The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will begin the 2025-26 session by hearing oral arguments in 11 cases on Wednesday, October 8, and Thursday, October 9, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days.
Continuing a longtime tradition, the first case will be heard in the Old Supreme Court Chambers at the State Capitol Building located in the east wing of the 3rd floor (current Senate Appropriations Committee Room). That case is expected to be livestreamed via Michigan Senate TV (pending Senate approval). The remaining cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing, beginning with a presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, and will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the Court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, October 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
State Capitol Building, 3rd Floor East (Old Supreme Court Chambers)
167492
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Katelyn Kerbrat)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - McGivney, M.)
MICHAEL MARC MORGAN, (attorney Mitchell Foster)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant made a U-turn in his car on Kensington Road in Brighton Township, and was struck by a motorcycle traveling in the opposite direction. The motorcyclist later died from his injuries. The defendant was cited for careless driving and later charged with a moving violation causing death, which is a misdemeanor. A toxicology report revealed that the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was .059 grams per deciliter. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant moved to admit evidence of the victim’s speed and BAC. The district court held that evidence of the victim’s speed was admissible, but evidence of his BAC was inadmissible. The defendant appealed to the circuit court, which denied his application for leave to appeal for failure to persuade the court of the need for immediate appellate review. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, and affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether evidence of the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration is relevant; and (2) whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See MRE 401, MRE 402, MRE 403, MCL 257.601d(1), and People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184 (2010).
Wednesday, October 8
Resume Morning Session – 10:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society
166699
LINDA MOLITORIS, (attorney Ken Oliver)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - Geddis,S.)
SAINT MARY MAGDALEN CATHOLIC CHURCH, (attorney Daniel Zick)
Defendant-Appellee.
After volunteering for an event hosted by defendant St. Mary Magdalen Catholic Church, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on black ice and fell as she stepped off the sidewalk and into the parking lot. She filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability. After the defendant moved for summary disposition, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss her ordinary negligence claim and proceed only on a premises liability theory. In ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court characterized the plaintiff as a licensee, rather than an invitee. “A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements she must satisfy to prevail on a claim for premises liability as a licensee. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiff was a licensee. In a separate opinion, Judge Gleicher urged the Supreme Court to discard Michigan’s status-based duty classifications in premises liability actions and instead adopt an across-the-board reasonableness standard of care in line with the Third Restatement of Torts. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); and (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Radke v Truesdell (Docket No. 167162).
167162
MICHAEL RADKE and KATHLEE RADKE, (attorney Drew Slager
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jamo, J.)
CHARLES TRUESDELL, d/b/a TRUESDELL INDUSTRIES, (attorney Thomas Tupper)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
RONALD SWENSON,
Defendant.
While helping a friend (defendant Ronald Swenson) install some lighting fixtures in a home that was under construction, plaintiff Michael Radke fell in an uncovered and unprotected opening in the garage to the basement. Defendant Charles Truesdell, d/b/a Truesdell Industries, was the general contractor on the project. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Truesdell and Swenson alleging negligence. Truesdell filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the claim sounded in premises liability, that the opening was open and obvious and Truesdell had no duty to safeguard Michael Radke, a licensee, from this danger, and that no special aspects existed which could render Truesdell liable for the injuries. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023), and Pinsky v Kroger Co of Mich, 512 Mich 95 (2023). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court, concluding that the shift in the analysis of the open and obvious doctrine set forth in Kandil-Elsayed does not change the outcome of this case because Michael Radke was a licensee, not an invitee. The court explained that the question whether a condition was open and obvious is not relevant to whether a land possessor breached their duty of care to a licensee, because land possessors only owe a duty to warn licensees of hidden dangers. See Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000); and (3) whether, if the status-based categories continue, there is a question of fact that the opening in the floor posed an unreasonable risk of harm, see Blackwell v Franchi, 502 Mich 918 (2018). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Molitoris v St Mary Magdalen Catholic Church (Docket No. 166699).
166790
CARLONDA NAISHE SWOOPE, (atrorney Jason Blankenship)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hathaway, D.)
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, (attorney Erin Sedmak)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff, who did not have a valid driver’s license, was injured in a motor vehicle accident after taking her friend’s car because her mother was having a medical emergency. Neither the plaintiff nor her friend had automobile insurance. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted an application for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., to the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), which assigned the claim to the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit after the defendant denied her claim for PIP benefits. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the plaintiff was barred from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), which provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if, at the time of the accident, “[t]he person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle ... that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle ... was taken unlawfully.” The trial court denied the motion on the basis that whether the plaintiff had permission to use the vehicle was a question of fact for the trier of fact. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the plaintiff is barred from recovering personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., because, at the time of the accident, she “was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle ... that was taken unlawfully, and [she] knew or should have known that the motor vehicle ... was taken unlawfully.” MCL 500.3113(a).
Wednesday, October 8
Afternoon Session – 1 p.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
167300-1
MICHIGAN IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CENTER, (attorney John Philo)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Gleicher, E.)
GOVERNOR, (attorney Gallant Fish)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff is a non-profit organization that provides legal assistance to immigrant communities in Michigan. It commenced a civil action seeking to declare unlawful the State’s practice of denying workers’ compensation benefits for undocumented workers based on their immigration status. The defendant sought summary disposition on multiple grounds, including lack of standing, no actual controversy, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to comply with the notice and filing requirements of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431(1). The Court of Claims denied summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff had satisfied each of those requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion, holding that the plaintiff’s claims are subject to the notice provision in MCL 600.6431(1) and that the plaintiff did not file its complaint within a year of the date when its claims accrued. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court of Claims for entry of an order dismissing the case. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals presumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff had standing and that there was an actual controversy. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether MCL 600.6431 applies to claims for prospective relief against state officers; and (2) if so, whether the plaintiff’s claims were filed within 1 year after they accrued, see MCL 600.6431(1).
167643
WARREN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, (attorney Nathan Petrusak)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Maceroni, J.)
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF HAZEL PARK, (attorney Thomas Landa)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff and the defendant are neighboring school districts. Beginning in approximately 2008, the defendant established an alternative education program targeting non-English speaking students. Some of the students who attended the program resided in the plaintiff’s district, and the defendant included those students in its student count for purposes of determining state aid under the State School Aid Act of 1979 (SSAA) without first obtaining the plaintiff’s approval, as required under the SSAA, MCL 388.1606(6). In 2011, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Macomb Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant violated the SSAA by including nonresident, nonexempt pupils in its count without obtaining the plaintiff’s approval. The plaintiff also sought injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, but subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and reopened the case. In 2014, the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies due to its failure to pursue an informal review with the Michigan Department of Education (MDE). The plaintiff did not appeal the circuit court’s decision, but sought a declaratory ruling from the MDE that the defendant had violated the SSAA. The MDE, through its assistant director, declined to issue a declaratory ruling. The plaintiff did not appeal the MDE’s refusal to issue a declaratory ruling, but instead filed another original action in the circuit court in 2017. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies due to its failure to appeal the decision of the MDE’s assistant director to the State Superintendent. The plaintiff then appealed the MDE assistant director’s decision to the State Superintendent, who declined to issue a declaratory ruling. The plaintiff did not appeal the State Superintendent’s determination to the circuit court, but filed a third original action in the circuit court, which granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not appealed the State Superintendent’s determination to the circuit court under MCL 24.263. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Macomb Circuit Court erred in concluding that MCL 24.263 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1969 required the plaintiff to appeal the State Superintendent’s act of declining to issue a declaratory ruling to the circuit court, see MCL 24.263; Human Rights Party v Mich Corrections Comm, 76 Mich App 204 (1977); and (2) whether an agency’s act of declining to issue a declaratory ruling enables a litigant to pursue a declaratory-judgment action in circuit court under MCL 24.264, see Huron Valley Sch v Secretary of State, 266 Mich App 638, 646 (2005); Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 51 (2000).
Thursday, October 9
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
167421
CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC., (attorney Zachary Kemp
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - O'Brien, P.)
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY and MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, (attorney Erin Sedmak)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
UNNAMED SERVICING INSURER,
Defendant.
After Mylene Brevard, a Michigan resident, was injured in an automobile accident in Toledo, Ohio, plaintiff Central Home Health Care Services, Inc., provided her with nursing and physical therapy services. Brevard assigned her rights to Michigan no-fault benefits to the plaintiff, which sought benefits from defendants Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility and Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, but the defendants neither assigned a processing insurer nor made any payments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit, and the defendants sought summary disposition on the ground that MCL 500.3172(1) requires that an accident occur in Michigan for a claimant to be eligible for benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether MCL 500.3172(1) requires a claimant seeking personal protection insurance benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan to show that the accident giving rise to the claim occurred in Michigan. In addressing that question, the parties have been directed to address the impact, if any, of MCL 500.3111 and MCL 500.3114(4).
167120
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney JoEllen Haas)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ottawa CC - Miedema, K.)
CINECCA DAQUAN MADISON, (attorney Christopher Wirth)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant is accused of fatally shooting one acquaintance and wounding another. He is awaiting trial on charges of open murder, assault with intent to murder, and two counts of felony-firearm. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to admit evidence of his diminished capacity to form the specific intent required for the charged offenses. Three mental health experts have examined the defendant and determined that although he suffers from schizophrenia, he was not legally insane at the time of the shooting. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, citing People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 241 (2001), in which the Court held that evidence of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity short of legal insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 241 (2001) was correctly decided and, if not, (2) whether Carpenter should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co, 500 Mich 158, 172-174 (2017).
166921
In re ESTATE OF JEROME E. SIZICK.
JULIE K. GRIES, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JEROME E. SIZICK, (attorney Norman Harrison)
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Saginaw PC - McGraw, P.)
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (attorney Marissa Wiesen)
Respondent-Appellee.
In March 2021, Jerome Sizick (who was 82 years old) needed to be hospitalized, and he was eventually transferred to a nursing home. In May 2021, his wife, Janet Sizick, petitioned the probate court for a protective order pursuant to MCL 700.5401(3), asking the probate court to transfer all of Mr. Sizick’s assets and the majority of his income to her. While the petition for a protective order was pending, Mr. Sizick applied for Medicaid, but no decision on his application was made before the hearing on Mrs. Sizick’s petition. The probate court entered an order directing Mr. Sizick to transfer all of his assets to his wife and to pay her $2,318 per month. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed that order and, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s finding that Mr. Sizick was unable to effectively manage his property and business affairs due to mental deficiency and physical illness or disability, thereby satisfying MCL 700.5401(3)(a). But with respect to the probate court’s finding regarding MCL 700.5401(3)(b), the Court of Appeals concluded that it was bound by In re Estate of Schroeder, 335 Mich App 107 (2020), and agreed with the DHHS’s argument that the probate court could not consider that Mr. Sizick’s needs could be met by Medicaid in the absence of a final Medicaid determination. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the DHHS that the probate court erred by failing to identify and value the assets being transferred in the protective order. The DHHS denied Mr. Sizick’s Medicaid application shortly after the appeal was decided. On remand, the probate court again entered an order directing Mr. Sizick to transfer all of his assets to his wife and to pay her $2,318 a month. The probate court entered a separate order directing that the amended protective order be applied retroactively to the date of the prior order. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, again affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. While an application for leave to appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, Mr. Sizick died. Consequently, the personal representative of his estate was substituted as the petitioner-appellant. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether this appeal has been rendered moot as a result of the death of Jerome E. Sizick; (2) if so, whether an exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable here; and (3) if the appeal is not moot or if a mootness exception applies, whether In re Estate of Schroeder, 335 Mich App 107 (2020), wrongly held that a probate court, in evaluating a petition for a protective order of spousal support under MCL 700.5401, cannot consider whether Medicaid benefits will be available to a protected individual in measuring his or her needs prior to a Medicaid eligibility determination.
167499
JOHN GOINGS, SR., (attorney Bradley Peri)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - McCarthy, K.)
BOBBIE JEAN GIACOMANTONIO-SNOW, (attorney Brandon Wykoff)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2021, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when he was rear-ended by the defendant. The plaintiff maintained a home with his mother and his son in Ohio, had an Ohio driver’s license, and was registered to vote in Ohio, but he worked in Michigan and spent some nights with his girlfriend and daughter in Michigan. The plaintiff’s vehicle was registered in Ohio, and he had an Ohio auto insurance policy. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant seeking noneconomic damages under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) because he was an uninsured Michigan resident in violation of MCL 500.3101(1) or because he was a nonresident who violated MCL 500.3102(1) by operating his vehicle in Michigan for more than 30 days in 2021 without maintaining Michigan no-fault insurance on his vehicle. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that, regardless of whether the plaintiff resided in Michigan or in Ohio, he could not recover tort damages in Michigan because he violated MCL 500.3102(1) by driving his vehicle in Michigan for more than 30 days without carrying Michigan no-fault insurance. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that MCL 500.3135(2)(c) only bars the recovery of noneconomic damages for violations of MCL 500.3101(1), not violations of MCL 500.3102(1). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether a violation of MCL 500.3102(1), which requires a nonresident to maintain Michigan no-fault insurance for a non-Michigan registered motor vehicle operated in Michigan for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year, bars the recovery of noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c).
167595
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Matthew Way)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Jackson CC - Wilson, T.)
TODD DOUGLAS ROBINSON, (attorney Harold Gurewitz0
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2012, the defendant was indicted by a one-man grand jury. He filed a pretrial motion for a preliminary examination, and alternatively asked the circuit court to quash the indictment. The circuit court denied the motion and the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381, 400 (2022), the Court held that the one-man grand jury statutes, MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, do not authorize a judge sitting as a one-man grand jury to issue an indictment. The Court also held that, when a criminal proceeding is initiated by way of a one-man grand jury, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination. Id. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Peeler, the defendant filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, arguing that his indictment was void ab initio and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. He also argued that Peeler should be applied retroactively. The circuit court denied relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, held that the defendant’s indictment by a one-man grand jury and without a preliminary examination was a procedural error that did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also held that Peeler does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the initiation of this case by an indictment filed by a judge acting as a one-man grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, and without a preliminary examination, contrary to People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022), deprived the Jackson Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered the indictment void ab initio; (2) whether Peeler “ ‘clearly establishe[d] a new principle of law;’ ” League of Women Voters v Sec’y of State, 508 Mich 520, 565 (2022), quoting Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 696 (2002); (3) if Peeler clearly established a new principle of law, whether Peeler applies retroactively to cases pending on collateral review; and (4) whether the defendant is entitled to relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G) and MCR 6.508(D).
Continuing a longtime tradition, the first case will be heard in the Old Supreme Court Chambers at the State Capitol Building located in the east wing of the 3rd floor (current Senate Appropriations Committee Room). That case is expected to be livestreamed via Michigan Senate TV (pending Senate approval). The remaining cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing, beginning with a presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, and will be livestreamed from the MSC website.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the Court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, October 8
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
State Capitol Building, 3rd Floor East (Old Supreme Court Chambers)
167492
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Katelyn Kerbrat)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - McGivney, M.)
MICHAEL MARC MORGAN, (attorney Mitchell Foster)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant made a U-turn in his car on Kensington Road in Brighton Township, and was struck by a motorcycle traveling in the opposite direction. The motorcyclist later died from his injuries. The defendant was cited for careless driving and later charged with a moving violation causing death, which is a misdemeanor. A toxicology report revealed that the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was .059 grams per deciliter. At a pretrial hearing, the defendant moved to admit evidence of the victim’s speed and BAC. The district court held that evidence of the victim’s speed was admissible, but evidence of his BAC was inadmissible. The defendant appealed to the circuit court, which denied his application for leave to appeal for failure to persuade the court of the need for immediate appellate review. The Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for leave to appeal, and affirmed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether evidence of the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration is relevant; and (2) whether the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See MRE 401, MRE 402, MRE 403, MCL 257.601d(1), and People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184 (2010).
Wednesday, October 8
Resume Morning Session – 10:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society
166699
LINDA MOLITORIS, (attorney Ken Oliver)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - Geddis,S.)
SAINT MARY MAGDALEN CATHOLIC CHURCH, (attorney Daniel Zick)
Defendant-Appellee.
After volunteering for an event hosted by defendant St. Mary Magdalen Catholic Church, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on black ice and fell as she stepped off the sidewalk and into the parking lot. She filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability. After the defendant moved for summary disposition, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss her ordinary negligence claim and proceed only on a premises liability theory. In ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court characterized the plaintiff as a licensee, rather than an invitee. “A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements she must satisfy to prevail on a claim for premises liability as a licensee. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiff was a licensee. In a separate opinion, Judge Gleicher urged the Supreme Court to discard Michigan’s status-based duty classifications in premises liability actions and instead adopt an across-the-board reasonableness standard of care in line with the Third Restatement of Torts. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); and (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Radke v Truesdell (Docket No. 167162).
167162
MICHAEL RADKE and KATHLEE RADKE, (attorney Drew Slager
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ingham CC - Jamo, J.)
CHARLES TRUESDELL, d/b/a TRUESDELL INDUSTRIES, (attorney Thomas Tupper)
Defendant-Appellee,
and
RONALD SWENSON,
Defendant.
While helping a friend (defendant Ronald Swenson) install some lighting fixtures in a home that was under construction, plaintiff Michael Radke fell in an uncovered and unprotected opening in the garage to the basement. Defendant Charles Truesdell, d/b/a Truesdell Industries, was the general contractor on the project. The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Truesdell and Swenson alleging negligence. Truesdell filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the claim sounded in premises liability, that the opening was open and obvious and Truesdell had no duty to safeguard Michael Radke, a licensee, from this danger, and that no special aspects existed which could render Truesdell liable for the injuries. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023), and Pinsky v Kroger Co of Mich, 512 Mich 95 (2023). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court, concluding that the shift in the analysis of the open and obvious doctrine set forth in Kandil-Elsayed does not change the outcome of this case because Michael Radke was a licensee, not an invitee. The court explained that the question whether a condition was open and obvious is not relevant to whether a land possessor breached their duty of care to a licensee, because land possessors only owe a duty to warn licensees of hidden dangers. See Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000); and (3) whether, if the status-based categories continue, there is a question of fact that the opening in the floor posed an unreasonable risk of harm, see Blackwell v Franchi, 502 Mich 918 (2018). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Molitoris v St Mary Magdalen Catholic Church (Docket No. 166699).
166790
CARLONDA NAISHE SWOOPE, (atrorney Jason Blankenship)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Hathaway, D.)
CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, (attorney Erin Sedmak)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff, who did not have a valid driver’s license, was injured in a motor vehicle accident after taking her friend’s car because her mother was having a medical emergency. Neither the plaintiff nor her friend had automobile insurance. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted an application for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., to the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), which assigned the claim to the defendant. The plaintiff filed suit after the defendant denied her claim for PIP benefits. The defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the plaintiff was barred from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), which provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if, at the time of the accident, “[t]he person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle ... that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle ... was taken unlawfully.” The trial court denied the motion on the basis that whether the plaintiff had permission to use the vehicle was a question of fact for the trier of fact. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the plaintiff is barred from recovering personal protection insurance benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., because, at the time of the accident, she “was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle ... that was taken unlawfully, and [she] knew or should have known that the motor vehicle ... was taken unlawfully.” MCL 500.3113(a).
Wednesday, October 8
Afternoon Session – 1 p.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
167300-1
MICHIGAN IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CENTER, (attorney John Philo)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ct of Claims - Gleicher, E.)
GOVERNOR, (attorney Gallant Fish)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff is a non-profit organization that provides legal assistance to immigrant communities in Michigan. It commenced a civil action seeking to declare unlawful the State’s practice of denying workers’ compensation benefits for undocumented workers based on their immigration status. The defendant sought summary disposition on multiple grounds, including lack of standing, no actual controversy, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to comply with the notice and filing requirements of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431(1). The Court of Claims denied summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff had satisfied each of those requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion, holding that the plaintiff’s claims are subject to the notice provision in MCL 600.6431(1) and that the plaintiff did not file its complaint within a year of the date when its claims accrued. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Court of Claims for entry of an order dismissing the case. In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals presumed, without deciding, that the plaintiff had standing and that there was an actual controversy. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether MCL 600.6431 applies to claims for prospective relief against state officers; and (2) if so, whether the plaintiff’s claims were filed within 1 year after they accrued, see MCL 600.6431(1).
167643
WARREN CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, (attorney Nathan Petrusak)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Macomb CC - Maceroni, J.)
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF HAZEL PARK, (attorney Thomas Landa)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff and the defendant are neighboring school districts. Beginning in approximately 2008, the defendant established an alternative education program targeting non-English speaking students. Some of the students who attended the program resided in the plaintiff’s district, and the defendant included those students in its student count for purposes of determining state aid under the State School Aid Act of 1979 (SSAA) without first obtaining the plaintiff’s approval, as required under the SSAA, MCL 388.1606(6). In 2011, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Macomb Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant violated the SSAA by including nonresident, nonexempt pupils in its count without obtaining the plaintiff’s approval. The plaintiff also sought injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, but subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and reopened the case. In 2014, the circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies due to its failure to pursue an informal review with the Michigan Department of Education (MDE). The plaintiff did not appeal the circuit court’s decision, but sought a declaratory ruling from the MDE that the defendant had violated the SSAA. The MDE, through its assistant director, declined to issue a declaratory ruling. The plaintiff did not appeal the MDE’s refusal to issue a declaratory ruling, but instead filed another original action in the circuit court in 2017. The circuit court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies due to its failure to appeal the decision of the MDE’s assistant director to the State Superintendent. The plaintiff then appealed the MDE assistant director’s decision to the State Superintendent, who declined to issue a declaratory ruling. The plaintiff did not appeal the State Superintendent’s determination to the circuit court, but filed a third original action in the circuit court, which granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff had not appealed the State Superintendent’s determination to the circuit court under MCL 24.263. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Macomb Circuit Court erred in concluding that MCL 24.263 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1969 required the plaintiff to appeal the State Superintendent’s act of declining to issue a declaratory ruling to the circuit court, see MCL 24.263; Human Rights Party v Mich Corrections Comm, 76 Mich App 204 (1977); and (2) whether an agency’s act of declining to issue a declaratory ruling enables a litigant to pursue a declaratory-judgment action in circuit court under MCL 24.264, see Huron Valley Sch v Secretary of State, 266 Mich App 638, 646 (2005); Citizens for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 51 (2000).
Thursday, October 9
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice, 6th Floor Courtroom
167421
CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC., (attorney Zachary Kemp
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Oakland CC - O'Brien, P.)
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY and MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, (attorney Erin Sedmak)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
UNNAMED SERVICING INSURER,
Defendant.
After Mylene Brevard, a Michigan resident, was injured in an automobile accident in Toledo, Ohio, plaintiff Central Home Health Care Services, Inc., provided her with nursing and physical therapy services. Brevard assigned her rights to Michigan no-fault benefits to the plaintiff, which sought benefits from defendants Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility and Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, but the defendants neither assigned a processing insurer nor made any payments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed suit, and the defendants sought summary disposition on the ground that MCL 500.3172(1) requires that an accident occur in Michigan for a claimant to be eligible for benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether MCL 500.3172(1) requires a claimant seeking personal protection insurance benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan to show that the accident giving rise to the claim occurred in Michigan. In addressing that question, the parties have been directed to address the impact, if any, of MCL 500.3111 and MCL 500.3114(4).
167120
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney JoEllen Haas)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Ottawa CC - Miedema, K.)
CINECCA DAQUAN MADISON, (attorney Christopher Wirth)
Defendant-Appellant.
The defendant is accused of fatally shooting one acquaintance and wounding another. He is awaiting trial on charges of open murder, assault with intent to murder, and two counts of felony-firearm. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to admit evidence of his diminished capacity to form the specific intent required for the charged offenses. Three mental health experts have examined the defendant and determined that although he suffers from schizophrenia, he was not legally insane at the time of the shooting. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, citing People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 241 (2001), in which the Court held that evidence of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity short of legal insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 241 (2001) was correctly decided and, if not, (2) whether Carpenter should nonetheless be retained under principles of stare decisis, Coldwater v Consumers Energy Co, 500 Mich 158, 172-174 (2017).
166921
In re ESTATE OF JEROME E. SIZICK.
JULIE K. GRIES, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF JEROME E. SIZICK, (attorney Norman Harrison)
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Saginaw PC - McGraw, P.)
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (attorney Marissa Wiesen)
Respondent-Appellee.
In March 2021, Jerome Sizick (who was 82 years old) needed to be hospitalized, and he was eventually transferred to a nursing home. In May 2021, his wife, Janet Sizick, petitioned the probate court for a protective order pursuant to MCL 700.5401(3), asking the probate court to transfer all of Mr. Sizick’s assets and the majority of his income to her. While the petition for a protective order was pending, Mr. Sizick applied for Medicaid, but no decision on his application was made before the hearing on Mrs. Sizick’s petition. The probate court entered an order directing Mr. Sizick to transfer all of his assets to his wife and to pay her $2,318 per month. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed that order and, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s finding that Mr. Sizick was unable to effectively manage his property and business affairs due to mental deficiency and physical illness or disability, thereby satisfying MCL 700.5401(3)(a). But with respect to the probate court’s finding regarding MCL 700.5401(3)(b), the Court of Appeals concluded that it was bound by In re Estate of Schroeder, 335 Mich App 107 (2020), and agreed with the DHHS’s argument that the probate court could not consider that Mr. Sizick’s needs could be met by Medicaid in the absence of a final Medicaid determination. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the DHHS that the probate court erred by failing to identify and value the assets being transferred in the protective order. The DHHS denied Mr. Sizick’s Medicaid application shortly after the appeal was decided. On remand, the probate court again entered an order directing Mr. Sizick to transfer all of his assets to his wife and to pay her $2,318 a month. The probate court entered a separate order directing that the amended protective order be applied retroactively to the date of the prior order. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, again affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. While an application for leave to appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, Mr. Sizick died. Consequently, the personal representative of his estate was substituted as the petitioner-appellant. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether this appeal has been rendered moot as a result of the death of Jerome E. Sizick; (2) if so, whether an exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable here; and (3) if the appeal is not moot or if a mootness exception applies, whether In re Estate of Schroeder, 335 Mich App 107 (2020), wrongly held that a probate court, in evaluating a petition for a protective order of spousal support under MCL 700.5401, cannot consider whether Medicaid benefits will be available to a protected individual in measuring his or her needs prior to a Medicaid eligibility determination.
167499
JOHN GOINGS, SR., (attorney Bradley Peri)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - McCarthy, K.)
BOBBIE JEAN GIACOMANTONIO-SNOW, (attorney Brandon Wykoff)
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2021, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when he was rear-ended by the defendant. The plaintiff maintained a home with his mother and his son in Ohio, had an Ohio driver’s license, and was registered to vote in Ohio, but he worked in Michigan and spent some nights with his girlfriend and daughter in Michigan. The plaintiff’s vehicle was registered in Ohio, and he had an Ohio auto insurance policy. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant seeking noneconomic damages under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by MCL 500.3135(2)(c) because he was an uninsured Michigan resident in violation of MCL 500.3101(1) or because he was a nonresident who violated MCL 500.3102(1) by operating his vehicle in Michigan for more than 30 days in 2021 without maintaining Michigan no-fault insurance on his vehicle. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that, regardless of whether the plaintiff resided in Michigan or in Ohio, he could not recover tort damages in Michigan because he violated MCL 500.3102(1) by driving his vehicle in Michigan for more than 30 days without carrying Michigan no-fault insurance. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that MCL 500.3135(2)(c) only bars the recovery of noneconomic damages for violations of MCL 500.3101(1), not violations of MCL 500.3102(1). The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether a violation of MCL 500.3102(1), which requires a nonresident to maintain Michigan no-fault insurance for a non-Michigan registered motor vehicle operated in Michigan for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year, bars the recovery of noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c).
167595
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney Matthew Way)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Jackson CC - Wilson, T.)
TODD DOUGLAS ROBINSON, (attorney Harold Gurewitz0
Defendant-Appellant.
In 2012, the defendant was indicted by a one-man grand jury. He filed a pretrial motion for a preliminary examination, and alternatively asked the circuit court to quash the indictment. The circuit court denied the motion and the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381, 400 (2022), the Court held that the one-man grand jury statutes, MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, do not authorize a judge sitting as a one-man grand jury to issue an indictment. The Court also held that, when a criminal proceeding is initiated by way of a one-man grand jury, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary examination. Id. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Peeler, the defendant filed a successive motion for relief from judgment, arguing that his indictment was void ab initio and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. He also argued that Peeler should be applied retroactively. The circuit court denied relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, held that the defendant’s indictment by a one-man grand jury and without a preliminary examination was a procedural error that did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also held that Peeler does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the initiation of this case by an indictment filed by a judge acting as a one-man grand jury under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, and without a preliminary examination, contrary to People v Peeler, 509 Mich 381 (2022), deprived the Jackson Circuit Court of subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered the indictment void ab initio; (2) whether Peeler “ ‘clearly establishe[d] a new principle of law;’ ” League of Women Voters v Sec’y of State, 508 Mich 520, 565 (2022), quoting Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 696 (2002); (3) if Peeler clearly established a new principle of law, whether Peeler applies retroactively to cases pending on collateral review; and (4) whether the defendant is entitled to relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(G) and MCR 6.508(D).
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