently held in Schafer that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final on July 17, 2020, the date the opinion was issued. Schafer v Kent Co, ___ Mich ___ (July 29, 2024) (Docket No. 164975). The Supreme Court has now ordered oral argument on the application in this case to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that both MCL 211.78t and MCL 211.78m apply retroactively; (2) if so, whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional takings claims are precluded by MCL 211.78t, see Hathon v State of Michigan, ___ Mich ___ (July 29, 2024) (Docket No. 165219); (3) if not, whether a violation of the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2, or of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution may occur as to a tax foreclosure when there is no public auction of the foreclosed property and a governmental unit retains or purchases the property, resulting in no surplus proceeds; (4) whether there was a violation of either Takings Clause by Oakland County under the facts of this case; and (5) if so, what compensation, if any, the taxpayer is entitled to from Oakland County. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Yono v Co of Ingham (Docket No. 166791).
NICK YONO, (attorney Kevin Schumacher)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Stokes, W.)
COUNTY OF INGHAM, INGHAM COUNTY TREASURER, and INGHAM COUNTY LAND BANK FAST TRACK AUTHORITY, (attorney Douglas Curlew)
Defendants-Appellants.
NOTE: This case is to be argued at the same session as MSC No. 166320, Jackson v Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative.
After the plaintiff failed to pay property taxes in 2014 and 2015 on a commercial industrial property, defendants Ingham County and the Ingham County Treasurer foreclosed on the property. The property was made available at an auction but it did not sell and was then transferred to defendant Ingham County Land Bank Fast Track Authority. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that an unconstitutional taking occurred because he never received the value of the equity he had in the property from the defendants. He also asserted a bailment claim, alleging that the defendants were in possession of personal property that had been kept on the property that was taken. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, reversed in part, holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants’ motion for summary disposition with respect to the plaintiff’s unconstitutional taking claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary disposition with respect to the bailment claim. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in: (1) holding that the plaintiff successfully established that the defendants violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, § 2; and (2) directing the Ingham Circuit Court to calculate the “surplus” owed on the property by reference to the value of the property less what the plaintiff owed on it when the foreclosure occurred. The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Jackson v Southfield Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (Docket No. 166320).
JACQUELINE DAVIS, (attorney Mark Granzotto)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Berry, A.)
BetMGM, LLC, (attorney Norman Ankers)
Defendant-Appellee.
The defendant operates an online gaming website. The plaintiff won a significant amount of money playing one of the defendant’s online games. After the plaintiff withdrew $100,000 of her winnings, the defendant suspended her online account, leaving her unable to access the remaining balance of the account, which was approximately $3.2 million. Following an investigation, the defendant determined that the plaintiff’s account had been erroneously credited due to an error in the game and closed her account. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in Wayne Circuit Court, alleging claims of fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA), MCL 432.301 et seq., preempted the plaintiff’s claims. Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed a patron dispute with the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB), which decided not to pursue formal disciplinary action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court in a 2-1 published opinion, holding that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the LIGA vests the MGCB with exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether each of the plaintiff’s common law claims is inconsistent with and preempted by the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA), MCL 432.301 et seq., such that the Wayne Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action; and (2) whether the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) has jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise, over common law claims regarding contract or account disputes, and if so, what statutes or administrative rules govern its resolution of the dispute.
MARY ANNE MARKEL, (attorney Mark Granzotto)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - Grant, N.)
WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL, (attorney Jacquelyn Klima)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
HOSPITAL CONSULTANTS, PC, LINET LONAPPAN, M.D., and IOANA MORARIU,
Defendants.
The plaintiff went to the emergency room at William Beaumont Hospital and was admitted to the hospital. After her admission, she was treated by Dr. Linet Lonappan, a hospitalist. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit claiming that Dr. Lonappan committed medical malpractice and that Beaumont is vicariously liable for the doctor’s negligence under a theory of ostensible agency. Dr. Lonappan is not a Beaumont employee, although she has privileges to treat patients at the hospital. Beaumont filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish ostensible agency. The trial court granted Beaumont’s motion. The plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, seeking interlocutory appellate review before her claims against other defendants were tried. The Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on ostensible agency. The plaintiff filed another application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which granted the application and reversed the Court of Appeals by order on December 7, 2022. Markel v William Beaumont Hosp, 510 Mich 1071 (2022). The Supreme Court’s order clarified the ostensible agency rule set forth in Grewe v Mt Clemens Gen Hosp, 404 Mich 240 (1978), and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration under the appropriate standard. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Beaumont in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Court of Appeals majority held that the governing concept in Grewe is agency by estoppel, that agency by estoppel requires a plaintiff to show reliance upon the apparent authority of the purported agent, and that the evidence in this case failed to show reliance. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the ostensible agency test set forth in Grewe v Mount Clemens General Hosp, 404 Mich 240 (1978), see Markel v William Beaumont Hosp, 510 Mich 1071 (2022); and (2) whether Beaumont is entitled to summary disposition of the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim that is premised on vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of Dr. Linet Lonappan under a theory of ostensible agency.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Christopher Allen)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Emmet CC - Johnson, C.)
MICHAEL GEORGIE CARSON, (attorney Nicholas Bostic)
Defendant-Appellee.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of safe breaking, larceny of property valued at $20,000 or more, receiving or concealing stolen property valued at $20,000 or more, larceny from a building, and conspiracy to commit each of those offenses. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of incriminating text messages found during a search of the defendant’s cell phone. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions in a 2-1 published opinion. The Court of Appeals majority held that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress the incriminating text messages on the grounds that the search warrant for the defendant’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The majority reasoned that if defense counsel had advanced such an argument, the trial court would have been obligated to suppress the text messages due to the inapplicability of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court of Appeals erred by: (1) holding that the warrant to search the defendant’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, see People v Hughes, 506 Mich 512, 538 (2020); (2) failing to sever any valid portions of the search warrant from any invalid portions, see People v Keller, 479 Mich 467, 479 (2007); (3) holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply, see People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 531 (2004), discussing United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 923 (1984); and (4) finding that trial counsel deprived the defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to move to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone on these grounds, see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688 (1984).
Full access to public notices, articles, columns, archives, statistics, calendar and more
Three-County & Full Pass also available
