By Berl Falbaum
Like most Americans, I am working to process the U.S. attack — Operation Midnight Hammer — on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the only certainty I come up with is uncertainty.
For every positive, there appears to be negative. As one of my neighbors summarized: This is not a black-&-white issue. It raises significant military, political, economic questions that may not be comprehensively answered for months, if not years.
So, let’s parse a few issues, putting aside, for the moment, the man — Trump — his character and Trumpism, and just focus on policy.
The results: Uncertainty. While Trump claims Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been “totally and completely obliterated,” Air Force General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would not go that far. He said it will take some time for an accurate assessment. He said the U.S. caused “extremely severe damage and destruction.” International nuclear armament experts were similarly cautious about the results. We may not know for some time how much damage was done to Iran’s nuclear objectives.
(As I was finishing this column, a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report was leaked and it estimated that Iran’s program was set back by only three to six months.)
Retaliation by Iran: Uncertainty. The airwaves were awash with speculation by “experts” but no one really knows. Even Iran may not know how it plans to respond. Retaliation could involve attacks on U.S. military installations in the area, terrorism around the world, unleashing sleeper cells on U.S. soil, mining of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most a vital transport routes, cyber attacks or isolated “lone wolf” terrorism in the U.S.
(In an immediate retaliatory strike, Iran fired several missiles into Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest American military installation in the Middle East. No one was killed or injured.)
Reaction around the world: Uncertainty. Most of the reaction could be described as “benign,” basically calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. Most important, however, are Arab states aligned with the U.S., such as Jordan and Egypt. Thus far, they have been “passive” although they expressed “deep concerns” about what they called violations of international law. But they may become more critical, depending on longer-term consequences. Then we have Saudi Arabia. Did this attack set back ongoing attempts to have Saudi Arabia join other Arab nations in the Abraham Accords and make peace with Israel?
Allies: Uncertainty. They may feel that they should have been informed. Sure, secrecy was required, but given that they may have deal with some of the economic and political fallout, they may be justified in their anger in not being part of the decision-making process.
Regime change: Uncertainty. There is no guarantee that a new Iranian administration would be less belligerent and hostile to Israel than the present one. Israel has killed several Hamas leaders but their successors are just as committed to destroying Israel as those eliminated.
The legality of the mission: Uncertainty. By acting unitarily and not consulting Congress about the attack, Trump possibly violated the Constitution and the War Powers Act. The two parties along with legal scholars will argue that case — pro and con — for months,
increasing the ugly political fissures in the country.
Trump: Uncertainty. I wrote above to put Trump and Trumpism aside. But that’s not possible. Given his pathological lying, we cannot judge whether Iran was close to developing a nuclear bomb or not. While politicians periodically bend the truth to support their policies, we have learned, in the last 10 years, that Trump is in a class by himself. Thus, we cannot debate or analyze this case as we might under a different leader — as I offered early in this column — solely as a policy matter.
For instance, on March 25 Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s director of National Intelligence, testified before Congress that Iran was not “building nuclear weapons and the Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003.” In mid-June, Trump said he believed that Iran was “very close” to developing a nuclear weapon. When asked about Gabbard’s testimony, Trump replied, “I don’t care what she said. I think they were very close to having one.” Several days later when faced again with Gabbard’s assessment, he said, she’s “wrong.”
Gabbard now says Iran could produce nuclear weapons “within weeks to months,” and charged that her comments to Congress were taken out of context by a “dishonest media.” But she waited till now to complain. Trump also did not dispute her at the time of her testimony. If she was wrong, Trump should have fired her then.
Worth noting, given the historical parallels, are two previous such attacks by former Israeli prime ministers, Menachem Begin and Ehud Olmert.
In 1981, Begin ordered the destruction of a nuclear facility in Iraq, ignoring opposition from President George H.W. Bush. Years later, when Bush invaded Iraq, he thanked Begin and praised him for his foresight.
With Operation Midnight Hammer, Trump may not know it but he was implementing what became known as the Begin Doctrine, a pre-emptive strike against what is considered an existential threat.
Twenty-six years later, in 2007, Olmert ordered the destruction of nuclear facilities in Syria. At that time, Olmert wanted support from Bush 43, but like his father, Bush opposed such a strike. Olmert went ahead regardless.
Finally, even if the U.S. had been successful in destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure — which, according to the report cited above, it was not — would that be the end of the story? More uncertainty. The U.S., Israel and the world may have bought no more than a few years before Iran rebuilt.
But here is the most perplexing uncertainty of them all which no one — no one — has mentioned: What about North Korea?
————————
Berl Falbaum is a veteran journalist and author of 12 books.
Like most Americans, I am working to process the U.S. attack — Operation Midnight Hammer — on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the only certainty I come up with is uncertainty.
For every positive, there appears to be negative. As one of my neighbors summarized: This is not a black-&-white issue. It raises significant military, political, economic questions that may not be comprehensively answered for months, if not years.
So, let’s parse a few issues, putting aside, for the moment, the man — Trump — his character and Trumpism, and just focus on policy.
The results: Uncertainty. While Trump claims Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been “totally and completely obliterated,” Air Force General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would not go that far. He said it will take some time for an accurate assessment. He said the U.S. caused “extremely severe damage and destruction.” International nuclear armament experts were similarly cautious about the results. We may not know for some time how much damage was done to Iran’s nuclear objectives.
(As I was finishing this column, a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report was leaked and it estimated that Iran’s program was set back by only three to six months.)
Retaliation by Iran: Uncertainty. The airwaves were awash with speculation by “experts” but no one really knows. Even Iran may not know how it plans to respond. Retaliation could involve attacks on U.S. military installations in the area, terrorism around the world, unleashing sleeper cells on U.S. soil, mining of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most a vital transport routes, cyber attacks or isolated “lone wolf” terrorism in the U.S.
(In an immediate retaliatory strike, Iran fired several missiles into Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the largest American military installation in the Middle East. No one was killed or injured.)
Reaction around the world: Uncertainty. Most of the reaction could be described as “benign,” basically calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. Most important, however, are Arab states aligned with the U.S., such as Jordan and Egypt. Thus far, they have been “passive” although they expressed “deep concerns” about what they called violations of international law. But they may become more critical, depending on longer-term consequences. Then we have Saudi Arabia. Did this attack set back ongoing attempts to have Saudi Arabia join other Arab nations in the Abraham Accords and make peace with Israel?
Allies: Uncertainty. They may feel that they should have been informed. Sure, secrecy was required, but given that they may have deal with some of the economic and political fallout, they may be justified in their anger in not being part of the decision-making process.
Regime change: Uncertainty. There is no guarantee that a new Iranian administration would be less belligerent and hostile to Israel than the present one. Israel has killed several Hamas leaders but their successors are just as committed to destroying Israel as those eliminated.
The legality of the mission: Uncertainty. By acting unitarily and not consulting Congress about the attack, Trump possibly violated the Constitution and the War Powers Act. The two parties along with legal scholars will argue that case — pro and con — for months,
increasing the ugly political fissures in the country.
Trump: Uncertainty. I wrote above to put Trump and Trumpism aside. But that’s not possible. Given his pathological lying, we cannot judge whether Iran was close to developing a nuclear bomb or not. While politicians periodically bend the truth to support their policies, we have learned, in the last 10 years, that Trump is in a class by himself. Thus, we cannot debate or analyze this case as we might under a different leader — as I offered early in this column — solely as a policy matter.
For instance, on March 25 Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s director of National Intelligence, testified before Congress that Iran was not “building nuclear weapons and the Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003.” In mid-June, Trump said he believed that Iran was “very close” to developing a nuclear weapon. When asked about Gabbard’s testimony, Trump replied, “I don’t care what she said. I think they were very close to having one.” Several days later when faced again with Gabbard’s assessment, he said, she’s “wrong.”
Gabbard now says Iran could produce nuclear weapons “within weeks to months,” and charged that her comments to Congress were taken out of context by a “dishonest media.” But she waited till now to complain. Trump also did not dispute her at the time of her testimony. If she was wrong, Trump should have fired her then.
Worth noting, given the historical parallels, are two previous such attacks by former Israeli prime ministers, Menachem Begin and Ehud Olmert.
In 1981, Begin ordered the destruction of a nuclear facility in Iraq, ignoring opposition from President George H.W. Bush. Years later, when Bush invaded Iraq, he thanked Begin and praised him for his foresight.
With Operation Midnight Hammer, Trump may not know it but he was implementing what became known as the Begin Doctrine, a pre-emptive strike against what is considered an existential threat.
Twenty-six years later, in 2007, Olmert ordered the destruction of nuclear facilities in Syria. At that time, Olmert wanted support from Bush 43, but like his father, Bush opposed such a strike. Olmert went ahead regardless.
Finally, even if the U.S. had been successful in destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure — which, according to the report cited above, it was not — would that be the end of the story? More uncertainty. The U.S., Israel and the world may have bought no more than a few years before Iran rebuilt.
But here is the most perplexing uncertainty of them all which no one — no one — has mentioned: What about North Korea?
————————
Berl Falbaum is a veteran journalist and author of 12 books.
