The Michigan Supreme Court (MSC) will begin its 2026-27 session by hearing oral arguments in nine cases on Wednesday, October 7, and Thursday, October 8, beginning at 9:30 a.m. on both days. Continuing a longtime tradition, the first case will be heard in the Old Supreme Court Chambers at the State Capitol Building located in the east wing of the 3rd floor (current Senate Appropriations Committee Room). That case will be livestreamed via Michigan Senate TV.
The remaining cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing, beginning with a presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, and will be livestreamed from the MSC website. The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, October 7
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
State Capitol Building,
3rd Floor East (Old Supreme Court Chambers)
169404
SHAUNTE JOHNSON, (attorney Carla D. Aikens)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BEST BUY COMPANY, INC., (attorney Deborah L. Brouwer)
Defendant-Appellee.
When applying for a position with Best Buy, the plaintiff was required to complete an electronic application, which provided a link to the company’s arbitration policy. She was required to affirmatively agree to the policy, which required any disputes arising during the course of her employment to be resolved through arbitration. After the plaintiff submitted the electronic application and was hired for a position, she was again required to agree to the company’s arbitration policy before accepting employment. After the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, she filed a lawsuit against Best Buy in Wayne Circuit Court, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., unequal pay on the basis of race and gender, retaliation in violation of ELCRA, and wrongful discharge in violation of Michigan public policy. Best Buy filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate and moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, which held the case in abeyance pending its decision in Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC ___ Mich___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 163989). In Rayford, the Court held that an adhesive boilerplate employment agreement that shortens a limitations period must be examined for reasonableness. The Court further held that such agreements are subject to traditional contract defenses, including unconscionability. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rayford, it vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to that court for reconsideration in light of Rayford. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court’s decision granting Best Buy summary disposition, concluding that the arbitration provision was reasonable. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the adhesion contract analysis in Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 163989), applies to determine the enforceability of the arbitration policy at issue; and (2) if so, whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1 et seq., preempts the application of Rayford to the facts of this case.
Wednesday, October 7
Resume Morning Session – 10:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
Presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society
168977
NORMA DEMOTT, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH PIONK, III, (attotney Christina A. Ginter)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Gillis, J.)
VHS HARPER-HUTZEL HOSPITAL, INC., doing business as HARPER-HUTZEL HOSPITAL, doing business as DMC HUTZEL WOMEN’S HOSPITAL, VHS PHYSICIANS OF MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY PEDIATRICIANS, MAYURA MADANI, M.D., PLLC, DONALD OKOYE, MAYURA S. MADANI, MONIKA BAJAJ, JORGE L. LUA, and GRACE LIN, (attorney Tali F. Wendrow)
Defendants-Appellants.
The plaintiff, as personal representative of the Estate of Kenneth Pionk, III, brought a medical malpractice lawsuit under the wrongful death act (WDA), MCL 600.2922, alleging that the defendants’ negligence caused Pionk’s death a few days after he was born. The defendants sought partial summary disposition as to the plaintiff’s claim for lost-earning-capacity damages and loss-of-services damages, arguing that such damages are too speculative. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the trial court in part, concluding that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for lost-earning-capacity damages. But the Court of Appeals held that loss-of-services damages are available under the WDA, that the plaintiff’s request for loss-of-services damages for the period after the decedent would have turned 18 is not barred as a matter of law, and that the request for such damages can proceed at this stage in the litigation. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the wrongful death act (WDA), MCL 600.2922, permits recovery of damages for the loss of a decedent’s household services and, specifically, for loss of services of a minor child after the age of majority; (2) if the WDA does permit such damages, whether a claim for lost services by an infant decedent is too speculative; and (3) if such a claim is permitted under the WDA as a matter of law and is not inherently too speculative, whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to show a reasonable expectation of services.
169064
In re NDD, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney William M. Worden)
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Walker, S.)
NDD, (attorney Joshua Mark Pease)
Respondent-Appellant.
The respondent had a history of juvenile adjudications. He was discharged from a residential treatment program after it was determined that he was no longer benefiting from the program. In August 2023, the respondent was released from probation without successfully completing the terms of probation. In September 2023, the prosecution petitioned the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division for delinquency proceedings on a charge of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle (a go-cart). The respondent was 17 years old. The prosecution moved the family division to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the proceedings to the criminal court for arraignment of the respondent on criminal charges. After conducting waiver proceedings, the family division waived its jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the circuit court’s general criminal jurisdiction. The respondent appealed as of right, arguing that the family division erred in evaluating the statutory factors in deciding to waive its jurisdiction. The respondent also argued that the waiver violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the waiver decision in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division reversibly erred in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the best interests of the juvenile and the public would best be served by granting the prosecution’s motion to waive the court’s jurisdiction over the respondent, see MCL 712A.4(4); MCR 3.950(D)(2); (2) whether, in deciding whether to waive its jurisdiction over the respondent, the family court was required to compare the relative suitability of programs and facilities available in the juvenile and adult correctional systems, see People v Dunbar, 423 Mich 380, 388 (1985); and (3) whether the discretionary waiver statute, MCL 712A.4, violates Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490 (2000), because it authorizes an increase in the respondent’s maximum punishment without a jury determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the factors considered in the waiver decision.
Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
168651
In re PAWLOSKI, Minors.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kent Family Division - Rossi, J.)
The Department of Health and Human Services removed two children from the respondent’s care and subsequently filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of her parental rights. At the termination trial, the respondent signed a release of her parental rights and the trial court entered an order terminating her rights. The respondent appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in terminating her rights because her release was not knowing and voluntary. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondent’s release of her parental rights was knowing and voluntary. Cf. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29-31 (2019); MCR 3.971; MCL 710.29.
169198
CRYSTAL LEDUKE, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BRANDON DAVID CHAMBERS, (attorney Ronald L. Marienfeld II)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CITY OF SOUTH HAVEN, (attorney Michael T. Berger)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
KATE HOSIER and WILLIAM BRENNER,
Defendants.
Brandon Chambers drowned while swimming at South Beach in the City of South Haven. His estate (plaintiff) sued the City under theories of premises liability and negligence. The plaintiff argues, under the proprietary function exception of MCL 169.1413, that the City is not entitled to governmental immunity because it operates its beaches for the purpose of generating a profit. The City moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that it is entitled to governmental immunity because its operation of South Beach is a government function. The City argued that the proprietary function exception does not apply because its operation of its beaches is self-sustaining and its primary purpose for operating the beaches is not to create a profit. The trial court denied the motion, finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the City operates its beaches for profit. The Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that there is no question of fact regarding the application of the proprietary function exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1413, and that the defendant City of South Haven is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Thursday, October 8, 2026
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
169021
TORIANO HUDSON, (attorney Jonathan Marko)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Walker, S.)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (attorney Kendell S. Asbenson)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff sued defendant Department of Corrections in Wayne Circuit Court under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., alleging that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. He did not file notice with the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6431(1) before filing his complaint directly in circuit court. He filed the lawsuit before the decision in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), in which the Supreme Court held that MCL 600.6431 applies to all claims against the state, including claims filed in circuit court, except as otherwise exempted in MCL 600.6431. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Christie, the defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that the decision in Christie should be given retroactive effect and that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed due to his failure to comply with MCL 600.6431(1). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff filed an appeal by right in the Court of Appeals, as well as a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the bypass application, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a published opinion, concluding that it was bound to do so by the decision in Landin v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367356). However, the panel disagreed with the analysis in Landin and called for the convening of a special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider the conflict between the decision in Landin and the decision in Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367863). The special panel, in a published opinion with one dissent, held that Flamont correctly determined that Christie applies retroactively. Consequently, the special panel affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court’s decision in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), applies retroactively to claims against the State of Michigan that were filed in circuit court without a timely notice being filed in the Court of Claims under MCL 600.6431.
166699
LINDA MOLITORIS, (attorney Ken Oliver)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - Geddis,S.)
SAINT MARY MAGDALEN CATHOLIC CHURCH, (attorney Daniel Zick)
Defendant-Appellee.
After volunteering for an event hosted by defendant St. Mary Magdalen Catholic Church, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on black ice and fell as she stepped off the sidewalk and into the parking lot. She filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability. After the defendant moved for summary disposition, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss her ordinary negligence claim and proceed only on a premises liability theory. In ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court characterized the plaintiff as a licensee, rather than an invitee. “A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements she must satisfy to prevail on a claim for premises liability as a licensee. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiff was a licensee. In a separate opinion, Judge Gleicher urged the Supreme Court to discard Michigan’s status-based duty classifications in premises liability actions and instead adopt an across-the-board reasonableness standard of care in line with the Third Restatement of Torts. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); and (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Radke v Truesdell (Docket No. 167162).
168943
JOSEPH KUILEMA,
(attorney Charissa Huang)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kent CC - Mims, C.)
CALVIN UNIVERSITY, (attorney Stephen J. Vanstempvoort)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff worked as a social work professor for the defendant for almost 15 years. In 2021, the defendant decided not to reappoint the plaintiff, effectively terminating his position. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging retaliation and sex-based associational discrimination in violation of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. He alleged that his firing was due in part to the fact that he had recently officiated a wedding for a same-sex couple. The defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and, in a 2-1 unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the retaliation claim but reversed its ruling on the associational discrimination claim and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in the defendant’s favor on that claim. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., provides a cause of action for sex-based associational discrimination, cf. Miller v Dep’t of Corrections, 513 Mich 125, 137 (2024); and, if so, (2) whether the plaintiff adequately pled such a claim. MCR 2.116(C)(8); Bryant v Automatic Data Processing, Inc, 151 Mich App 424 (1986); Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670 (1999).
168634-9
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, and DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendants.
—————
168636, 168637
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, GARY TROLZ, GYLNN TROLZ AND ASSOCIATES, INC., MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, WEST BAY EXPLORATION COMPANY, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, TIMMUS ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS ENERGY, INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC, TONI S. TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK, SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC., CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L. GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH, III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH, III, TRUST, MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL TRUST, LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E. TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Co-Trustees of the JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE, CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, and DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendants.
—————
168638
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSIONER, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, and AT&T, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants,
and
DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
—————
168639
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, GARY TROLZ, GLYNN TROLZ AND ASSOCIATES, INC., MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, WEST BAY EXPLORATION COMPANY, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, TIMMUS ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS ENERGY, INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC, TONI S. TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK, SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC., CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L. GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH, III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH, III, TRUST, MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL, TRUST, LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E. TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Co-Trustees of the JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE, CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, and CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants,
and
DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
In 2020, plaintiff Michigan Gas Utilities Corporation (MGUC) applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) with the Michigan Public Service Commission to construct a pipeline to replace an existing pipeline in Calhoun County. The Commission approved the CPCN. MGUC unsuccessfully attempted to purchase the land rights to easements on two parcels of land owned by the Earl R. Midlam and Hazel M. Midlam Trust (Midlam Trust) through a unitary good faith offer extended to the Midlam Trust and other persons and entities that may have had interests in those two parcels. MGUC did not make such an offer to Double Eagle Farms II, Co. (Double Eagle), which leased farmland from the Midlam Trust, because MGUC was not aware of Double Eagle’s existence. MGUC filed suit to condemn easements in the private land. The Midlam Trust filed a motion to review necessity and to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which the circuit court denied. The Midlam Trust then filed a motion for summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion and ordered MGUC to add Double Eagle as a party to the complaint. The Midlam Trust made multiple requests for an additional necessity hearing, which the circuit court denied. Double Eagle filed a motion to dismiss, but the circuit court denied the motion. The Midlam Trust and Double Eagle filed applications for leave to appeal various orders entered by the circuit court. The Court of Appeals granted the applications and consolidated the appeals. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over MGUC’s condemnation complaint. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the Midlam Trust and Double Eagle. MGUC sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the case was moot given the completion of the project. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, determined that the case was not moot and reaffirmed its earlier decision that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the issues raised in the defendants-appellees’ applications for leave to appeal filed in the Court of Appeals were rendered moot given the failure to timely appeal the circuit court’s initial necessity determination or given the project’s completion before the parties applied for leave to appeal; (2) whether, given the condemnation procedures set forth in the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq., the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction to consider on appeal duplicate rulings by the circuit court after the time to appeal the circuit court’s initial determination upholding the necessity of the public project had expired; (3) whether the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff-appellant failed to submit a good faith offer to an owner it did not know existed given the procedure for submitting good faith offers set forth in MCL 213.55 of the UCPA; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the plaintiff-appellant was required to use the prefiling discovery mechanisms set forth in MCL 213.55(2) of the UCPA to identify owners for the purpose of submitting a good faith offer under MCL 213.55(1) of the UCPA.
The remaining cases will be heard in the 6th floor courtroom at the Michigan Hall of Justice at 925 W. Ottawa St. in Lansing, beginning with a presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, and will be livestreamed from the MSC website. The notice of cases is posted on the Supreme Court’s oral arguments web page.
The following brief accounts may not reflect the way that some or all of the court’s seven justices view the case. The attorneys may also disagree about the facts, issues, procedural history, and significance of this case. For further details, contact the attorneys.
Wednesday, October 7
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
State Capitol Building,
3rd Floor East (Old Supreme Court Chambers)
169404
SHAUNTE JOHNSON, (attorney Carla D. Aikens)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BEST BUY COMPANY, INC., (attorney Deborah L. Brouwer)
Defendant-Appellee.
When applying for a position with Best Buy, the plaintiff was required to complete an electronic application, which provided a link to the company’s arbitration policy. She was required to affirmatively agree to the policy, which required any disputes arising during the course of her employment to be resolved through arbitration. After the plaintiff submitted the electronic application and was hired for a position, she was again required to agree to the company’s arbitration policy before accepting employment. After the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, she filed a lawsuit against Best Buy in Wayne Circuit Court, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq., unequal pay on the basis of race and gender, retaliation in violation of ELCRA, and wrongful discharge in violation of Michigan public policy. Best Buy filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the plaintiff’s agreement to arbitrate and moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, which held the case in abeyance pending its decision in Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC ___ Mich___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 163989). In Rayford, the Court held that an adhesive boilerplate employment agreement that shortens a limitations period must be examined for reasonableness. The Court further held that such agreements are subject to traditional contract defenses, including unconscionability. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rayford, it vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to that court for reconsideration in light of Rayford. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed the trial court’s decision granting Best Buy summary disposition, concluding that the arbitration provision was reasonable. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the adhesion contract analysis in Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC, ___ Mich ___ (July 31, 2025) (Docket No. 163989), applies to determine the enforceability of the arbitration policy at issue; and (2) if so, whether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC 1 et seq., preempts the application of Rayford to the facts of this case.
Wednesday, October 7
Resume Morning Session – 10:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
Presentation of the Annual Report of the Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society
168977
NORMA DEMOTT, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF KENNETH PIONK, III, (attotney Christina A. Ginter)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Gillis, J.)
VHS HARPER-HUTZEL HOSPITAL, INC., doing business as HARPER-HUTZEL HOSPITAL, doing business as DMC HUTZEL WOMEN’S HOSPITAL, VHS PHYSICIANS OF MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY PEDIATRICIANS, MAYURA MADANI, M.D., PLLC, DONALD OKOYE, MAYURA S. MADANI, MONIKA BAJAJ, JORGE L. LUA, and GRACE LIN, (attorney Tali F. Wendrow)
Defendants-Appellants.
The plaintiff, as personal representative of the Estate of Kenneth Pionk, III, brought a medical malpractice lawsuit under the wrongful death act (WDA), MCL 600.2922, alleging that the defendants’ negligence caused Pionk’s death a few days after he was born. The defendants sought partial summary disposition as to the plaintiff’s claim for lost-earning-capacity damages and loss-of-services damages, arguing that such damages are too speculative. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the trial court in part, concluding that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for lost-earning-capacity damages. But the Court of Appeals held that loss-of-services damages are available under the WDA, that the plaintiff’s request for loss-of-services damages for the period after the decedent would have turned 18 is not barred as a matter of law, and that the request for such damages can proceed at this stage in the litigation. The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address: (1) whether the wrongful death act (WDA), MCL 600.2922, permits recovery of damages for the loss of a decedent’s household services and, specifically, for loss of services of a minor child after the age of majority; (2) if the WDA does permit such damages, whether a claim for lost services by an infant decedent is too speculative; and (3) if such a claim is permitted under the WDA as a matter of law and is not inherently too speculative, whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to show a reasonable expectation of services.
169064
In re NDD, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, (attorney William M. Worden)
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Walker, S.)
NDD, (attorney Joshua Mark Pease)
Respondent-Appellant.
The respondent had a history of juvenile adjudications. He was discharged from a residential treatment program after it was determined that he was no longer benefiting from the program. In August 2023, the respondent was released from probation without successfully completing the terms of probation. In September 2023, the prosecution petitioned the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division for delinquency proceedings on a charge of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle (a go-cart). The respondent was 17 years old. The prosecution moved the family division to waive its jurisdiction and transfer the proceedings to the criminal court for arraignment of the respondent on criminal charges. After conducting waiver proceedings, the family division waived its jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the circuit court’s general criminal jurisdiction. The respondent appealed as of right, arguing that the family division erred in evaluating the statutory factors in deciding to waive its jurisdiction. The respondent also argued that the waiver violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the waiver decision in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Livingston Circuit Court Family Division reversibly erred in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the best interests of the juvenile and the public would best be served by granting the prosecution’s motion to waive the court’s jurisdiction over the respondent, see MCL 712A.4(4); MCR 3.950(D)(2); (2) whether, in deciding whether to waive its jurisdiction over the respondent, the family court was required to compare the relative suitability of programs and facilities available in the juvenile and adult correctional systems, see People v Dunbar, 423 Mich 380, 388 (1985); and (3) whether the discretionary waiver statute, MCL 712A.4, violates Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490 (2000), because it authorizes an increase in the respondent’s maximum punishment without a jury determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the factors considered in the waiver decision.
Wednesday, October 7, 2026
Afternoon Session – 12:30 p.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
168651
In re PAWLOSKI, Minors.
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kent Family Division - Rossi, J.)
The Department of Health and Human Services removed two children from the respondent’s care and subsequently filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of her parental rights. At the termination trial, the respondent signed a release of her parental rights and the trial court entered an order terminating her rights. The respondent appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in terminating her rights because her release was not knowing and voluntary. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the respondent’s release of her parental rights was knowing and voluntary. Cf. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 29-31 (2019); MCR 3.971; MCL 710.29.
169198
CRYSTAL LEDUKE, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF BRANDON DAVID CHAMBERS, (attorney Ronald L. Marienfeld II)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CITY OF SOUTH HAVEN, (attorney Michael T. Berger)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
KATE HOSIER and WILLIAM BRENNER,
Defendants.
Brandon Chambers drowned while swimming at South Beach in the City of South Haven. His estate (plaintiff) sued the City under theories of premises liability and negligence. The plaintiff argues, under the proprietary function exception of MCL 169.1413, that the City is not entitled to governmental immunity because it operates its beaches for the purpose of generating a profit. The City moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that it is entitled to governmental immunity because its operation of South Beach is a government function. The City argued that the proprietary function exception does not apply because its operation of its beaches is self-sustaining and its primary purpose for operating the beaches is not to create a profit. The trial court denied the motion, finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the City operates its beaches for profit. The Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that there is no question of fact regarding the application of the proprietary function exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1413, and that the defendant City of South Haven is entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Thursday, October 8, 2026
Morning Session – 9:30 a.m.
Hall of Justice,
6th Floor Courtroom
169021
TORIANO HUDSON, (attorney Jonathan Marko)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Wayne CC - Walker, S.)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (attorney Kendell S. Asbenson)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff sued defendant Department of Corrections in Wayne Circuit Court under the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., alleging that the defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on his race. He did not file notice with the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6431(1) before filing his complaint directly in circuit court. He filed the lawsuit before the decision in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), in which the Supreme Court held that MCL 600.6431 applies to all claims against the state, including claims filed in circuit court, except as otherwise exempted in MCL 600.6431. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Christie, the defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that the decision in Christie should be given retroactive effect and that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed due to his failure to comply with MCL 600.6431(1). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff filed an appeal by right in the Court of Appeals, as well as a bypass application in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the bypass application, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a published opinion, concluding that it was bound to do so by the decision in Landin v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367356). However, the panel disagreed with the analysis in Landin and called for the convening of a special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider the conflict between the decision in Landin and the decision in Flamont v Dep’t of Corrections, ___ Mich App ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367863). The special panel, in a published opinion with one dissent, held that Flamont correctly determined that Christie applies retroactively. Consequently, the special panel affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal to address whether the Court’s decision in Christie v Wayne State Univ, 511 Mich 39 (2023), applies retroactively to claims against the State of Michigan that were filed in circuit court without a timely notice being filed in the Court of Claims under MCL 600.6431.
166699
LINDA MOLITORIS, (attorney Ken Oliver)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Livingston CC - Geddis,S.)
SAINT MARY MAGDALEN CATHOLIC CHURCH, (attorney Daniel Zick)
Defendant-Appellee.
After volunteering for an event hosted by defendant St. Mary Magdalen Catholic Church, the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on black ice and fell as she stepped off the sidewalk and into the parking lot. She filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging ordinary negligence and premises liability. After the defendant moved for summary disposition, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss her ordinary negligence claim and proceed only on a premises liability theory. In ruling on the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court characterized the plaintiff as a licensee, rather than an invitee. “A landowner owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved.” Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596 (2000). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that the plaintiff cannot meet the requirements she must satisfy to prevail on a claim for premises liability as a licensee. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiff was a licensee. In a separate opinion, Judge Gleicher urged the Supreme Court to discard Michigan’s status-based duty classifications in premises liability actions and instead adopt an across-the-board reasonableness standard of care in line with the Third Restatement of Torts. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Court should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts’ reasonable-care standard in lieu of traditional status-based categories to determine a premises possessor’s duty to persons who suffer physical harm caused by a condition on the land, Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591 (2000); see also Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 143-144 (2023); and (2) whether adopting the Third Restatement’s reasonable-care standard, and thus overruling Stitt, 462 Mich at 591, comports with the doctrine of stare decisis, see Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439 (2000). The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same future session of the Court when it will hear oral argument in Radke v Truesdell (Docket No. 167162).
168943
JOSEPH KUILEMA,
(attorney Charissa Huang)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
(Appeal from Ct of Appeals)
(Kent CC - Mims, C.)
CALVIN UNIVERSITY, (attorney Stephen J. Vanstempvoort)
Defendant-Appellee.
The plaintiff worked as a social work professor for the defendant for almost 15 years. In 2021, the defendant decided not to reappoint the plaintiff, effectively terminating his position. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging retaliation and sex-based associational discrimination in violation of the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. He alleged that his firing was due in part to the fact that he had recently officiated a wedding for a same-sex couple. The defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and, in a 2-1 unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the retaliation claim but reversed its ruling on the associational discrimination claim and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in the defendant’s favor on that claim. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., provides a cause of action for sex-based associational discrimination, cf. Miller v Dep’t of Corrections, 513 Mich 125, 137 (2024); and, if so, (2) whether the plaintiff adequately pled such a claim. MCR 2.116(C)(8); Bryant v Automatic Data Processing, Inc, 151 Mich App 424 (1986); Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670 (1999).
168634-9
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, and DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendants.
—————
168636, 168637
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, GARY TROLZ, GYLNN TROLZ AND ASSOCIATES, INC., MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, WEST BAY EXPLORATION COMPANY, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, TIMMUS ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS ENERGY, INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC, TONI S. TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK, SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC., CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L. GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH, III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH, III, TRUST, MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL TRUST, LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E. TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Co-Trustees of the JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE, CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, and DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendants.
—————
168638
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, EXXON COAL RESOURCES, GARY TROLZ, MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, CALHOUN COUNTY ROAD COMMISSIONER, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, and AT&T, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants,
and
DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
—————
168639
MICHIGAN GAS UTILITIES CORPORATION, (attorney Matthew Kennison)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
E. RICHARD MIDLAM, JR. and LISA R. MIDLAM, Co-Trustees of the EARL R. MIDLAM AND HAZEL M. MIDLAM TRUST, MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, GARY TROLZ, GLYNN TROLZ AND ASSOCIATES, INC., MATRIX EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, LUCAS EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT, WEST BAY EXPLORATION COMPANY, STRICKLER RESOURCES LP, TIMMUS ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., POLARIS ENERGY, INC., NOVERR ENTERPRISES, LLC, TONI S. TONDA, JES ENTERPRISES, LLC, JES INVESTMENTS, LLC, JEFFREY S. SOBECK, SNH HOLDINGS, PETER NOVERR, CASEY COWELL, INNOVA EXPLORATION, INC., CHERRY RIVER INVESTMENTS, LLC, JORDAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC, ROCK OIL COMPANY, LLC, TREDWELL ENERGY CORPORATION, TIMOTHY L. BAKER, JIM BOWSER, GARY GOTTSCHALK, HARRY L. GRAHAM, MATT JOHNSTON, MURRAY MATSON, ERIC MAYFIELD, SHEILA MAYFIELD, MORRIS A. MICELI, DAVID RATAJ, KEITH SCHAUB, BENNETT L. SMITH, III, BENNETT LAWSON SMITH, III, TRUST, MARY VANCE TUCKER STILLWELL, TRUST, LUCY LEA TUCKER TRUST, ROBERT E. TUCKER, JR., MATTHEW A. JOHNSTON and KELLY L. JOHNSTON, Co-Trustees of the JOHNSTON TRUST, CALHOUN COUNTY WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, PETER S. LUCYSHYN, Trustee of the MYMACHOD TRUST, AT&T, L. NICHOLAS & NANCY RUWE CHARITABLE TRUST, JOHN SCHMITZ, Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF N. RUWE, CALHOUN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY, CONSUMERS ENERGY, and CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY, (attorney Joseph Sherman)
Defendants,
and
DOUBLE EAGLE FARMS II, CO.,
Defendant-Appellee.
In 2020, plaintiff Michigan Gas Utilities Corporation (MGUC) applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) with the Michigan Public Service Commission to construct a pipeline to replace an existing pipeline in Calhoun County. The Commission approved the CPCN. MGUC unsuccessfully attempted to purchase the land rights to easements on two parcels of land owned by the Earl R. Midlam and Hazel M. Midlam Trust (Midlam Trust) through a unitary good faith offer extended to the Midlam Trust and other persons and entities that may have had interests in those two parcels. MGUC did not make such an offer to Double Eagle Farms II, Co. (Double Eagle), which leased farmland from the Midlam Trust, because MGUC was not aware of Double Eagle’s existence. MGUC filed suit to condemn easements in the private land. The Midlam Trust filed a motion to review necessity and to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which the circuit court denied. The Midlam Trust then filed a motion for summary disposition. The circuit court denied the motion and ordered MGUC to add Double Eagle as a party to the complaint. The Midlam Trust made multiple requests for an additional necessity hearing, which the circuit court denied. Double Eagle filed a motion to dismiss, but the circuit court denied the motion. The Midlam Trust and Double Eagle filed applications for leave to appeal various orders entered by the circuit court. The Court of Appeals granted the applications and consolidated the appeals. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over MGUC’s condemnation complaint. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of the Midlam Trust and Double Eagle. MGUC sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the case was moot given the completion of the project. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, determined that the case was not moot and reaffirmed its earlier decision that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has ordered oral argument on the application to address: (1) whether the issues raised in the defendants-appellees’ applications for leave to appeal filed in the Court of Appeals were rendered moot given the failure to timely appeal the circuit court’s initial necessity determination or given the project’s completion before the parties applied for leave to appeal; (2) whether, given the condemnation procedures set forth in the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.51 et seq., the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction to consider on appeal duplicate rulings by the circuit court after the time to appeal the circuit court’s initial determination upholding the necessity of the public project had expired; (3) whether the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff-appellant failed to submit a good faith offer to an owner it did not know existed given the procedure for submitting good faith offers set forth in MCL 213.55 of the UCPA; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the plaintiff-appellant was required to use the prefiling discovery mechanisms set forth in MCL 213.55(2) of the UCPA to identify owners for the purpose of submitting a good faith offer under MCL 213.55(1) of the UCPA.
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