By Ben Solis
Gongwer News Service
The Allegan Circuit Court did not err when it levied court costs against a defendant who claimed they amounted to unconstitutional taxes in violation of the Headlee Amendment, the Court of Appeals ruled unanimously on Monday.
In a published opinion released Tuesday written by Judge Brock Swartzle, joined by Judge James Redford and Judge Kathleen Feeney, the panel in People v. Jones (COA Docket No. 365590) affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, including his court costs.
Swartzle wrote the case hinged on a question of: “When is a tax that is ordered and collected by a local unit of government, one that benefits that unit, not a local tax?”
The case involved the defendant being assessed $200 in court costs as part of his criminal sentence of assaulting a police officer, to which he pleaded no contest. He challenged those costs as an unconstitutional tax under Headlee, as well as a challenge to his right to a speedy trial.
Not so, Swartzle and his colleagues wrote on appeal.
After determining that his right to a speedy trial was not violated, Swartzle addressed the Headlee argument, noting that the defendant took aim at state statute authorizing local courts to impose certain costs for criminal defendants.
“First, the costs imposed by local courts under MCL 769.1k are considered taxes, not fees,” Swartzle wrote. “Second, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) went into effect after the effective date of the (Michigan Constitution of 1963); thus, if the costs are determined to be local in nature, then the Headlee Amendment would apply to them. Third, as local political subdivisions of the state, we presume for purposes of the defendant’s claim that local courts qualify as ‘units of local government’ under the Headlee Amendment. Finally, local voters did not approve the imposition of court costs as part of criminal sentencing. All four of these points favor defendant’s position.”
That said, the question of whether court costs were a state tax or a local tax.
Swartzle said precedent in Airlines Park Inc. v. Wayne County answers that question.
“The court identified several features that weighed in favor of treating the airport-parking tax as a state tax, not a local one. These included: it was ‘an excise tax,’ and the Constitution authorized the Legislature to enact such taxes; it was styled as a state tax, had ‘the structural attributes of a state tax,’ and served ‘a state purpose,’” Swartzle wrote. “’It was enacted by the Legislature and was administered by the state’; the state collected the funds and credited them to the parking fund; there was ‘a statutory formula’; the state retained any interest and penalties from delinquent taxes; the statute was subject to annual
appropriations and therefore the revenues were ‘subject to redirection by the Legislature’; the state retained the discretion to discontinue the taxing scheme; and the tax served a statewide purpose, in that any other airport across the state that qualified in the future would be subject to the same scheme.”
By contrast, the Airlines Parking court contrasted those factors with those typical of a local tax, which are collected by a local government, administered by the local entity and spent accordingly on local fiscal items.
“Taking our guide from Airlines Parking, we conclude that the tax authorized by MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is better characterized as a state tax, rather than purely local one,” Swartzle wrote. “To be sure, there are features of the court-costs scheme that appear to be more local than the airline-parking tax in Airlines Parking.”
On one hand, Swartzle said local courts impose costs as part of a sentence and courts are responsible for collecting those funds.
“The amounts collected are used to defray local courts’ costs, and the state neither collects the amounts nor retains any interest or penalties,” Swartzle wrote. “Local courts even have the discretion whether to impose the costs or not.”
On the other hand, Swartzle said the court cost scheme has several characteristics of a statewide tax.
“First, and most critically, the imposition of court costs depends necessarily on statutory authority provided by our Legislature. The policy of permitting the defrayment of certain costs of local courts with a tax imposed on criminal defendants is one enacted by our statewide legislative body, not a local unit of government,” Swartzle wrote. “Second, although local courts have the discretion whether to impose costs or not, if they decide to do so, then they must do so according to the statutory condition that the imposed costs be ‘reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.’ In other words, local courts do not have unfettered discretion to impose any costs imaginable.”
The State Court Administrative Office developed the overall formula for courts to impose costs and the Legislature has statutorily directed how courts must distribute those monies.
“Fifth, the authority to impose these costs can be stripped at any time by our Legislature and, indeed, the current authorization will sunset in 2026,” Swartzle added. “Sixth and finally, in contrast to Airlines Parking’s future hypothetical airport that arguably meant that the tax had an intended statewide reach, the authorization for local courts to impose costs on criminal defendants has a current actual benefit to courts across the state. There is nothing in the statutory authorization that restricts the tax to certain isolated parts of the state; rather, courts across the state can participate in this program.”
Given that the statute permits a state tax, not a local one, the panel found that court costs do not violate Headlee, and as a result, there was no plain error in the court’s imposition of the $200 in costs for the defendant.
Gongwer News Service
The Allegan Circuit Court did not err when it levied court costs against a defendant who claimed they amounted to unconstitutional taxes in violation of the Headlee Amendment, the Court of Appeals ruled unanimously on Monday.
In a published opinion released Tuesday written by Judge Brock Swartzle, joined by Judge James Redford and Judge Kathleen Feeney, the panel in People v. Jones (COA Docket No. 365590) affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence, including his court costs.
Swartzle wrote the case hinged on a question of: “When is a tax that is ordered and collected by a local unit of government, one that benefits that unit, not a local tax?”
The case involved the defendant being assessed $200 in court costs as part of his criminal sentence of assaulting a police officer, to which he pleaded no contest. He challenged those costs as an unconstitutional tax under Headlee, as well as a challenge to his right to a speedy trial.
Not so, Swartzle and his colleagues wrote on appeal.
After determining that his right to a speedy trial was not violated, Swartzle addressed the Headlee argument, noting that the defendant took aim at state statute authorizing local courts to impose certain costs for criminal defendants.
“First, the costs imposed by local courts under MCL 769.1k are considered taxes, not fees,” Swartzle wrote. “Second, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) went into effect after the effective date of the (Michigan Constitution of 1963); thus, if the costs are determined to be local in nature, then the Headlee Amendment would apply to them. Third, as local political subdivisions of the state, we presume for purposes of the defendant’s claim that local courts qualify as ‘units of local government’ under the Headlee Amendment. Finally, local voters did not approve the imposition of court costs as part of criminal sentencing. All four of these points favor defendant’s position.”
That said, the question of whether court costs were a state tax or a local tax.
Swartzle said precedent in Airlines Park Inc. v. Wayne County answers that question.
“The court identified several features that weighed in favor of treating the airport-parking tax as a state tax, not a local one. These included: it was ‘an excise tax,’ and the Constitution authorized the Legislature to enact such taxes; it was styled as a state tax, had ‘the structural attributes of a state tax,’ and served ‘a state purpose,’” Swartzle wrote. “’It was enacted by the Legislature and was administered by the state’; the state collected the funds and credited them to the parking fund; there was ‘a statutory formula’; the state retained any interest and penalties from delinquent taxes; the statute was subject to annual
appropriations and therefore the revenues were ‘subject to redirection by the Legislature’; the state retained the discretion to discontinue the taxing scheme; and the tax served a statewide purpose, in that any other airport across the state that qualified in the future would be subject to the same scheme.”
By contrast, the Airlines Parking court contrasted those factors with those typical of a local tax, which are collected by a local government, administered by the local entity and spent accordingly on local fiscal items.
“Taking our guide from Airlines Parking, we conclude that the tax authorized by MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is better characterized as a state tax, rather than purely local one,” Swartzle wrote. “To be sure, there are features of the court-costs scheme that appear to be more local than the airline-parking tax in Airlines Parking.”
On one hand, Swartzle said local courts impose costs as part of a sentence and courts are responsible for collecting those funds.
“The amounts collected are used to defray local courts’ costs, and the state neither collects the amounts nor retains any interest or penalties,” Swartzle wrote. “Local courts even have the discretion whether to impose the costs or not.”
On the other hand, Swartzle said the court cost scheme has several characteristics of a statewide tax.
“First, and most critically, the imposition of court costs depends necessarily on statutory authority provided by our Legislature. The policy of permitting the defrayment of certain costs of local courts with a tax imposed on criminal defendants is one enacted by our statewide legislative body, not a local unit of government,” Swartzle wrote. “Second, although local courts have the discretion whether to impose costs or not, if they decide to do so, then they must do so according to the statutory condition that the imposed costs be ‘reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.’ In other words, local courts do not have unfettered discretion to impose any costs imaginable.”
The State Court Administrative Office developed the overall formula for courts to impose costs and the Legislature has statutorily directed how courts must distribute those monies.
“Fifth, the authority to impose these costs can be stripped at any time by our Legislature and, indeed, the current authorization will sunset in 2026,” Swartzle added. “Sixth and finally, in contrast to Airlines Parking’s future hypothetical airport that arguably meant that the tax had an intended statewide reach, the authorization for local courts to impose costs on criminal defendants has a current actual benefit to courts across the state. There is nothing in the statutory authorization that restricts the tax to certain isolated parts of the state; rather, courts across the state can participate in this program.”
Given that the statute permits a state tax, not a local one, the panel found that court costs do not violate Headlee, and as a result, there was no plain error in the court’s imposition of the $200 in costs for the defendant.
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