By Zach Gorchow
Gongwer News Service
Employees reporting a violation of the common law at their place of work are entitled to the safeguards of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled recently.
In 2021, James Stefanski was working for Saginaw County's 9-1-1 when he resigned after the agency suspended him without pay for 90 days. His supervisors cited unscheduled absences. Stefanski claimed the real reason was his disagreement with supervisors about a 9-1-1 call.
The supervisor received a call reporting gunshots and possibly a woman had been shot. The supervisor coded the call to indicate shots fired. Stefanski, who arrived about an hour after the call was taken, said this coding does not lead to dispatching emergency medical services.
About 25 minutes after Stefanski began work, a different employee received another call from the person who placed the first call, saying the woman may not be breathing and police had not arrived. EMS was dispatched and found the woman in cardiac arrest. She died shortly thereafter.
Stefanski said the call was improperly coded and claimed the supervisor became angry and told him to let it go. Stefanski took his concerns to the agency director, who stood behind the supervisor. Stefanski began missing work and claimed he was being treated poorly. Eventually he was suspended. He sued, claiming he was suspended for reporting actions that constituted gross negligence and a common law violation of Michigan law under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act.
The 9-1-1 agency countered that Stefanski did not engage in protected activity because gross negligence is neither a violation of law nor regulation. The Saginaw Circuit Court dismissed the case (Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, MSC Docket No. 166663), and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, however, held that violations or suspected violations of the common law meet the definition in the Whistleblowers' Protection Act and reversed the lower courts. Clement cited Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary and Webster's New World Dictionary as including "common law" in the definition of "law."
"We conclude that 'law,' when given its plain meaning as found in a lay dictionary, includes the common law," Clement wrote. "This interpretation aligns with the WPA's broader purpose of public protection, which is achieved 'by protecting the whistleblowing employee and by removing barriers that may interdict employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law.'"
However, the decision was not a total win for Stefanski. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether reporting gross negligence is a protected activity. Clement said there must be a specific law violation alleged, statutory or common, not a general allegation.
Signing the opinion were Justice Richard Bernstein, Justice Megan Cavanagh, Justice Elizabeth Welch, Justice Kyra Harris Bolden and Justice Kimberly Thomas.
Justice Brian Zahra, in a dissent, said the majority distorted the phrase "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" in the Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Zahra said the act, through its words, clearly points to specific law violations, regulations or rules – not the common law.
"These violations all commonly share the qualities of positive law and remain static after having been promulgated," he wrote. "In contrast, common law lacks the discreteness of positive law and evolves. In sum, the majority opinion improperly holds that common law is 'a law' under the WPA and exponentially expands the violations that the Legislature intended employees to be able to report without fear of losing employment."
Gongwer News Service
Employees reporting a violation of the common law at their place of work are entitled to the safeguards of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled recently.
In 2021, James Stefanski was working for Saginaw County's 9-1-1 when he resigned after the agency suspended him without pay for 90 days. His supervisors cited unscheduled absences. Stefanski claimed the real reason was his disagreement with supervisors about a 9-1-1 call.
The supervisor received a call reporting gunshots and possibly a woman had been shot. The supervisor coded the call to indicate shots fired. Stefanski, who arrived about an hour after the call was taken, said this coding does not lead to dispatching emergency medical services.
About 25 minutes after Stefanski began work, a different employee received another call from the person who placed the first call, saying the woman may not be breathing and police had not arrived. EMS was dispatched and found the woman in cardiac arrest. She died shortly thereafter.
Stefanski said the call was improperly coded and claimed the supervisor became angry and told him to let it go. Stefanski took his concerns to the agency director, who stood behind the supervisor. Stefanski began missing work and claimed he was being treated poorly. Eventually he was suspended. He sued, claiming he was suspended for reporting actions that constituted gross negligence and a common law violation of Michigan law under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act.
The 9-1-1 agency countered that Stefanski did not engage in protected activity because gross negligence is neither a violation of law nor regulation. The Saginaw Circuit Court dismissed the case (Stefanski v. Saginaw County 911 Communications Center Authority, MSC Docket No. 166663), and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement, however, held that violations or suspected violations of the common law meet the definition in the Whistleblowers' Protection Act and reversed the lower courts. Clement cited Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary and Webster's New World Dictionary as including "common law" in the definition of "law."
"We conclude that 'law,' when given its plain meaning as found in a lay dictionary, includes the common law," Clement wrote. "This interpretation aligns with the WPA's broader purpose of public protection, which is achieved 'by protecting the whistleblowing employee and by removing barriers that may interdict employee efforts to report violations or suspected violations of the law.'"
However, the decision was not a total win for Stefanski. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether reporting gross negligence is a protected activity. Clement said there must be a specific law violation alleged, statutory or common, not a general allegation.
Signing the opinion were Justice Richard Bernstein, Justice Megan Cavanagh, Justice Elizabeth Welch, Justice Kyra Harris Bolden and Justice Kimberly Thomas.
Justice Brian Zahra, in a dissent, said the majority distorted the phrase "a violation or a suspected violation of a law" in the Whistleblowers' Protection Act. Zahra said the act, through its words, clearly points to specific law violations, regulations or rules – not the common law.
"These violations all commonly share the qualities of positive law and remain static after having been promulgated," he wrote. "In contrast, common law lacks the discreteness of positive law and evolves. In sum, the majority opinion improperly holds that common law is 'a law' under the WPA and exponentially expands the violations that the Legislature intended employees to be able to report without fear of losing employment."
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